State v. HeinerState v. Heiner
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Appellant, Arthur A. Anderson, appeals from an order finding him in direct contempt of court and sentencing him to a 6-month jail term for refusing to testify at the criminal trial of Jean Paul Heiner. Heiner was charged with burglary and theft, for which Anderson had been convicted previously of the lesser included offense of criminal trespass.
Before being called as a prosecution witness at Heiner‘s trial on December 6, 1979, Anderson obtained a court appointed attorney to advise him. The trial judge then swore him as a witness at the trial and granted him immunity except for prosecution for failure to testify or for perjury. The judge informed Anderson of the penalty under
In this appeal, Anderson does not question the finding that his conduct in refusing to answer questions after having been granted immunity constitutes contempt of court, but he does challenge the trial court‘s authority to sentence him summarily to 6 months in jail for civil contempt under
Washington has three types of contempt proceedings:
(1) the criminal contempt prosecution underRCW 9.23 -.010, (2) the civil contempt initiated underRCW 7.20 , and (3) the inherent contempt power of a constitutional court (a) to punish conduct occurring in the court‘s presence, (b) to enforce orders or judgments in aid of the court‘s jurisdiction, and (c) to punish violations of orders or judgments. Keller v. Keller, 52 Wn.2d 84, 86, 323 P.2d 231 (1958).
(Footnote omitted.) State v. Ralph Williams’ N.W. Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 87 Wn.2d 327, 335, 553 P.2d 442 (1976). Whatever original distinctions once existed among these three contempt categories have unfortunately become obscured. As our Supreme Court recognized in Keller v. Keller, 52 Wn.2d 84, 88, 323 P.2d 231 (1958):
In a large measure, this court is responsible for a certain amount of confusion, because we have not always made plain and definite the distinction betweenRCW 9.23.010 andRCW 7.20.
Part of the confusion also stems from the fact that a single contemptuous act may constitute criminal, civil and inherent power of the court contempt.
Keller v. Keller, supra
at 89;
State ex rel. Dailey v. Dailey,
164 Wash. 140, 144, 2 P.2d 79 (1931). In fact, the refusal of a witness to answer questions where required by law specifically violates both
Although no bright line distinction has been made between civil and criminal contempt, certain fundamental differences are recognized. In Keller v. Keller, supra at page 88, our Supreme Court noted the basic distinctions:
RCW 9.23.010 is a criminal statute—it is punitive; proceedings thereunder must be instituted in the name of the state by the prosecuting attorney; the accused is entitled to a jury trial.
On the other hand, proceedings underRCW 7.20 may be both coercive and punitive. Although the “state is the plaintiff,” proceedings may be initiated by either the prosecuting attorney or a private party, and the contemnor is not entitled to a jury trial.
Frequently, the court makes its choice of contempt proceeding solely in terms of what purpose its final order will serve. State v. Sanchez, 4 Wn.2d 432, 435, 104 P.2d 464 (1940). In any case, the court retains the power to punish contempt as an essential method for efficient action and for the proper administration of justice. Blanchard v. Golden Age Brewing Co., 188 Wash. 396, 423, 63 P.2d 397 (1936).
In the instant case, the trial court indicated it was proceeding under the civil contempt statute,
A court may use the civil contempt statute,
Anderson also correctly contends that the contempt judgment cannot be sustained as a criminal contempt proceeding pursuant to
Finally, we must consider if the trial court‘s order of contempt can be sustained under its inherent powers of contempt, for we must uphold the trial court as long as a proper basis can be found even though the trial court did not rely on that particular theory. A court of general jurisdiction has inherent power to punish for contempt—a power which the legislature cannot abridge.
Deskins v. Waldt,
81 Wn.2d 1, 499 P.2d 206 (1972);
State v. Estill,
55 Wn.2d 576, 579-81, 349 P.2d 210, 89 A.L.R.2d 1251 (1960);
Blanchard v. Golden Age Brewing Co.,
188 Wash. 396, 63 P.2d 397 (1936);
Johnston v. Beneficial Management Corp. of America,
26 Wn. App. 671, 675, 614 P.2d 661 (1980). Judges of constitutional courts have the inherent power (1) to punish summarily contemptuous conduct occurring in the presence of the court, (2) to enforce orders or judgments in aid of the court‘s jurisdiction, and (3) to punish violations of orders or judgments.
Keller v. Keller, supra
at 86;
see Deskins v. Waldt, supra; State v. Caffrey,
70 Wn.2d 120, 122, 422 P.2d 307 (1966). The punishment available under the inherent power of contempt should at least equal that available under the civil contempt statute,
In the instant case, it was difficult for the trial court to fashion a coercive remedy to punish Anderson in that the
The trial court did not find, and respondent does not argue, that the $100 limitation ofRCW 7.20.020 would impair the court‘s contempt power in this case. In the absence of such a finding it was not necessary for the court to resort to its inherent, rather than statutory, contempt authority. The proceedings below were, in all particulars except the severity of the sentences imposed, consistent with the requirements ofRCW 7.20. In such circumstances, to allow trial courts to choose to deviate from the statutory scheme and revert to inherent power in a single aspect of a case would effectively nullify the statutes. Unless the legislatively prescribed procedures and remedies are specifically found inadequate, courts should adhere to them and are not free to create their own.
(Citations omitted.)
In
State v. Ralph Williams’ N.W. Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., supra,
the Supreme Court upheld the imposition of coercive sanctions of a continuing fine of $100 per day under the trial court‘s inherent power of contempt even though the trial court did not specifically find that the
In the instant case, however, the trial court found it necessary to exercise its power to punish for contempt. It could then have proceeded under the criminal contempt statute. The criminal contempt statute includes a maximum penalty for a misdemeanor conviction of imprisonment in the county jail for not more than 90 days or of a $250 fine.
To recapitulate our holding, the imposition of a fixed punishment to commence in the future transformed the intended civil contempt proceeding under
Andersen and Durham, JJ., concur.
Reconsideration denied July 6, 1981.
Review denied by Supreme Court October 22,1981.
Notes
“Every person who shall commit a contempt of court of any one of the following kinds shall be guilty of a misdemeanor:
“(6) Contumacious and unlawful refusal to be sworn as a witness or, after being sworn, to answer any legal and proper interrogatory . . .”
“The following acts or omissions, in respect to a court of justice or proceedings therein, are deemed to be contempts of court:
“(10) Disobedience of a subpoena duly served, or refusing to be sworn or answer as a witness.”
“Every court of justice, and every judicial officer has power to punish contempt by fine or imprisonment, or both. But such fine shall not exceed three hundred dollars, nor the imprisonment six months; and when the contempt is not of those mentioned inRCW 7.20.010(1) and (2), it must appear that the right or remedy of a party to an action, suit or proceeding was defeated or prejudiced thereby, before the contempt can be punished otherwise than by a fine not exceeding one hundred dollars.”