State v. Head

Virginia, Plaintiff STATE

Below, Appellee, HEAD, Defendant

Michael

Below, Appellant.

No. 23404.

Supreme Court of Virginia. Sept. 1996.

Submitted

Decided Nov. Forbes, Prosecuting Attorney I.

William C. Kershner, County, Mary

for Kanawha Beth Charleston, Attorney, Prosecuting Assistant AND BACKGROUND FACTS appellee. aggravated Michael Head was convicted of Boothroyd, H. Assistant Public De- John 21, robbery September 1990 and sen- on fender, Charleston, appellant. for (60) sixty years Virgi- in tenced to the West Penitentiary. following nia The factors were RECHT, Justice:1 by sentencing in considered the circuit court (1) robbery appellant: the The victim was a (appellant) appeals Michael Head the deni- old, sixty-six year injured retired World War al of his motion for a reduction of sentence (2) veteran; appellant II had to The testified County. of the Circuit Court Kanawha (3) alibi;” timely Although appellant appellant filed a motion had a the “ridiculous 60-year for a reduction of his sentence for prior breaking entering for and in conviction robbery aggravated under Rule (4) 1983; twenty-nine appellant Procedure, Virginia West Rules of Criminal (5) old; years and No firearm was used appel- rule the the circuit court failed to on committing the crime.2 After this on Court years. Finally, motion for over four lant’s 2, July appellant’s 1991 refused the direct prompted by appellant’s filing of an the appeal, appellant a motion Au- the filed motion, amended the circuit court held 30, gust circuit court under Rule motion, hearing reasoning the but denied the of Criminal had resulted in a inordinate Procedure for a reduction of his sentence.3 jurisdiction by the circuit court. loss of On August undisputed appellant’s It is that the appeal, appellant argues that the circuit 30, timely.4 1991 motion was filed No hear- jurisdiction delay, al- court has because ing was held on the motion. not, though lengthy, in this affect does underlying policy reasons the time limits appellant, acting pro 16, 1994, On June con- of Rule Because se, for a filed another motion appellant’s ferred on the circuit court August appellant sentence. On by the filed motion cannot be lost August amended his 1991 motion and on time, passage mere we reverse the circuit 26, 1995, hearing October was held before and remand this for consideration court case Ranson, Judge assigned who had been of the motion on its merits. resigned running Recht this Court commences the of the 120- 1. The Honorable Arthur M. as Virginia Supreme Court day period filing Justiсe of the West for a motion for sentence reduc- Appeals tion, effective October 1996. The Honor- impact this case amendment does Caperton, the State able Gaston Governor of therefore, we will cite the new to rule. See Virginia, appointed Judge him of the First Thornton, State v. 197 W.Va. 478 S.E.2d 576 that same date. Pursuant to Judicial Circuit on 35(b)(1996) Under Rule of the West Vir- an administrative order entered this Court Procedure, ginia Rules of Criminal motion "[a] assigned Judge October Recht was to reduce a sentence be made ... within Virginia Supreme of the West sit as member entry after the of a mandate commencing October Court of appeals upon supreme affirmance court of continuing Court. until further order of this judgment probation revocation of conviction or entry supreme or the of an order court Although Judge appel- 2. Ranson's denial dismissing rejecting petition appeal or of a is the lant's motion for reduction subject judgment probation of a revoca- conviction Hey, appeal, John a former circuit of this p. complete tion." See 6 for the text оf infra County, presided judge at trial in Kanawha 35(b)(1996). appellant. and sentenced underlying our decision in 4.The critical factor Although Virginia Rules of the West amended, August appellant’s is that the case effective Criminal Procedure was clarify for sentence reduction was filed. September when an action (1996) hearing, appellant (applying in 1994.5 At the S.E.2d 114 a similar case three- action); extraordinary pronged in a again length noted the of his standard of review civil Carter, Syl. pt. argued Carter v. sentence and that because of that W.Va. (1996)(applying length, board similar had not had the three-pronged opportunity standard of review to a civil significant to consider his efforts order). contempt By at rehabilitation. order entered on No- 2, 1995, Judge vember Ranson denied the A motion made under Rule 35 grounds motion on the that the had of the West Rules of Criminal Pro by failing request abandoned his motion cedure is directed to the sound discretion of original timely action on his filed Rule and, generally, the circuit court is not review motion, passage and that because of the gen able absent an abuse of discrеtion. Our great time “has become too and unreason- eral standard of review a Rule mo able,” jurisdiction the circuit court lost applied by tion is the same as that hear the matter. Stumpf, Fourth Circuit U.S. v. 476 F.2d (4th first, Cir.1973), appeal asserting: This followed that 946 which held that a once a defendant files a motion for reduction of sentence is addressed motion, subsequent to the sound inaction does not con- discretion of the district court motion; appeal except stitute an and is not abandonment of his reviewable for an second, Lee, becаuse the in this abuse of discretion. v. case does See U.S. 648 Cir.1981); role, usurp not board’s mere F.2d 668 n. 1 v. Niemiec, (7th Cir.1982). passage of time does not result in a loss of 692 appel- in the circuit court. The The abuse of discretion standard on Rule argues delay, lant caused administra- 35 motions continues the deference we have error, tive should not be considered “unrea- traditionally accorded trial courts matters purposes sonable” for the of Rule sentencing. Syl. pt. See State v. Broughton, 196 470 W.Va. S.E.2d 413 II. (1996) (’’[sjentences imposed by the trial court, statutory if within limits and if not DISCUSSION factor, ([imjpermissible based some are review”); subject appellate Syl. pt. not 9 A. Standard Review Hays, v. State 185 W.Va. reviewing findings of fact and (1991); Syl. pt. Goodnight, State conclusions of law of a circuit court concern 366, 287 W.Va. S.E.2d ing an order on a motion made under Rule 35 However, Virginia Rules of Pro in this the circuit of West Criminal pf cedure, apply three-pronged appel a merits of the standard did address the motion, found as a review. We review the decision on the Rule lant’s Rule 35 but rather 35 motion under an abuse of discretion stan matter of law that he had abаndoned his dard; underlying failing request are un motion “to or obtain an facts reviewed standard; ques expeditious ruling” passage of clearly a erroneous and that the der jurisdiction. interpretations in a Be of law and of statutes time resulted loss of tions subject ruling an to a de novo review. cause the circuit court’s involves ‍​​​​‌​‌​‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌​​​‌​​​‌‌‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​‌‌​​​​‌‌​​​​‌​‍and rules are Burnside, interpretation im Syl. pt. as to whether See Burnside duty (1995)(applying poses continuing upon a defendant to W.Va. S.E.2d request hearing, three-pronged of review to we review that decision de similar standard circuit family nоvo. We also review de novo the findings made law master court); Syl. pt. determination that its own failure to adopted by a circuit court’s are time resulted in a Porterfield, 469 rule within a reasonable Burgess v. 196 W.Va. only The real difference grounds in all three tence excessive. 