State v. HeddrickState v. Heddrick
- Reporters:
- Before:
- Owens (en banc)
¶ 1 A defendant‘s competency is a necessary prerequisite for a fair criminal trial.
¶ 2 When the court entered the competency order, Heddrick‘s counsel for his custodial assault case was absent. Because the order ostensibly applied to both felony prosecutions,
¶ 3 We affirm the Court of Appeals because Heddrick, through his appointed counsel, waived completion of the statutory competency procedures. In addition, we affirm the Court of Appeals because Heddrick did not suffer a complete denial of counsel during a critical stage in the proceedings.
FACTS
¶ 4 Heddrick‘s appeal arises out of two separate alleged criminal acts. Clerk‘s Papers King County Super. Ct. No. 04-1-12703-0(1CP) at 1; Clerk‘s Papers King County Super. Ct. No. 05-1-08886-5(2CP) at 1. In 2004, Heddrick was charged with felony harassment. While awaiting trial on that charge, Heddrick was allegedly involved in an altercation with jailhouse staff, leading to the subsequent charge of custodial assault.
¶ 5 Concerns about Heddrick‘s competency arose several times as his cases proceeded. In the felony harassment matter, the issue of Heddrick‘s competency arose first on September 8, 2004. 1CP at 17. The trial court found Heddrick incompetent and ordered him to Western State Hospital (WSH) for 90 days. In January 2005, the trial court found that Heddrick had been restored to competency. Id. at 6-7.
¶ 6 In July 2005, newly appointed defense counsel Tracy Lapps raised concerns again about Heddrick‘s competency. Pet. for Review at 3; see 1CP at 38. In response, the trial court orally ordered a new evaluation by Dr. White, an expert retained by the defense. Report of Proceedings (RP) (July 27, 2005) at 6. Also, the court directed that a written report be prepared by a staff psychologist at WSH and circulated to the parties. 1CP at 40.
¶ 7 Near the due date for production of the report, defense counsel informed the court that Dr. White had found Heddrick competent. She further informed the court that she declined production of Dr. White‘s report due to cost concerns. As a result, the WSH staff psychologist‘s report was not entered into evidence.1 Counsel thereby withdrew Heddrick‘s competency motion. After the harassment trial concluded, a jury found Heddrick guilty on October 12, 2005. Id. at 69.
¶ 8 While in custody in the King County jail awaiting trial for felony harassment, Heddrick allegedly assaulted one of the two officers assigned to move him to another cell. The State charged Heddrick with custodial assault. After substituting for a previous attorney, Marcus Naylor began to represent Heddrick in his assault case. Once competency concerns arose in the felony harassment matter, the trial judge in the custodial assault case decided to “track competency procedures with the felony harassment case.” State v. Heddrick, noted at 140 Wash.App. 1019, 2007 WL 2411354, at *2, 2CP at 7.
¶ 9 Heddrick‘s custodial assault case was transferred to Judge Mary Yu, who was presiding over his felony harassment case. When Judge Yu signed the competency order on October 10, 2005, in Heddrick‘s assault case, she evidently did not enter an equivalent order in the harassment case. 2CP at 8. Moreover, Judge Yu issued the ruling outside of the presence of Heddrick‘s counsel in the custodial assault case. Id. (lacking signature of Naylor). The only counsel present was Lapps, Heddrick‘s appointed attorney in the felony harassment case. Lapps declined to sign the order of competency in the custodial assault matter. Id. The court simply found Heddrick competent after his appointed attorney in the felony harassment matter, Lapps, informed the court that Dr. White found Heddrick to be competent. RP (Oct. 11, 2005) at 15. The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that Heddrick received adequate process. Heddrick, 140 Wash.App. 1019, 2007 WL 2411354, at *4-5. We granted Heddrick‘s petition for review. 163 Wash.2d 1039, 187 P.3d 270 (2008).
ANALYSIS
¶ 10 We granted review to consider two issues arising from Heddrick‘s prosecutions.
A. Standard of Review
¶ 11 The determination of whether a competency examination should (or should not) be ordered rests generally within the discretion of the trial court. State v. Thomas, 75 Wash.2d 516, 517-18, 452 P.2d 256 (1969). Whether a trial court erred in accepting a defendant‘s withdrawal of a competency challenge and ruling on competency without further proceedings is therefore reviewed for abuse of discretion.
