State v. HelmerState v. Helmer
Rendered on the 11th day of May, 2012.
R. KELLY ORMSBY III, Atty. Reg. No. 0020615, Prosecuting Attorney and DEBORAH S. QUIGLEY, Atty. Reg. No. 0055455, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Courthouse, Greenville, Ohio 45331
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant
WILLIAM H. COOPER, Atty. Reg. No. 0018307, 507 S. Broadway, Greenville, Ohio 45331
Attorney for Defendant-Appellee
DONOVAN, J.
{¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant State of Ohio appeals a decision of the Darke County Court of Common Pleas dismissing defendant-appellee Kary L. Helmer‘s December 17,
{¶ 2} On February 9, 2011, Helmer filed a motion to dismiss the charges against him based on pre-indictment delay of over twenty-seven months. A hearing was held on Helmer‘s motion to dismiss on March 14, 2011. In a written decision filed on April 21, 2011, the trial court overruled Helmer‘s motion to dismiss finding that he failed to prove that he suffered any actual prejudice as a result of the State‘s delay regarding the filing of the indictment. The trial court, however, stated its intent to review the matter pursuant to
{¶ 3} On May 18, 2011, the trial court, on its own motion and over objection of the State, dismissed Helmer‘s indictment for the following reasons: 1) the unexplained delay in the indictment; 2) the State‘s argument regarding the protection of a confidential informant‘s identity did not justify delaying the indictment; 3) the memories of the witnesses could be impacted negatively by the delay; 4) inability of Helmer to avail himself of speedy trial provisions and/or possibility of concurrent sentences in other cases for which he had been convicted and sentenced because of the State‘s failure to indict in the instant case in a
{¶ 4} It is from this judgment that the State now appeals.
{¶ 5} Because they are interrelated, the State‘s first and second assignments of error will be discussed together as follows:
{¶ 6} “THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DISMISSED THE INDICTMENT PURSUANT [TO]
{¶ 7} “THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED THE PRINCIPLE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS WHEN IT DISMISSED THE INDICTMENTS.”
{¶ 8} In its first assignment, the State contends that the trial court erred when it dismissed Helmer‘s December 17, 2010, indictment over objection pursuant to
{¶ 9}
{¶ 10} A trial court‘s dismissal of an indictment is reviewed for abuse of discretion. State v. Busch, 76 Ohio St.3d 613, 616, 669 N.E.2d 1125 (1996). The term “abuse of discretion” implies a decision that is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable. State v. Rodriguez, 2d Dist. Darke No. 1722, 2008-Ohio-3377, ¶8.
{¶ 11} As we recently discussed in State v. Montiel, 185 Ohio App.3d 362, 2009-Ohio-6589, 924 N.E.2d 375 (2d Dist.):
The Ohio Supreme Court has held that
Crim. R. 48(B) “does not limit the reasons for which a trial judge might dismiss a case, and we are convinced that a judge may dismiss a case pursuant toCrim.R. 48(B) if a dismissal serves the interest of justice.” Busch, supra at 615. The Court also stated that trial courts are on “the front lines of the administration of justice in our judicial system, dealing with the realities and practicalities of managing a caseload and responding to the rights and interests of the prosecution, the accused, and victims. A court has the ‘inherent power to regulate the practice before it and protect the integrity of its proceedings.’ ” Id. “The Court also stressed the flexibility a trial court should have to devise a solution in a given case, and went on to state that ‘[t]rial judges have the discretion to determine when the court has ceased to be useful in a given case.’ ” State v. Rodriguez,
{¶ 12} The State argues that the trial court improperly considered how local budgetary issues potentially impacted the decision to file the indictment against Helmer, as well as other defendants with older pending drug charges. During the evidentiary hearing held on March 14, 2011, the trial court noted that the timing of Helmer‘s indictment on the two-year old charges coincided with the Darke County sheriff‘s request for additional allocations from the county commissioners during meetings. The trial court essentially stated that it had heard rumors that the decision to indict the older drug cases was an attempt to persuade the county commissioners to allocate more funds to the sheriff‘s office by demonstrating that Darke County had a serious drug problem that could only be addressed by additional fiscal appropriations. Ultimately, however, the trial court stated that it did not believe that there was a connection between the timing of the indictments and the sheriff‘s budget requests, but merely noted that the simultaneous occurrence was coincidental. At the close of the hearing, the trial court requested the parties to submit additional arguments regarding whether the court should dismiss Helmer‘s indictment pursuant to
{¶ 13} On May 18, 2011, the trial court issued its decision dismissing Helmer‘s indictment pursuant to
{¶ 14} Upon review, we conclude that the trial court complied with the terms of
{¶ 15} In its second and final assignment, the State argues that the trial court violated
{¶ 16} In light of the foregoing, the State‘s first and second assignments of error are overruled.
{¶ 17} The State‘s assignments of error having been overruled, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
GRADY, P.J. and HALL, J., concur.
Copies mailed to:
R. Kelly Ormsby III
Deborah S. Quigley
William H. Cooper
Hon. Jonathan P. Hein