State v. Hazelwood

47.10.010(а)(2)(A) n.13, op. at 866 to demonstrate B. AS legislature import chapter not did intend level, pragmatic given On a and the court’s 17 n definition of chapter “neglect” into (a)(2)(A) discussion of subsection in In re identify any This examination does other S.A., agree I willingness with the court’s source, definitional and does not establish parent’s take into account a caring record in propose I reading that the was not intended considering for the child in par- whether the by legislature. “willing” ent to care for the child. I imprecision is unfortunate that unsuccessfully direct, proposed a more 47.10.010(a)(2) found in AS has been the appropriate, way interpret subsection litigation. source of so much Issues of (a)(2)(A)in In re S.A. jurisdiction CINA and termination are diffi enough overlay statutory cult without an

imprecision. example, years For after

conflicting interpretations AS

47.10.010(a)(2)(A),8 attempted the court

resolve that conflict when it issued re

S.A., (Alaska 1996). 912 P.2d 1235 Even relating

now linger issues to that subsection S.A, Nothing example, on. we said Alaska, Petitioner, STATE of would have the trial court in led this case to (Alas State, anticipate O.R. v. 1997), ka or this court’s discussion of sub Joseph HAZELWOOD, Respondent. J. (a)(2)(A) today’s section opinion. Inter No. S-7602. 47.10.010(a)(2)

pretation presented of AS has questions. the courts with difficult Our an Supreme Court of Alaska. questions may may swers to those or have original legislative coincided with the 3,Oct. intentions, degree and there is a certain supposition adopt propose when we

particular interpretation. might expect One State,

or wish having that the such received past,

mixed results in the would seek a com

prehensive revision of the CINA and Child

Protective Services statutes to enhance their

consistency, and to make sure that CINA

jurisdiction encompasses leg the harms the address,

islature wishes to and excludes

those it does not. Statutes from all the conveniently

states are collected 3 Thom Jacobs,

as A. Rights Children and the Law: (1995) Obligations (Appendices). itAs interpreted,

is now written and Alaska’s potentially

statue is overinclusive or under-

inclusive, both, depending point on one’s legisla

of view. It would be better for the and, assuming

ture to revisit the statute it is interpretations adopted

not content with the years, clarify this court in recent it to legislature’s

reflect the actual intentions. S.A., (Alaska J.L.F., (Alaska 1992), 8. See In re In re 828 P.2d 166 1996), AM., T.W.R., discussing overruling A.M. v. 891 P.2d 815 and J.L.F. to the limited (Alaska T.W.R., 1995); they may ability In re 887 P.2d 941 extent stated that the to care 1994); (Alaska 1993); (a)(2)(A). F.T. v. 862 P.2d 857 considered under subsection independent source. Hazelwood App.1992). P.2d 943 This Court

reversed, holding that the inevitable discov- ery apply immunity doctrine does cre- 1321(b)(5) § ated spill 33 U.S.C. oil Hazelwood, reports. State v. (Alaska 1993). remand, On Appeals again the Court of reversed Hazelwood’s conviction. This time it held that Hazelwood should have been tried under a criminal negligence theory negligence rather than the civil standard of culpability. The court ruled that criminal may predicated convictions be findings on simple ordinary negligence only when the Johnson, Attorney Eric A. Assistant Gen- heavily regulated offense involves а commer eral, Special Office of Ap- Prosecutions and activity. cial Hazelwood v. peals, Botelho, Anchorage, Bruce M. Attor- App.1996). ap Since the General, Juneau, ney for Petitioner. plication of former AS 46.03.790 is not re McComas, Friedman, James H. Rubin and heavily regulated industries, stricted White, Anchorage, and Richard H. Fried- Appeals Court of concluded that Hazelwood’s man, Friedman, White, Rubin and Anchor- conviction under a civil standard Respondent. age, for process. a granted was denial We petition state’s hearing and now reverse. COMPTON, C.J., Before MATTHEWS, RABINOWITZ and JJ. III.DISCUSSION

OPINION RABINOWITZ, Justice. The difference between criminal and civil I. INTRODUCTION negligence although major is distinct. standards, person both a “negli- Under acts petition In upon we are called to de- gently” perceive when he fails to a substan- cide whether due under Alaska’s unjustifiable particular tial and risk that a requires Constitution that a criminal offense result will occur. predicated proof be just on more simple part ways

