State v. HebertState v. Hebert
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Singleton
OPINION
SINGLETON, Judge.
In this case we are asked to consider the validity of 5 Alaska Administrative Code (AAC) 27.987, a fish and game regulation governing commercial herring fishing in Norton Sound. On February 6, 1986, Fish and Wildlife Protection officers charged Jay Hebert with violating
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Hebert was charged because he fished as an entry-permit holder in an exclusive use area, Norton Sound, after having already fished in nonexclusive-use areas, Bristol Bay and Security Cove, during the 1985 fishing season. On May 5, 1986, Hebert moved to dismiss the charge on the ground that the Board of Fisheries had exceeded its authority when it enacted
On August 18, 1986, District Court Judge Bradley N. Gater agreed that
In reaching our decision, we first consider whether the Board exceeded its statutory mandate in promulgating the regulation, either by pursuing impermissible objectives or by employing means outside its powers. Second, we consider whether the regulation is reasonable and not arbitrary. Meier v. State, 739 P.2d 172, 173 (Alaska, 1987); Kelly v. Zamarello, 486 P.2d 906, 911 (Alaska 1971).
The Board’s undisputed purpose in promulgating the regulation was to allocate a percentage of the herring yield to local residents larger than they would otherwise receive in unregulated competition with fishermen from outside the district. Hebert argues, and the trial court found, that this objective is outside the Board’s statutory mandate because it is inconsistent with, and not reasonably necessary for, purposes of conservation or development. 2
In Meier and, in an earlier case, Kenai Peninsula Fisherman’s Co-op. Ass’n Inc. v. State, 628 P.2d 897, 903 (Alaska 1981), the supreme court considered and rejected arguments similar to Hebert’s. In both cases, it held that the duty to conserve and develop fishery resources implied a concomitant power to allocate fishery resources among competing users. Meier, 739 P.2d at 174; Kenai Peninsula, 628 P.2d at 903. In Kenai Peninsula, the court reasoned that the Board’s power to control resource utilization permitted it to establish priorities of use between commercial and recreational fishermen as a response to sharp competition between the two groups for a limited fishery resource. Id. at 903. In Meier, the court concluded that competition between various subgroups of commercial users was also keen and, consequently, the Board’s power to control fishery resource utilization allowed it to allocate the fishery harvest between two competing subgroups of commercial fishermen. Id. at 174.
Implicit in
Meier
and
Kenai Peninsula
is the supreme court’s conclusion that questions such as the one presented in this
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case are divisible into two related issues: first, does the need for conservation or development permit the Board to regulate a particular fishery,
see
Nevertheless, the trial court, as well as Hebert, believes that the Board erred in finding that the prerequisites for an allocation decision had been met. Hebert contends that the Board’s decision was not premised on a need to effectuate conservation or development of the Norton Sound herring stocks, but solely on a desire to economically assist the Norton Sound residents.
We find that whether the herring fishery resource in Norton Sound requires conservation or development is a question of legislative fact.
See, e.g., State v. Erickson,
574 P.2d 1, 4-6 and n. 14 (Alaska 1978) (quoting Davis,
An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process,
55 Harv.L.Rev. 364, 402-10 (1942) (legislative facts are those which help the tribunal to determine the content of law and policy and to exercise its judgment or discretion in determining what course of action to take)). The supreme court has promulgated a two-prong reasonable basis test to govern an administrative agency’s decisions regarding legislative facts in rule-making. First, the regulation must be consistent with and reasonably necessary to carry out the statutory purposes of the agency. Second, the regulation must be reasonable and not arbitrary.
See Meier,
739 P.2d at 173, and
Kelly,
486 P.2d at 911. Applying this test to the instant case, we consider the Board’s findings relating to
*396 Findings five and six make it clear that the Board did not view the herring sac roe fishery in Norton Sound as so extensive that it could meet the needs of all men and women who wished to fish, and therefore need not be regulated for purposes of development and conservation. In fact, it appears that the Board had the same concerns present in Kenai Peninsula and Meier: the need for allocation of a limited fishery resource between sharp competitors. In fact, it appears that an administrative finding that some limitation on the quantity of fish which could be taken was necessarily more explicit in this case than it was in either Meier or Kenai Peninsula. We note that neither the supreme court nor the agency, in either Kenai Peninsula or Meier, seems to have made a separate factual determination that respective salmon fishery resources required regulation for purposes of conservation or development before reaching the allocation decision.
Hebert challenges the Board’s findings on a number of grounds. First, he contends that there is nothing in the record indicating that the Board ever adopted or discussed the February 1985 findings and that they therefore are a nullity. It is unclear from the record whether the entire Board ever ratified the findings or how the findings were adopted. The only references in the record to the findings are found in a letter to assistant attorney general Larri Irene Spengler from Elizabeth Stewart, the director of the Division of Boards, Department of Fish and Game, and in an affidavit by Elizabeth Stewart. The letter states that the findings were written after the board meeting had adjourned and that, “there is no discussion on the tapes adopting the findings.” The affidavit further states that time was not available during the November 1984 meeting for the findings to be drafted, discussed, and signed, that they consequently were finalized [sic] later. Ms. Stewart does not explain what she means by “finalized,” though it appears that she is suggesting that the entire Board ratified the findings off the record.