5. The for relief asserted (the among two motions and amended claim of an addi documents the documents was the motion), essentially ap behavior, the same with the were good represented tional record urging that a pellant that his character was such passаge of time. 60-year sen was warranted and that days jurisdiction, thereby precluding filing to 120 for either of a time loss considering or action court from a defendant’s motion for sentence reduction court, motion, to reduce a sentence. to reduce his sentence. without filed motion 120-day period triggered by any is (1) following imposition of the B. events: (2) (3) sentence; probation; revocation of Criminal Procedure judgment this Court’s affirmance of a of a 1. Abandonment (4) revocation; probation or conviction or aspects Our discussion of bоth of the cir- rejection petition or of a Court’s dismissal holding in Rule cuit court’s is based appeal probation.7 of a conviction or Rules of Criminal part, in the second contained second sentence Procedure, which states: rule, requires the determination of a by the court “within a Reduction Sentence —A motion to re- Finally, part, time.” the third contained in made, duce a or the court rule, permits the last sentence of the may reduce a sentence without motion change imprisonment of a sentence of to a days within 120 аfter the sentence is im- grant probation. revoked, posed probation or within entry after the of a mandate rule, language the clear Under supreme appeals upon court of affir- days measuring within 120 of one of the judgment a mance of a of conviction or events, a to defendant who wishes insure probation entry revocation or the of an request consideration of his must file a mo supreme appeals order tion for reduction of his sentence.8 Rule dismissing rejecting petition ap- or a for terms, express require its does not peal judgment pro- of a of a conviction or any other action a defendant for consider bation revocation. court shall deter- reduction; ation of a motion for sentence a mine motion within reasonable time. filed, 35(b) rather, a once motion is Rule Changing a sentence from a sentence of shifts the burden to the court for a determi grant probation incarceration to a shall nation of “the motion within a reasonable permissible a constitute of sen- time.” tence under this subdivision.6 ease, Virginia appellant of the West In this filed his 30, 1991, August of Criminal Procedure consists of three motion on which was within parts: part days rejection peti the first sets forth a time limita of this Court’s of his (120 days) appeal July tion and the events that commence tion for 1991. No other limitation; appellant required. running of the time the sec action part requires appellant required the court to rule on the was not ond to time;” expedited hearing motion “within a reasonable and the seek an or to otherwise part permits grant probation as a remind the circuit court of his motion. Al third part, though speculates reduction of sentence. The first con the circuit court’s order rule, in the first of the limits that such tactics would have resulted in a tained sentence amendment, a 6.Before the 1996 of the sentence from sentence of incarceration to a Virginia Procedure read: Rules of Criminal grant probation permissi- shall constitute A Reduction of Sentence. motion to reduce reduction of under this ble sentence subdivi- made, may sentence or the court re- sion. duce a sentence without motion within 120 days impоsed probation after sentence is or Thornton, (discussing supra 7. See State v. revoked, days receipt by is or within 120 after 120-day period which commenced the events upon the court of a mandate issued affirmance 35(b)(1985); Massey ex rel. under Rule State judgment appeal, or dismissal of the or of the Hun, 729, 201, 197 W.Va. 478 S.E.2d days entry any or within 120 after order (1996)(per curiam)(applying the 1985 Rule judgment Supreme Court of generis). sui of, having denying up- review the effect of holding, judgment probation of conviction or permits 8. We that Rule also a court to note revocation. The court shall determine the mo- 120-day period. Changing sponte within a time. act sua within the tion reasonable supersede the function of the timely appellant’s fere with or consideration more motion, supported by speculation is not board. The Fourth Circuit U.S. v. (4th Cir.1975), Indeed, appellant’s Stollings, second the record. reduction, for a sentence filed time motion allowed a district court languished.9 The record 120-day period June also to decide a motion after the response the three letters sent contains no Stollings, sentence reduction. judges appellant to several day motion was filed on 119th and was not Court, County none of later, the Kanawha Circuit until a few and the decided appellant’s assigned been to the Circuit, whom had purposes un Fourth based on the appel- indicates that the case.10 The record rule, derlying the found that the district for over lant’s motion remained undecided peri court retained for a limited years because of an administrative er- four od and stated: ror. Because the filed his appears The time limitation to have as motion, thereby fulfilling duty his under purpose protection of the its dual dis- required to the court he was not remind continuing trict court from and successive appellant’s of his motion. The failure to importunities and to assure that the dis- remind the trial court of his motion cannot be power to trict court’s reduce of mo- considered to be an abandonment as a substitute for the will not be misused made under Rule tion. Once motion parole by the Parole consideration Rules of Criminal Pro- Board. filed, cedure is the failure of defen- Cleckley, Franklin D. 516 F.2d at 1289. See dant to remind thе trial court that Handbook on West Criminal Proce- pending does