The two tests in their II. AND FACTS descriptions PROCEEDINGS of the relevant risk. unobserved ordinary negligence, Under “the risk must be Respondent’s conviction stems from the degree of such a nature and that the failure 24, 1989, Exxon Valdez incident. On March perceive it constitutes deviation from the Captain Joseph ship Hazelwood ran his person standard of care that a reasonable aground Bligh reported off Reef and he was would observe the situation.” Id. at 1278. “evidently leaking Eventually, some oil.” negligence requires greater Criminal risk. gallons poured eleven million into Prince Wil- standard is met when the risk is liam A jury subsequently Sound. convicted negligent discharge Hazelwood of of oil. of such a degree nature and that the fail- perceive gross ure to Appeals The Court of constitutes a devi- reversed Hazel- wood’s conviction on ation from the standard of that a the basis that some of care person the evidence admitted at trial reasonable had been de- would observe spill rived from Hazelwood’s situation. Criminal oil is some- immunized report. thing slight degree The court held that these more than negli- statements could not have they gence necessary support been admitted even if a civil action inevitably would have been damages degree discovered from and is ‘punish- gross deserving permits so as to be activities for which licenses Hazelwood, required.” ment. at 1279 P.2d (quoting Cole added). (emphasis Id. at 1278-79 n. 16 (Alaska App.1992)).3 essence, then, negli the criminal Appeals’ ruling, defense of the Court of gence jury neg find presents argument. Hazelwood two lines of ligence gross just damages so as merit not First, guarantee pro- he contends of due punishment. spill but also does not over cess demands that criminal recklessness; require into there is still no predicated just ordinary negli- on more than actually ment that the defendant aware gence. precedents requir- our He reads negli the risk of harm. ing culpability of at mens rea least reckless gence require culpable does more mental Second, for criminal offenses. Hazelwood simple, ordinary negligence.1 state than maintains that the statute under which he statute which The under Hazelwood was incorporates was convicted itself the criminal provides in pаrt: convicted ‍‌​‌​​‌‌‌​‌​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​​​​​‌​​‌‍relevant argu- standard. We address each person may discharge, A cause to be ment in turn. discharged, permit discharge pe- or of into, upon ...

troleum or the waters or A. Due Negligence Process and a Civil except of the in quantities, land state Mens Rea Standard at times and locations or under circum- law Alaska department stances and conditions as the bymay regulation permit.... grounds process his due Hazelwood State, claim in our decisions Hentzner v. 46.03.790(a) (current Former AS AS (Alaska 1980); 613 P.2d 821 Kimoktoak v. 46.03.740). crime, At alleged the time of the State, (Alaska 1978); 584 P.2d 25 Alex v. person “negligently” who pro- violated this 1971); Spei P.2d guilty vision was of a B class misdemeanor. (Alaska 1969). del v. 460 P.2d 77 He Id.2 that in contends each of these cases we re Appeals The Court of concluded that recklessness, quired showing subjec or “negligently” the unadorned use of the word tive awareness of wrongdoing, order ambiguity created an as to whether the stat sustain the criminal conviction. ordinary rests on criminal ute or decisions, Relying past on its the court held These decisions stand for a com mаy imposed that criminal proposition: on the mon that criminal convictions simple ordinary basis negligence “only predicated must be on criminal intent.4 dealing heavily regulated words, for offenses with other there must be some level of Heck, (“It Pa.Super. 