B. Competency Procedures under RCW 10.77.060
¶ 12 Heddrick argues that he was denied due process of law when the trial court failed to execute the procedures in
¶ 13 The record is clear that the procedures outlined in
¶ 15 In Fleming, this court suggested that the condition of competency may not be waived. 142 Wash.2d at 864. There, the State argued that an entry of an Alford5 plea constituted a waiver of competency. Id. This court rejected this argument, holding that “incompetency cannot be waived,” and that “an incompetent person may not enter into any plea agreement.” Id. The court found it “apparent” that a person found to be incompetent could not then be tried or enter into a plea agreement of any kind. Id. Underlying the court‘s concern was our traditional insistence that any waiver of a constitutional right be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. State v. Stegall, 124 Wash.2d 719, 724-25, 881 P.2d 979 (1994). It is axiomatic that a person incompetent to stand trial cannot affect a knowing or intelligent waiver. State v. Smith, 88 Wash.2d 639, 642, 564 P.2d 1154 (1977), overruled on other grounds by Jones, 99 Wash.2d at 744.
¶ 16 This court has stated that the statutory competency procedures are “mandatory and not merely directory.” Wicklund, 96 Wash.2d at 805. In Wicklund, the court cited to Israel without disapproving of its waiver provisions. Id. Rather, the court noted that waiver was not at issue in the case of Mr. Wicklund. Id. Thus, the language in Wicklund suggests that waiver of the procedures has legal effect and does not violate due process.
¶ 17 In a recent case, this court added further heft to the statutory competency procedures. State v. Marshall, 144 Wash.2d 266, 27 P.3d 192 (2001). In Marshall, the defendant‘s competency became an issue when, against counsels’ advice, the defendant stated his intent to change his plea to guilty. Id. at 269. The court engaged the defendant in a colloquy during a plea hearing and concluded that he was competent to enter a plea of guilty. Id. After the prosecutor decided to seek the death penalty, the defendant moved to withdraw the plea and presented strong evidence of the defendant‘s significant brain injury. Id. at 270-73. Despite the evidence, the trial court denied the motion without observing procedures compliant with the competency statute. Id. at 273. This court reversed, holding that “where a defendant moves to withdraw [a] guilty plea with evidence the defendant was incompetent when the plea was made, the trial court must either grant the motion to withdraw ... or convene a formal competency hearing required by RCW 10.77.060.” Id. at 281.
¶ 18 On the other hand, a defendant may waive completion of the procedures in
¶ 19 Despite the propriety of waivers in earlier cases, Heddrick asserts that competency cannot be found by waiver or stipulation. Suppl. Br. of Pet‘r at 6-8. Heddrick cites to Pate for the proposition that a “person whose competency is in doubt cannot waive his right to have the court properly determine his capacity to stand trial.” Id. at 7. Pate is factually distinguishable from Heddrick‘s case because the defendant never demanded a hearing. Thus, the court‘s reasoning focused on the duty of the court and the impropriety of an implied waiver by failure to raise the issue. Moreover, Pate is emblematic of a line of cases standing for the proposition that competency in substance cannot be waived. See also Fleming, 142 Wash.2d at 864; Odle v. Woodford, 238 F.3d 1084, 1087 (9th Cir.2001); Silverstein v. Henderson, 706 F.2d 361, 369 (2d Cir.1983) (reasoning that conflicting psychiatry reports triggered a trial court‘s duty to conduct a competency hearing). While we recognize the legal weight of these authorities, we believe a distinction exists between substantive competency and the procedures used to discern a defendant‘s competency with regard to waiver or abandonment of a competency challenge.
¶ 20 Therefore, we hold that the statutory competency procedures may be waived, and Heddrick effected a waiver at trial when his counsel Lapps withdrew the challenge to competency. Heddrick‘s case more closely resembles Israel than Marshall and Fleming because Heddrick expressly withdrew his competency challenge. Marshall is distinguishable on the grounds that counsel in that case contested competency before the guilty plea was entered as well as during motion proceedings to withdraw the plea, and the latter contest was supported by extensive evidence of incompetence. 144 Wash.2d at 279-80. Heddrick‘s counsel contested competency early in the proceedings but withdrew the contest after Dr. White‘s report revealed Heddrick to be competent. Fleming is similarly distinguishable because although waiver was an issue, any waiver in that case would have been merely implied by the entry of the defendant‘s Alford plea. Heddrick entered an express waiver after psychological examination revealed evidence of competence. In Fleming, evidence of incompetence existed but was not brought to the attention of the court before the plea because of counsel‘s negligence. No question of negligent representation or ineffective assistance of counsel appears before this court.6
¶ 21 Heddrick argues that, despite the withdrawal by his counsel, the trial court abused its discretion by failing to complete the statutory proceedings on its own initiative. Suppl. Br. of Pet‘r at 8. A trial court abuses its discretion when it reaches a conclusion on untenable or unreasonable grounds. While it is true that a court has the authority to order and complete competency proceedings on its own motion, a court must do so only when there is reason to doubt a defendant‘s competency.
