12 Conn. App. 662 | Conn. App. Ct. | 1987
The defendant was convicted, after a trial to a jury, of burglary in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-101 (a) (1), robbery in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §53a-134 (a) (4), and carrying a pistol without a permit in violation of General Statutes § 29-35. The defendant claims that the trial court erred (1) in denying his motion to suppress, (2) in overruling his objection to the admission into evidence of the guilty plea of an alleged accomplice, (3) in denying his motion for a new trial,
The jury could reasonably have found the following facts. On January 29,1986, the defendant drove from Brooklyn, New York, to New Haven with Eric Clarke, Tony Foster and a third man known as Country to commit a robbery. At about 1 a.m., they went to an apartment on Howard Avenue where they expected to find money and drugs. The defendant and Country were armed with automatic weapons. Foster remained in the car while the defendant, Clarke and Country entered the back entrance of the apartment building and went to the third floor. When they reached the third floor, they saw a man enter the apartment to buy something. As the man left, Country held his gun to the man’s head and told him to go back to the apartment door and
Officer Carlos Stewart arrived at the building in response to a report of the burglary. He saw two or three people come down the rear stairway into the back yard and start running down the street. He drove after them and was joined by Officer Paul Healey. In a schoolyard, the defendant flattened himself on the ground, while Country and Clarke continued to run down an adjoining street named Portsea Street. When Stewart approached, the defendant jumped up and started to run. The canine unit arrived on the scene and began to chase the defendant, while Stewart continued after the other two. Officer John Tompkins of the canine unit saw the defendant point what appeared to be a gun at the dog, but no shots were fired. After the dog eventually stopped him, the defendant was ordered by Tompkins, to drop the gun. Instead, the defendant threw it into a fenced-in area. The defendant was handcuffed and taken by Healey in his police car to a police wagon, in which the defendant was taken to the police station. Tompkins later recovered the gun which was found loaded and cocked. Clarke was apprehended by another policeman. Stewart saw the other two men running down Portsea Street carrying a bag. He saw them climb a fence to the rear of the schoolyard, and he lost sight of them. Country was not caught, but the bag he took from the apartment was recovered. A resident of Portsea Street later found a gun there and turned it over to the police. Healey left
I
The defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence of statements which he made to the police. The court held a hearing prior to trial, after which it denied the motion to suppress. The defendant claims that the ruling was erroneous because (1) the state failed to prove that he understood his Miranda rights, and (2) the state failed to prove that his course of conduct waived those rights.
Before any statement made by a suspect while he is in custody may be used against him in a criminal prosecution, it must be shown that he was informed that he had certain rights which are secured by the United States constitution. These rights are set out in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966), and are too well known to require repeating here. The suspect may, however, knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer questions or make a statement. Miranda v. Arizona, supra.
At about 4 a.m. on January 29, 1986, while the defendant was in custody, he was questioned by Detective Leonard Pastore of the New Haven police department. Pastore was the only witness who testified at the suppression hearing. Pastore said that he identified himself and that he then read the Miranda rights to the defendant from a standard waiver form used by the police department. Pastore asked the defendant if he understood, and the defendant indicated that he did understand and that he was willing to talk to Pastore. He did not ask for an attorney. The defendant was
The defendant does not claim that he did not understand his rights, but that the state did not prove that he understood his rights. This may well be because no evidence was offered to the trial court that the defendant did not understand his rights. The only evidence on the subject was the testimony from Pastore that the defendant indicated that he understood, and that there was no question in Pastore’s mind that the defendant understood. The state argues that this claim should not be reviewed because it was not raised before the trial court. State v. Vasquez, 9 Conn. App. 648, 653, 520 A.2d 1294 (1987). It is undoubtedly true, as asserted by the defendant, that to waive his rights knowingly and voluntarily the defendant must have understood them. State v. Wilson, 183 Conn. 280, 285, 439 A.2d 330 (1981). Whether he did so is a question of fact, but requires a scrupulous examination of the record in order
II
During the trial of this case to the jury, the state called Eric Clarke as one of its witnesses. Clarke testified concerning the events of January 29,1986, and the defendant’s participation in those events. This was the only testimony concerning what had occurred at the Howard Street apartment. In the course of his direct testimony, Clarke said that he had pleaded guilty but that he did not know what his sentence was to be. On cross-examination, Clarke testified that he knew that he would be expected to testify and that his testi
“Cross-examination is the principal means by which the believability of a witness and the truth of his testimony are tested.” Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316, 94 S. Ct. 1105, 39 L. Ed. 2d 347 (1974). The defendant attacks the credibility of Clarke and suggests that the change to a charge containing no mandatory minimum sentence suggests the possibility of an unstated agreement. He does not claim that he did not have the opportunity fully to cross-examine Clarke. He made no effort to call either the assistant state’s attorney or Clarke’s attorney, and he did not suggest to the trial court or
III
The defendant also claims error in admitting into evidence the two guns and the wallet. He contends that none of these items was sufficiently linked to the defendant and, thus, their relevance was not established. We disagree.
The trial court is vested with broad discretion in rulings on relevancy; State v. Rogers, 10 Conn. App. 258, 260, 522 A.2d 839, cert. denied, 203 Conn. 809, 525 A.2d 522 (1987); and every reasonable presumption must be given in favor of the court’s rulings. State v. Brown, 9 Conn. App. 313, 317, 518 A.2d 670 (1986). These items constituted proof of elements of the crimes charged, and they corroborated testimony of Clarke. Whether they were sufficiently linked to the defendant goes to the weight to be accorded them as evidence and was for the jury to determine. There was no error as to this claim.
IV
The defendant finally claims that the court erred in denying his motion for acquittal because the state failed
There is no error.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
This claim was raised in the defendant’s preliminary statement of issues. Since this issue was neither briefed nor argued, however, it is deemed abandoned. State v. Mack, 197 Conn. 629, 632, 500 A.2d 1303 (1985).