1. Accord Commonwealth v. 584 P.2d at 29 is well-settled that an act or (1985), aff'd, 491 A.2d 517 Pa. omission can result in serious criminal (1987) ("While negli 535 A.2d 575 both criminal only person requisite when a has the criminal gence 'gross’ and recklessness involve deviations Guest, intent.”); (Alas State v. 583 P.2d conduct, from reasonable recklessness includes ("[I]t 1978) deprivation liberty ka would be a disregard conscious of a risk whereas criminal process person without due of law to convict a accompanied by lack of awareness requirement a serious crime without the of crim risk.”). of a intent.”) Alex, (citing Speidel, inal and Kimokt- oak); Alex, ("[T]o 484 P.2d at 681 constitute person 2. A convicted of a B class misdemeanor guilt only wrongful there must be not act abut at the time of Hazelwood’s could offense intention.”); Speidel, 460 P.2d at 80 imprisonment "sentenced to a term of of not ("To person fеlony convict a for such an act 12.55.135(b). days.” more than 90 AS car], proving [failure to return a rental without conclusion, ruling legal 3. Because this ais we intent, deprive person tois such of due review de novo. See Aviation Associates v. TEM law.”). process of (Alas Helicopters, SCO 881 P.2d 1130 n. 4 I, Article section of the Alaska Constitution 1994). ka life, provides: person deprived "No shall be Hentzner, ("[C]riminal 4. See 613 P.2d at 825 liberty, property process without due of law.” predicate intent is an essential of criminal liabili Kimoktoak, 78); ty.”) (citing Speidel, 460 P.2d at culpability part mental on the of the defen- Hazelwood’s distinc- conduct/circumstances principle pre- matter, dant. tion is does untenable. As an initial we a civil negligence clude standard. it note that nowhere do our prece- What dents generally does mean is that we will differentiate between read into the minimum rea, a criminal mens rea for statute some level of mens circumstances “as and conduct. Alex, Nor opposed any is there reason liability.” many strict criminal to do so. In cases, added); only (emphasis 484 P.2d at 681 see circumstances of also Kimoktoak, objectionable. offense that render it 584 P.2d at 29. It is No one strict liabil- suggest, example, would ity, standard, and not the Rice’s transportation game exception would still have “is to the rule which been criminally Rice, sanetionable had it not been taken criminal intent.” State illegally. (Alaska 1981). proscribes The statute underly- requirement The of crim- ing conduct when the inal relevant circum- emphasize specific intent does “not present. stance is Alex, The same was true in wrongfulness.” awareness Indeed, cases, Guest. in both had we not at 681.5 applied negligence standard to the circum- point Guest, is illustrated State v. offense, stance of the it would have included (Alaska 1978), Rice, 583 P.2d 836 no mens rea element whatsoever. case, upheld each we imposition of criminal sanctions on the basis thinkWe Hazelwood confuses vo simple, ordinary ap- Guest lition with many intent. While crimes do not proved Superior Court’s instruction that require that .underlying their action be car guilty defendant was not statutory mind, guilty ried out with a always it is rape reasonably if he his bеlieved victim was prosecution defense to that the conduct was effect, consenting age. In we sustained voluntary. every case, alleged prosecution on charges that the defendant infraction product must have been the negligent was as to the age. will, victim’s coercion, See duress, free and or mental Guest, 583 (quoting Wayne P.2d at 839 n. 5 illness. Had terrorists boarded the Exxon Scott, Jr., R. LaFave & Austin Valdez, W. Criminal example, for and demanded that Ha- 47, (1972)). § Law at 356-57 Similarly, Rice Reef, run zelwood his Bligh vessel onto prohibition read into a criminal transpor- on fact that knowledge he did so even with and illegally tation ‍‌​‌​​‌‌‌​‌​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​​​​​‌​​‌‍of game taken a requirement purpose would be irrelevant. He could de that the defendant negligent was at least on fend the basis that his act was not volun game illegally fact the was taken. tary, See properly and thus could not be attrib Rice, cases, 626 P.2d at 110. In both a mens uted him. This is not the case here. simple rea of ordinary negligence or was compulsion Hazelwood faced no that would made the basis of the offense. excuse his conduct at the time the Exxon Bligh