¶ 22 In addition, the State counters effectively that complaining now that the court should have proceeded despite Heddrick‘s withdrawal of his competency challenge amounts to invited error. A party invites error when a party sets up an error at trial and then claims such error on appeal. In re Dependency of K.R., 128 Wash.2d 129, 147, 904 P.2d 1132 (1995). This doctrine applies even to errors of constitutional magnitude that can be raised for the first time on appeal. State v. Henderson, 114 Wash.2d 867, 869-70, 792 P.2d 514 (1990). From the facts at bar, any putative error was invited by the defendant‘s conduct.
¶ 23 In keeping with Israel and O‘Neal, we hold that so long as a defendant maintains a challenge to competency, the
C. Denial of Counsel During a Critical Stage in the Proceedings
¶ 24 Heddrick argues that he lacked the assistance of counsel at a critical stage of the litigation. Under both the Washington and United States Constitutions, a criminal defendant is entitled to the assistance of counsel at critical stages in the litigation.
¶ 25 Rather, a separate proceeding requiring the assistance of counsel arose because competency in the custodial assault case became an issue when the trial judge decided to track the proceedings in the felony harassment case. When Judge Yu signed the order before Deputy Prosecuting Attorney Jennifer Miller and Lapps, significant consequences for Heddrick hung in the balance, cf. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 696, 122 S.Ct. 1843, 152 L.Ed.2d 914 (2002), because, as we have stated above, his rights to further procedures could be waived at this stage. However, we are not persuaded that Heddrick was denied counsel at this stage.
¶ 26 However, Lapps’ presence at the signing of the order, with the apparent blessing of Naylor, militates against a finding of complete denial of counsel. As Miller describes before Judge Yu, Naylor was fully apprised of Lapps’ intention to withdraw the competency challenge. RP (Oct. 10, 2005) at 3-4. Lapps’ reluctance to sign the order did not stem from her concerns regarding Naylor‘s agreement; rather she expressed more concern over scheduling. Id. at 4. Though no transcript of the Friday conversation exists, Naylor‘s agreement is evident from the statements by both Miller and Lapps. On the particular facts of this case, Naylor and Lapps appear to have coordinated their efforts, including the withdrawal of Heddrick‘s competency challenge. Thus, Heddrick was not denied the assistance of counsel at a critical stage in the proceedings.
¶ 27 Justice Stephens correctly ascribes great importance to the out-of-court discussion between Miller, Naylor, and Lapps, but goes too far in describing the event as a critical stage in the proceedings. By definition, a critical stage is one during a criminal proceeding, such as arraignment, that holds significant consequences for the accused. Bell, 535 U.S. at 696. Moreover, “[e]ach [of the United States Supreme Court cases dealing with complete denial of counsel at a critical stage] involved criminal defendants who had actually or constructively been denied counsel by government action.” Id. at 696 n. 3. The court could not and did not have any effect on the discussion and agreement between the attorneys. The discussion was informal and not on the record. We decline to refer to such an event as a critical stage in the proceedings.
CONCLUSION
¶ 28 We affirm the Court of Appeals on the issue of due process during the competency proceedings. Though the statutory procedures are a sufficient condition to deliver due process to a possibly incompetent defendant, a defendant may waive the remainder of procedures when psychological evidence satisfies any remaining question of competence.
¶ 29 We also affirm the Court of Appeals that Heddrick was not denied the assistance of counsel because Naylor agreed and deferred to Lapps’ decision to withdraw the competency challenge.
WE CONCUR: GERRY L. ALEXANDER, Chief Justice, CHARLES W. JOHNSON, BARBARA A. MADSEN,