Hebert is in error. Alaska Statute 44.-62.310(a) addresses meetings, not findings. There is nothing in the Administrative Procedure Act requiring the Board to make any findings when exercising its quasi-legislative function. 4 A fortiori, there is nothing in the Act regulating the manner in which findings must be adopted or approved. As the supreme court noted in Kelly, when we examine the validity of a regulation, we apply roughly the same tests we would apply to a statute to determine whether it is reasonable. 486 P.2d at 911. Thus, the findings signed by the chairman of the board are the conceptual equivalent of a legislative committee report, which may be helpful in determining legislative or, in this case, administrative intent, but is hardly a condition prerequisite for the regulation or statute’s validity. *397 Consequently, we may consider the findings as one indication among many of the actual legislative factual determinations the Board made when it enacted the regulation.
Finally, Hebert argues that there is no evidentiary basis in the administrative record for the Board’s finding that the herring sac roe fisheries in Norton Sound require conservation, even if such a finding is implicit in the Board’s actions. Hebert has confused administrative rule making,
see
Consequently, we conclude that the Board’s objective in promulgating
The judgment of the district court is REVERSED,
Notes
.
Superexclusive Use Areas, (a) The Cape Ro-manzof and Norton Sound Districts are supe-rexclusive use areas.
(b) A person who participates in the commercial taking of herring as a CFEC [commercial fisheries entry commission] permit holder in a superexclusive use area at any time from February 1 through June 30 may not participate or have participated in the commercial taking of herring, either as a CFEC permit holder or a crew member aboard a vessel used to take herring, in another supe-rexclusive or non-exclusive use area at any time from February 1 through June 30 of that same year.
(c) A person who participates in the commercial taking of herring as a crew member aboard a vessel that is used to take herring in a superexclusive use area at any time from February 1 through June 30 may not participate or have participated in the commercial taking of herring as a CFEC permit holder in another superexclusive or non-exclusive use *394 area at any time from February 1 through June 30 of that year.
(d) A vessel used in the taking of herring in a superexclusive use area at any time from February 1 through June 30 may not be used or have been used in the taking of herring in another superexclusive or non-exclusive use area at any time from February 1 through June 30 of that year.
. In order to determine whether
. The findings are:
The Alaska Board of Fisheries has adopted regulations allowing participation in certain sac roe fisheries of the A-Y-K [Arctic-Yukon-Kuskokwim] area only by persons or vessels that have not also participated in other Alaska herring sac roe fisheries during the calendar year. While the board does not believe that exclusive use regulations are appropriate for all fisheries, it does believe that these regulations will serve the orderly conservation and development of those fisheries. In support of the regulations, the board finds:
(1) These fisheries are an important segment of the local economies of communities of the A-Y-K region. In most cases, there are few coastal if any employment alternatives to commercial fishing.
(2) The herring sac roe fisheries are only recently developing, and local fishers in general do not have sophisticated equipment or skills to apply to herring fishing, though they do have the capability to fully harvest and utilize all available resources.
(3) Herring fishers and other Alaska sac roe fisheries have generally developed highly refined fishing skills and acquire significantly more efficient fishing equipment, which if employed on a wholesale basis in the A-Y-K area would disadvantage A-Y-K fishermen and the communities that are dependent upon commercial fishing as a cash economy.
(4) In order to allow A-Y-K fishers the opportunity to acquire the skills and equipment so that they may fairly compete with those who participate in other Alaska herring sac roe fisheries, the board has adopted the exclusive use regulations. Exclusive use will allow A-Y-K fishers the time to develop those skills needed to be competitive, and income generated from the fisheries will assist them in upgrading equipment.
(5) Without the exclusive use regulations, the amount of effort in the fishery will increase, since other Alaskan herring sac roe fisheries would be over by the time the fisheries are conducted in the A-Y-K region. This would result in a shortened fishing season *396 and increased numbers of participants, diminishing the opportunity for A-Y-K fishers to develop fishing skills and diminishing the income generated to each participant, thus impacting the A-Y-K fishers’ ability to acquire competitive equipment.
(6) Since the A-Y-K herring fisheries are so recently developed compared to other Alaska herring sac roe fisheries, the level of knowledge of the status of the herring resource is less than that of stocks elsewhere in Alaska. Regulations which reduce the amount of effort and the efficiency of the participants or which reduce the rate at which effort grows and efficiency increases are therefore necessary. A slower-paced fishery on stocks of unknown magnitude, distribution, and resiliency is appropriate. Further, the significant degree of subsistence utilization of the herring resource in the A-Y-K region, compared to other regions of the state, supports the board’s desire for a cautious, conservative regulatory environment.
. It is necessary to constantly bear in mind that an agency record, and the conclusions and findings the agency draws from that record serve different purposes when the agency acts in a quasi-legislative, as opposed to a quasi-judicial capacity.
. Neither