not constitute an abandon- (2d ed.l993)(the policy dure 11^135-36 be- plain on the ment of that motion. Based (1) protect hind Rule 35 is the court from timely filing language and the protect repetitious motions and reduction, of the motion for sentence we find “against usurpations by sentencing the court finding in that that the circuit court erred properly performed by of function the board by abandoned his motion the had parole”). “any ... failing to make reasonable effort expeditious ruling.” request or оbtain an However, many courts have not looked to imposed purposes the of the time limitation 2. Jurisdiction 35(b), by simply have looked to the Rule but delay amount of to determine whether The circuit court also ruled that lacked passed. See jurisdiction matter “reasonable” time had U.S. to consider the because (3rd Idone, Cir.1994)(twenty-five time was unreasonable. The passage the unreasonable); Diggs v. jurisdiction critical issue in months considered question was the (3rd Cir.1984)(two U.S., and a to consider the 740 F.2d 239 the circuit court’s refusal unreasonable); years U.S. v. merits. Rulе half considered appellant’s motion on its (6th Cir.1985)(eighteen Taylor, mo- F.2d 114 ‍​​​​‌​‌​‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌​​​‌​​​‌‌‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​‌‌​​​​‌‌​​​​‌​‍requires the court “determine the that unreasonable); U.S. v. time.” The “rea- months considered a reasonable tion within (7th Cir.1983), cert. Kajevic, 711 F.2d 767 limitation of Rule has sonable time” denied, 1047, 104 policy deci- 464 U.S. S.Ct. generally recognized as a been any delay (1984)(questioning be reconsidera- L.Ed.2d 182 preventing a trial court’s sion limitation).11 120-day yond inter- the sentencing decision so as to tion of a assigned Judge Ranson was not not 10. We note that appellant's June 1994 motion was 9.The August and none of until to this case timely that motion is and consideration of filed supra appellant’s to her. See letters was sent However, the 35(b). August by Rule barred 2, noting assignment. note case to and related motion was an amendment timely August filed 1991 motion. back to his Federal Rules of current Rule 35 of the 11. The appellant’s amended motion Consideration of the substantially our from Criminal Procedure differs by 120-day Rule the limitation of is not barred 35(b). pre-1985 of federal Rule 35 Rule 35. A version a sentence "district courts to reduce authorized imposed it has it is or after within 120 after case, delay wаs pre-1985 that the federal In this We note caused an administrative error of spoke having Rule 35 in terms of the sen appellant’s mo 120-day circuit court. The tencing action court take within filed, timely no taken provision In to the tion but action was period. similar years. on his motion for over four For of our was added second sentence 35(b), a purposes of Rule defendant should allowing the motion the court to “determine penalized by a court’s failure to act. not be within time.” Because strict delay solely by a application pre-1985 Rulе 35 A caused court’s adminis federal trative error not constitute unreason would have “manifest unfairness” should resulted U.S., 245), delay purposes for the (Diggs v. F.2d at the federal able otherwise, be implied “Were it the defendant would period” courts a “reasonable after sentencing penalized: once the court 120-day period to twice because allow the failed to act- his motion ... [almost Because of the court consider motion. years; again period and once because specified pre-1985 four] limited fed relief.” 35(b), narrоwly court’s own inaction bars Rule 35 eral Rule federal have courts (Gibbon, J., Diggs, interpreted 740 F.2d at 250 dissent what constitutes a “reasonable However, ing). penalizing In avoid a defen period.” at court has order to least one dant, we find when a fails to questioned that trial court interpretation this narrow when timely delay act on a defendant’s filed Rule administra excessive caused error, Hernandez, an tive error. 975 F.2d motion reason of administrative cannot, (10th Cir.1992), any delay 709 n. resultant as a matter the Tenth Cir law, delay barring an unreasonable cuit Court said: relief. Because the in this case We are reluctant to that a district conclude error, cir was caused administrative on a filed motion inaction finding cuit court it lacked erred deprive jurisdiction. can Because itself appellant’s consider the of our the district court conclusion 35(b) motion, filed we remand properly not denied Rule relief we do appellant’s for further consideration. al- question, here rule on the timeliness though that the ex- we note district court remand, ex On because of the plained delay resulted the motiоn from traordinary delay in this which was not having put “mislaid or aside or lost.” been appellant, caused the circuit court history the now Given of federal Rule should limit its consideration to interpretations find the of their for stale facts and events of 1991. In this federal 35(b) 35(b) policy underlying persuasive mer Rule have limited value the concerns are inquiry determining period” under not violated a broader because the “reasonable 35(b). We, term, sixty-year appellant, serving v. Her has our similar to U.S. nandez, yet parole to come the for its are reluctant аllow error not before board sentencing deprive worry court to a defendant of evaluation. The circuit need not court considering and oc consideration of the merits of his motion that facts events which Rather, during our Rule will with sentence reduction. under curred interfere 35(b), activity any parole a “reason determination what is board because to acted. period” parole able for a court rule on a sentence board has not When consider 35(b) motions, ing gener on the circuit courts reduction motion should be based ap only that case-by-case ally This should consider those events facts each case. 120-day period; how proach language filing with the occur within the consistent ever, long not as as the circuit court does rule. 35(b) day period appeal. period is the rule was The time where motion been affirmed Janiec, 983, may jurisdictional U.S.v. filed. U.S. v. F.2d extended.” See 505 2235, (3rd denied, Addonizio, Cir.1974), n. 3 cert. 420 U.S. 442 U.S. 99 S.Ct. 984-85 948, However, (1975). 95 S.Ct. 43 L.Ed.2d 427 In 60 L.Ed.2d 814 specify including Stallings, federal was to Cir. in amended several courts 4th sentencing mo supra, has ‍​​​​‌​‌​‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌​​​‌​​​‌‌‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​‌‌​​​​‌‌​​​​‌​‍limited that the district court "shall determine the found the аuthority beyond 120- within a time.” reduce a sentence tion to

