STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. WILBERT HENDRICKS
No. COA20-718
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
Filed 4 May 2021
2021-NCCOA-184
HAMPSON, Judge.
Watauga County, No. 13 CRS 51810
Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Assistant Attorney General Zachary K. Dunn, for the State.
Mary McCullers Reece for defendant-appellant.
HAMPSON, Judge.
Factual and Procedural Background
¶ 1 Wilbert Hendricks (Defendant) appeals from the trial court‘s Judgment and Commitment upon Revocation of Probation entered 10 March 2020 activating Defendant‘s 29- to 47-month suspended sentence. The Record reflects the following:
¶ 2 On 2 December 2013, a Watauga County Grand Jury indicted Defendant on one count of Aggravated Felony Serious Injury by Vehicle. As evidenced by Defendant‘s Transcript of Plea, Defendant pled guilty to one count each of:
¶ 3 Defendant began his active sentence in 13 CRS 51810 on 7 October 2014 and then served a brief 26-day sentence for Misdemeanor Injury to Real Property. Defendant began his supervised probation on 28 September 2015. Defendant‘s probation officer filed probation violation reports on 23 January 2020, 5 February 2020, and 25 February 2020. Defendant‘s probation revocation hearing came on for trial on 10 March 2020. After receiving evidence and testimony, the trial court found Defendant willfully violated the terms of his probation—the trial court revoked Defendant‘s probation and activated his suspended sentence. Defendant gave oral Notice of Appeal in open court. That same day, the trial court entered Judgment and Commitment upon Revocation of Probation revoking Defendant‘s probation and activating his suspended 29- to 47-month suspended sentence.
Issue
¶ 4 The issue on appeal is whether the Superior Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to revoke Defendant‘s probation because Defendant‘s probation officer filed violation reports after the probationary period expired.
Analysis
¶ 5 Defendant argues the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to revoke his probation because the probation period, as imposed, had already expired. The State agrees and so do we.
¶ 6 “A trial court must have subject matter jurisdiction over a case in order to act in that case.” State v. Reinhardt, 183 N.C. App. 291, 292, 644 S.E.2d 26, 27 (2007) (citation omitted). “Except as provided in
¶ 7
The court may extend, modify, or revoke probation after the expiration of the period of probation if all of the following apply:
(1) Before the expiration of the period of probation the State has filed a written violation report with the clerk indicating its intent to conduct a hearing on one or more violations of one or more conditions of probation.
(2) The court finds that the probationer did violate one or more conditions of probation prior to the expiration of the period of probation.
(3) The court finds for good cause shown and stated that the probation should be extended, modified, or revoked.
(4) If the court opts to extend the period of probation, the court may extend the period of probation up to the maximum allowed under G.S. 15A-1342(a).
¶ 8 As to special probation,
The original period of probation, including the period of imprisonment required for special probation, shall be as specified in G.S. 15A-1343.2(d), but may not exceed a maximum of five years, except as provided by G.S. 15A-1342(a). The court may revoke, modify, or terminate special probation as otherwise provided for probationary sentences.
beyond the original [probationary] period (i) for the purpose of allowing the defendant to complete a program of restitution, or (ii) to allow the defendant to continue medical or psychiatric treatment ordered as a condition of the probation. The period of extension shall not exceed three years beyond the original period
of probation. The special extension authorized herein may be ordered only in the last six months of the original period of probation. Any probationary judgment form provided to a defendant on supervised probation shall state that probation may be extended pursuant to this subsection.
¶ 9 Here, the trial court originally sentenced Defendant to an intermediate punishment of special probation for 60 months, including an active sentence of 330 days. Therefore, under
Conclusion
VACATED.
Judges DIETZ and ZACHARY concur.
