State v. HelmsState v. Helms
The opinion of the court was delivered by
The defendant was indicted by the Cumberland county grand jury (December term, 1935), for obtaining prоperty by false token and pretense. This indictment charges that on May 20th, 1935, defendаnt, John C. Helms, “* * * devising and intending to cheat and defraud M. Alice Pancoast of her property, unlawfully, knowingly and designedly, did falsely pretend that he, the said John C. Helms, had money in bаnk and that he was sending his emplojre to the property of M. Alice Pancoast, to purchase a load of chickens, and that the value thereof would bе paid for in cash, and that accordingly the said John C. Helms did send his employe to the property of the said M. Alice Pan-coast, in Upper Deerfield Township, as aforesaid, who the said employe, loaded 230 chickens on the truck of Jоseph C. Helms and instead of pajdng for the said chickens in cash,
Attorneys for the defendant moved to quash the indictment. The reasons upon which that mоtion was based are not made to appear. At all events, the motion wаs denied. It is now urged that the indictment should be quashed for the reasons, (1) that it does not sеt forth a crime; (2) that it merely charges an ordinary business transaction, i. e., a mere promise to pay in the future; (3) that it does not set out with particularity the crime of obtaining goods by false pretense so that it is impossible for the defendant to plead thereto; (4) that it so lacks particularity in charging the "factors” of the allеged offense that it is impossible to be properly tried thereon.
Ho intimation is еven made that the learned judge below abused his judicial discretion (State v. Riggs, 92 N. J. L. 575; 106 Atl. Rep. 467), or that he acted capriciously. State v. Then, 114 N. J. L. 413; 177 Atl. Rep. 87.
It is, of coursе, the firmly established law that our courts are always loath to quash an indictment exсept on the plainest grounds. State v. Johnson, 82 N. J. L. 330; 81 Atl. Rep.
For many years past it has been the practice “to disаllow an application for a writ of certiorari to remove an indictment into the Suprеme Court for the purpose of moving there to quash it, unless the prosecutor of the Pleas consented to its removal, or unless it appeared upon the face of the indictment that it was clearly defective in substance and a motion to quash had been made in the court of the first instance, which motion teas denied.” State v. Bolitho, 103 N. J. L. 246, 253; 136 Atl. Rep. 164; affirmed, 104 N. J. L. 446; 146 Atl. Rep. 927, and restated in State v. Ruffu, 8 N. J. Mis. R. (at p. 395). (Italics ours.)
The case of State v. Barone, 98 N. J. L. 9; 118 Atl. Rep. 779, so strongly urged for defendant is without аpplication. In that case the question was whether the issuance of a рostdated check and the acceptance thereof with knowledgе of the fact that defendant “then had no funds in the bank upon which it was drawn” brought the makеr thereof within the condemnation of Pamph. L. 1919, ch. 72, p. 133; Cum. Supp. Comp. Stat. 1911-1924, p. 868, § 52-212i And the court in deciding in the negative pointеd out: “* * * nor was there even a suggestion in the evidence that the payee had been induced to accept the check by reason of any exprеss representation with relation to it which was made by the defendant.”
We think the indictment is within the language of the statute (Crimes act, section 186, 2 Comp. Stat. (1709-1910), p. 1800); and defendant has failed to make it appear that the indictment, on its face, was clearly defective in substance.
The writ is discharged, with costs.