305 board, standard, usurp may range anywhere it it can careful the role of from beyond filing period scrutiny scrutiny. consider matters no I almost concur to emphasize such consideration serves the ends of when that the context of Rule justice. Taylor, explain. See U.S. v. 768 F.2d should be the latter. me Let (6th Cir.1985) (“district judge 118 n. is not filed, At the time a Rule motion is required eyes developments to close his final sentence order has been entered. Inde- request”); favorable to the movant’s v. pendently sentencing оf Rule order Colvin, Cir.1981), 644 F.2d review, subject appellate itself is as both quoting, Ellenbogen, U.S. v. 390 F.2d constitutionality compliance to its and its (2nd Cir.), denied, cert. 393 U.S. with the West Rules of Criminal (1968)(district 21 L.Ed.2d 206 S.Ct. statutory applicable provi- Procedure and the court can “reconsider But, we sions. also describe the stándard of light any further information about the sentencing review used to review the final defendant or the case which have been an order as abuse of discretion. It creates a interim”). presented to him in the paradox to foist another “abuse of discretion” reasons, For the above stated we reverse response standard on a circuit court whose the decision of the Circuit Court of Kanawha may very impose I well be “the sentence County proceedings and remand this case for See, during trial was appropriate.” United opinion. consistent with this (1st DeCologero, States F.2d Cir.1987) (holding that the function of the

