THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. HEINS, APPELLANT. THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. CALHOUN, APPELLANT.
Nos. 94-686 and 94-747
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
July 19, 1995
72 Ohio St.3d 504 | 1995-Ohio-208
ALICE ROBIE RESNICK, J.
[Cite as State v. Heins, 1995-Ohio-208.]
Evidence—Witnesses—Competency—State Highway Patrol officer who conducts speed checks for purpose of monitoring compliance with traffic laws is competent to testify under
A State Highway Patrol aircraft that is operated for the purpose of conducting speed checks is not a “motor vehicle,” and therefore does not fall within the purview of
(Nos. 94-686 and 94-747—Submitted April 26, 1995—Decided July 19, 1995.)
APPEALS from the Court of Appeals for Ashland County, Nos. CA-1058 and CA-1060.
Case No. 94-686
{¶ 1} On May 20, 1993, at approximately 12:46 p.m., appellant, Kenneth J. Heins, was charged with speeding. The offense occurred in Ashland County while Heins was driving a commercial tractor-trailer north on Interstate 71. William R. Watkins, a trooper pilot assigned to the Aviation Section of the Ohio State Highway Patrol, had been conducting routine speed checks from the air over Interstate 71 when he observed appellant‘s vehicle. Using a stopwatch and a standard mathematical formula to compute a driver‘s speed based upon the time it takes the driver to travel between a series of white lines painted on the highway, Watkins determined that Heins was driving sixty-six miles per hour in a fifty-five mile per hour zone. Watkins radioed this information to Trooper Carl L. Buris, who was positioned on the ground. Buris thereafter stopped Heins and issued him a citation
{¶ 2} Heins entered a plea of not guilty to the charge of speeding. Prior to trial, Heins filed a motion in limine to exclude the testimony of Watkins, on the grounds that the latter was incompetent to testify under
Case No. 94-747
{¶ 3} On May 20, 1993, approximately twelve minutes after Heins was cited for speeding, appellant, William C. Calhoun, was similarly stopped. Trooper Watkins, continuing to conduct speed checks above Interstate 71, observed Calhoun traveling north through Ashland County in a commercial tractor-trailer. Employing the same technique he had used to determine Heins’ speed, Watkins calculated that Calhoun was driving seventy-five miles per hour. This information was radioed to Trooper Buris on the ground, who then stopped Calhoun‘s vehicle and issued a citation for traveling at a speed in excess of the fifty-five miles per hour limit in violation of
{¶ 4} Calhoun entered a plea of not guilty to the charge of speeding. Prior to trial, Calhoun filed a motion in limine to exclude the testimony of Watkins on the grounds that the officer was incompetent to testify under
W. David Montague, Assistant Director of Law, for appellee.
Mason, Mason, Sullivan & Mason and Thomas L. Mason, for appellants.
ALICE ROBIE RESNICK, J.
{¶ 6} The sole proposition raised for our review is whether a State Highway Patrol officer who conducts speed checks from an aircraft for the purpose of monitoring compliance with traffic laws is competent to testify under the dictates of
{¶ 7}
“Every person is competent to be a witness except:
“***
“(C) An officer, while on duty for the exclusive or main purpose of enforcing traffic laws, arresting or assisting in the arrest of a person charged with a traffic violation punishable as a misdemeanor where the officer at the time of the arrest was not using a properly marked motor vehicle as defined by statute or was not wearing a legally distinctive uniform as defined by statute.”
{¶ 8} The Staff Note to
{¶ 9}
{¶ 10}
{¶ 11} Through the enactment of these statutes, the legislature demonstrated an intent to provide uniformity in traffic control and regulation in an effort to make driving safer within Ohio‘s political subdivisions. Dayton v. Adams (1967), 9 Ohio St.2d 89, 38 O.O.2d 223, 223 N.E.2d 822. “It requires little imagination to contemplate the unfortunate consequences should a frightened motorist believe that he [or she] was being forced off the road by a stranger. The General Assembly sought to avoid such mischief by requiring police officers on traffic duty to be identified clearly.” Columbus v. Murchison (1984), 21 Ohio App.3d 75, 76, 21 OBR 79, 81, 486 N.E.2d 236, 238. In addition to issues of safety and public welfare, the legislature also adopted
{¶ 12} Appellants in the case sub judice assert that the use of speed checks by the highway patrol clearly violates the legislature‘s intended ban on speed traps, and therefore such practice is impermissible. In reaching this conclusion, appellants contend that a plain reading of
{¶ 13} The interpretation of
{¶ 14} The better course of reasoning in this case is to read
{¶ 15} As a starting point,
“(A) ‘Vehicles’ means everything on wheels or runners, including motorized bicycles *** [with certain exceptions which are not relevant to this case].
“(B) ‘Motor vehicle’ means any vehicle, including manufactured homes and recreational vehicles, that is propelled or drawn by power other than muscular power or power collected from overhead electric trolley wires *** [with numerous exceptions which are not relevant to this case].”
{¶ 16} Another definition appears in
“(A) ‘Vehicle’ means every device, including a motorized bicycle, in, upon, or by which any person or property may be transported or drawn upon a highway *** [with certain exceptions which are not relevant to this case].
“(B) ‘Motor vehicle’ means every vehicle propelled or drawn by power other than muscular power or power collected from overhead electric trolley wires *** [with certain exceptions which are not relevant to this case].”
{¶ 17}
“***
“(B) ‘Motor vehicle’ means any vehicle driven or drawn by mechanical power for use on the public streets, roads, or highways.”
“(A) ‘Aviation’ means transportation by aircraft; operation of aircraft; the establishment, operation, maintenance, repair, and improvement of airports, landing fields, and other air navigation facilities; and all other activities connected therewith or incidental thereto.
“(B) ‘Aircraft’ means any contrivance used or designated for navigation or flight in the air, excepting a parachute or other contrivance for such navigation used primarily as safety equipment.”
{¶ 19} After closely reviewing the above definitional sections, we conclude that while no section in R.C. Title 45 specifically defines “motor vehicle,” as it appears in
{¶ 21} The judgments of the court of appeals are affirmed.
Judgments affirmed.
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, WRIGHT, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER and COOK, JJ., concur.