State v. HelmsState v. Helms
* * * * *
Julia R. Bates, Lucas County Prosecuting Attorney, and Evy M. Jarrett, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Rebecca L. West-Estell, for appellant.
* * * * *
HANDWORK, J.
{¶ 1} Appellant, Perry Helms, appeals from his sentence entered by the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas in the above-captioned case. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.
{¶ 2} Appellant was indicted in charges of aggravated burglary and kidnapping on May 10, 1999. On June 21, 1999, appellant withdrew his pleas of not guilty and
{¶ 3} Before accepting the pleas, the trial court informed appellant that, upon his release from prison, he would be subject to certain postrelease control obligations. Included in the trial court‘s statement to appellant was notification that appellant would be subject to a mandatory term of five years of postrelease control. Thereafter, appellant executed a written plea agreement that expanded upon those postrelease control obligations—informing appellant not just about the mandatory term of five years, but also the applicable discretionary term of three years—and, further, indicated appellant‘s acknowledgment thereof.
{¶ 4} At sentencing on July 15, 1999, appellant was provided with a written notice of his postrelease control obligations stating that, following his release from prison, a term of postrelease control would be imposed, and that violation of those terms could result in appellant‘s serving additional time in prison. Appellant and his counsel acknowledged receipt and execution of the document, and appellant acknowledged reading the document and understanding it.
{¶ 5} The trial court then sentenced appellant to a term of nine years in prison on the aggravated burglary charge, to be served consecutively with a term of seventeen months on the attempted abduction charge. The relevant portion of the judgment entry stated that “[d]efendant has been given notice under
{¶ 6} On October 21, 2008, the trial court entered a nunc pro tunc judgment entry stating that appellant was “given notice of appellate rights under
{¶ 7} Appellant completed his sentence in the above-captioned case on September 10, 2009. On February 23, 2010—while appellant was still in prison serving a sentence in an unrelated case—the trial court held yet another hearing in the current case to advise appellant of his postrelease control obligations. This time, the purpose of the hearing was to bring appellant‘s sentence into compliance with the requirements set forth in State v. Bloomer, 122 Ohio St.3d 200, 2009-Ohio-2462. The related judgment entry stated in relevant part: “Defendant given notice of appellate rights under
I. “THE TRIAL COURT IS PROHIBITED BY LAW FROM RESENTENCING APPELLANT AFTER HIS SENTENCE TERM HAS BEEN COMPLETED.”
{¶ 9} The state argues that, despite any ineffectiveness of the trial court‘s last entry, the notices provided in the original proceedings were sufficient to apprise appellant of his postrelease control obligations and to authorize imposition of postrelease control. We disagree.
{¶ 10} The Supreme Court of Ohio has held that “when sentencing a felony offender to a term of imprisonment, a trial court is required to notify the offender at the sentencing hearing about postrelease control and is further required to incorporate that notice into its journal entry imposing sentence.” State v. Jordan, 104 Ohio St.3d 21, 2004-Ohio-6085, ¶ 17.
{¶ 11} As indicated above, prior to entering his plea, appellant received written and verbal notice informing appellant of the postrelease obligations to which he would be subject if he were to enter the plea. At sentencing, he received another written notice, this one informing him that he would be subject to postrelease control and that violations of postrelease control could result in additional time in prison. It is undisputed that the trial court‘s judgment entry incorporated that notice in its sentencing entry.
{¶ 13} For all of the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas is reversed. Appellee is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal pursuant to
JUDGMENT REVERSED.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to
Peter M. Handwork, J. _______________________________
JUDGE
Mark L. Pietrykowski, J. _______________________________
Thomas J. Osowik, P.J. JUDGE
CONCUR. _______________________________
JUDGE
This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of Ohio‘s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court‘s web site at: http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/newpdf/?source=6.