Reversed and remanded. pre-guidelines Rule of the federal rules merely “to allow the court to district CLECKLEY, Justice, concurring: if, reflection, decide on further the sentence only significant I note one area of differ- harsh”); accord, unduly seems United States majority’s ence from the otherwise admirable (9th Cir.1981).1 Smith, eiqplication subject. of this elusive my judgment, many perfectly In there are majority legitimate summary rejection “[a] states motion made reasons for 35(b) motion, despite presentation under Rule persuasive sympathetic of Criminal Procedure is directed to the of an otherwise and, particularly sound discretion of the circuit court case a defendant. This is so generally, grounds is not reviewable absent an abuse where the in such a motion asserted implicate illegally imposed of discretion.... The abuse of discretion do not an sen- tence or one that with an unlawful- standard on Rule 35 motions continues the is tainted traditionally ly corrupt principle, deference have accorded tri- motive. it cannot be sentencing.” reasonably expected in matters of that a trial court must al courts appellate type discre- majority concedes that our review exercise the same of constrained Although applied a Rule that it at under Rule is circumscribed. tion on require majority suggests sentencing phase of trial.2 To the standard of unreasonable, discretion, this of our circuit courts is review is an abuse of which was only congestion recently us as less than would lead to further docket characterized that would friendly, by adopting this standard because of the time and resources necessarily entertain- it has another effect have to be devoted to without elaboration salutary. ing for of sentence in the For we cannot lose a motion which is not light panoply and sight of discretion standаrd same with same abuse and, rights sentencing hearing many application in our of the associated with has faces contrite, 35(b) genuinely person and Federal is because 1. Prior to Rule to our cur- sentencing ‍​​​​‌​‌​‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌​​​‌​​​‌‌‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​‌‌​​​​‌‌​​​​‌​‍judge of Criminal Procedure was identical unique opportunity of has the 35(b). change provi- in federal rent Rule observing evaluating his or the defendant and adoption was done to reflect the sion Federal context, desirability leniency all her for in a live Sentencing Guidelines. rulings findings and of the trial court are entitled great respect and shоuld not be disturbed great phase trial court 2. Even at the trial has it is without foundation. unless credibility and demeanor discretion. Because determining play whether a a crucial role in 306 Johnson, not, hearing 159

proper. A Rule nor was State v. S.C. 156 S.E. be, sentencing hearing. it intended to unconditionally ever If 354 micro-re- succinctly put appropriately As one court and latter, unceremoniously view the we will be it, guarantee meant to Rule was “not putting garb on the of the former. replay the defendant an of the sen instant my The tenor of comments here are con DeCologero, tencing process.” 821 F.2d at sistent with the manner in which federal Thus, only way I believe that degree appellate courts understood the can discretion circuit court abuse his error, legal commit a deference was be accorded federal is to — Berger, see rel. rulings State ex Hoover W.Va. district court on motions to reduce (“a -, 12 483 S.E.2d circuit court sentences, prior adoption to the of the Feder abuses when it makes definition its discretion Sentencing al Guidelines and the alteration of law”), ruling an error of or that its In under federal rules. Unit marred a fundamental defect which inher (5th Lewis, 743 1129 ed States v. F.2d justice.3 ently miscarriage results in a No Cir.1984), it was said that a district court’s other claim of abuse of discretion should be ruling under would reversed “ reviewable under As matter of ‘only illegality gross for abuse discre policy, suggest it is undesirable to that we ” Rollerson, Quoting, tion.’ United States v. give any complaining will further review to a (5th Cir.1974) (emphasis 491 F.2d defendant, upon and call this Court should its added). See, Stump, United States v. legal forthrightly unequivocal wisdom to and (9th Cir.1990) (gross F.2d abuse of ly say analysis, For in the final so. standard); discretion United States v. Dista essentially plea leniency motion is sio, (1st Cir.1987) (gross 820 F.2d presumptively from a valid conviction. Unit standard). unpub In an abuse discretion (8th Colvin, ed States 644 F.2d opinion, the lished court United States v. Cir.1981). It is not our role to undermine Rosch, 1995 WL 695973 the valid exercise of constrained discretion Cir.1995) held that: “The has almost courts, ary authority by they circuit when unlimited discretion under Rule to re imposed have sentences that fall that fall sentence, ruling duce a and its will not be legitimately within the four corners of our except disturbed for dear abuse of discre constitutions, applicable federal and state (Citations omitted) added). (emphasis tion.” statutory provisions proce and our criminal This is the nature of the deference we must judges right have a dure rules. Circuit court long they accord circuit courts on the issue of a reduc to believe that so as have not nefariously violated a law or acted dis tion in sentence. sentences, criminatory way imposing present example case is an excellent through the nooks and Court will sift type what abuse of discretion claim we their crannies of dеcisions determined agree majority’s review. I with the should finding being not there. that which is opinion that the error in this in committed judicial of our true to the limitations constitu law, squarely it stance is one of falls role, matter “[t]he tional we must let appellate authority purview within the of our ... commutation or melioration be addressed It law to correct. is fundamental that a executive,” to the chief Colvin v. Common “court definition abuses its discretion

wealth, Ky. 57 S.W.2d —Koon, an error of when makes law.” (1933), length prison allow “[t]he (citation at -, 116 S.Ct. at 2047 omit in the sound discretion of [to] rest[ ] ted). However, prejudice, ‍​​​​‌​‌​‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌​​​‌​​​‌‌‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​‌‌​​​​‌‌​​​​‌​‍we should not let this case partiality, the trial court unless oppression, corrupt signal readily motive is shown.” send a will Court States, - U.S. -, Hairston, Indeed, in ed in United States v. 106- 3. Koon v. United Cir.1996), -, 135 L.Ed.2d 392 review for abuse of “[t]his 116 S.Ct. discretion, however, (1996), legal analysis sentencing under the Guidelines the includes a ... Supreme "de definition abuses it discretion when ‘[a] United States Court abolished law,' "unitary our review is review and established a abuse of makes an error overall novo” (Citation omitted). the Fourth Circuit stat- thus for abuse of discretion.” discretion standard.” As rulings scrutinize all reduction in sentence microscope glass-

with the used herein. The

es worn the Court in are to this case legal gross

reserved for clear error or abuse

of discretion. Cases that do not come within purview categories latter should be

greeted hostilely by this with Court blind-

folds.

Melody KING, A. Plaintiff

Below, Appellant,

Amy Danielle FERGUSON Sisson,

Frank Defendants

Below, Appellees.

No. 23170.

Supreme Court of Virginia. Sept. 24,

Submitted 1996.

Decided Nov.

Case Details

Case Name: State v. Head

Court Name: West Virginia Supreme Court

Date Published: Nov 14, 1996

Citation: 480 S.E.2d 507

Docket Number: 23404

Court Abbreviation: W. Va.