Valdez rammed into Reef. While there 2. Hazelwood’s conduct!circumstances is a voluntariness element every

distinction offense, because Hazelwood’s commissions alone, were his and his prerequisite is .this distinguishes Hazelwood Rice and satisfied here.6 on ground Guest that in negli each the gence applied only above, standard was to the cir firmly As noted it is established in crime, cumstances of the not the underlying jurisprudence our that a mental state of sim process, maintains, conduct. Due he ple still or ordinary negligence support can government to demonstrate criminal conviction. Further decisions re veal, was prohibit however, “volitional conduct of there that in some situations more ed act.” required, Spei will be and sometimes less. Salmond, (8ih Jurisprudence See also J. 410 6. For further elaboration of the be- distinction ed.1930) ("[n]egligence rightly ... treated as a Brady, tween intent and volition see B. James rea, standing form of mens wrongful side side with Negligence: Reply Punishment Hall, A Professor ground respon- intention as a formal 107, (1972). 22 Buff. L.Rev. 109-16 sibility”). 880 wrote,

del, 80, аgo, Blackstone constitute a “[T]o 460 at found a denial P.2d laws, against con human there must first process where the defendant had been crime will, secondly “simple neglectful negligent or fail be a vicious an unlawful victed of upon 4 consequent ure to return a rented automobile.” act such a vicious will.” case, century finding at least a 21. A and a half later Bish we insisted on Comm. culpability op large in can crime reckless order affirmed: “There be no Bishop, imposed. sanctions to be small without an evil mind.” 1 Crim (9th ed.1930) § inal Law 287.7 hand, On the other elsewhere we have history, throughout Yet our common law allowed the mens rea element to be dis entirely. parallel imposition tradition has allowed pensed with We have allowed strict “public proof without formal of criminal to be read into welfare of See, Rice, liability, early intent. An version of strict e.g., fenses.” 626 P.2d at 107. deodands, law of public proscrip These welfare offenses are has been traced back to early history. in A was an “heighten tions which the duties of those Western deodand industries, trades, object pаrticular prop that was forfeited to the Crown for control of health, directly indirectly public causing the death of a erties or activities affect being. generally, human safety or welfare.” Morissette v. United See Wendell Oliver (1881). States, Holmes, Jr., 246, 254, 240, 245, Law 24-25 342 U.S. 72 S.Ct. Common original reasoning 288 See also v. The was the instru- L.Ed. Haxforth Idaho, guilty ment itself was of the offense. Idaho test). (App.1990) (four-part corollary, As a Although the deodand form was abolished requirement imputed only mens rea when England 9 & 10 c. Vict. Guest, penalty a serious attaches. See incorporated never was into the American 838; Kimoktoak, 29; at at P.2d P.2d Tate, law, common see Parker-Harris Co. v. 80; Speidel, People see also (1916), 135 Tenn. 188 S.W. 54 its sub Olson, Mich.App. 448 N.W.2d contemporary pro stance survives rem (1989). Also, no mental element will be itself, ceedings. object The rather its provides legis when a statute “clear owner, See, formally charged. e.g., human Rice, contrary.” lative intent to the Plymouth Pennsylvania, 1958 v. One Sedan 108; California, v. at see also Lambert 355 693, 1246, 380 U.S. 85 S.Ct. 14 L.Ed.2d 170 225, 228, 240, 242-43, 2 78 S.Ct. U.S. L.Ed.2d (1965); v. United States Gallons Whis 43 of (1957) (“There in 228 is wide latitude 188, (1876); key, 93 U.S. 23 L.Ed. 846 United lawmakers to declare an offense and to ex U.S.(8 Coffee, Bags v.1960 States of knowledge diligence elements of clude and Cranch) (1814). 398, 3 L.Ed. 602 The Su definition.”); Gregory from its v. cf. preme of the States has recent Court United App.1986). ly proof culpability affirmed that of the moral explanation why necessary predicate of the owner is not a to simple An of or ordi- punitive nary negligence ap- these forfeitures. See Bennis v. standard is nevertheless — U.S.—, Michigan, propriate 116 S.Ct. in this case consideration (1996). upheld L.Ed.2d 68 Bennis a modern- of the reasons that variable levels of mens sorts, day allowing deodand of the state to satisfy rea will for different of- any seize and forfeit an automobile without fenses. showing that the owner knew her husband liability might prostitutes. 3. The strict tradition use the vehicle to solicit Id. The rule that a criminal offense exists at guilty guilty year In

the intersection of a act and a the same the deodand rule was commonly repealed England, practice began mind is viewed as the of in to bedrock new develop place criminal common law. two centuries in its on both sidеs of the Over Morissette, persistent systems as See also 342 U.S. at 72 S.Ct. at and in mature of law belief ("The injury consequent that an can amount in will and a contention freedom of human ability duty to to a crime when inflicted intention is no and of the normal individual evil.”). provincial good choose between and transient notion. universal Woodrow, shore, Regina began In 15 M. M. On this Atlantic. & courts also to allow (Exch.1846),the of Exchequer al proof Court for certain offenses without of imposition lowed the £200 fine on a during practice intent The era. first possession tobacco for Massachusetts, dealer adulterated apparently took root in quite tobacco, without the dealer evidence “had cases, independently English of the knowledge suspect” product’s or cause to spread quickly Again, from there.11 crimes Pollock, C.B., condition. Per at 416. which recently required had criminal intent Regina The case was reaffirmed v. Ste punished could now be without it.12 Q.B. phens, L.R. 1 The Court accepted that a new class offenses without liability Theories strict ‍‌​‌​​‌‌‌​‌​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​​​​​‌​​‌‍being. a mens rea had come into element product many While of these statutes were a years, Over the several authorities have technological change8 modern sensibilit attempted appropriate to define the role and ies,9 and thus no common had law anteced scope of the strict offense. ent, others old crimes which had overlaid Sayre catalogued Professor all such crimes an intent element.10 once included appearing reports. His classifications in- up development Cundy Court summed minors, alcoholics, clude sales of alcohol (1884): Q.B.D. LeCocq, L.R. 13 Indians, soldiers, slaves; students and sales time, applicable butter; old and as to the com- impure foods, particularly milk and

mon law or to earlier statutes the maxim articles; sales of misbranded and various every criminal offense [that there must regulations. automobile and traffic See guilty may general be a have been of mind] Sayre, supra 84-87. n. Pro- application; but a difference has arisen Sayre fessor employing was unable avoid precision owing greater of modern categories broad “Criminal Nuisances” impossible apply ... statutes. It is now Regulations and “General Police for the Safe- statutes, generally the maxim to all ty, Well-Being Health or of the Community.” reported the substance of all the cases is He strict recommends that crimes necessary object that it is look at light penalties, though enforced with he con- each Act that is under consideration to see cedes this limit not been has followed. Id. at knowledge whether how far is of the generality 79-82. He concludes with the essence of the offence created. that the of mens rea is suited abandonment J.) (Stephen, (upholding Id. at 210 situation's where the need social order strict lia- bility selling outweighs punish- conviction for alcohol to an in- the need individualized person). toxicated ment.13 Id. See, 256-57, 240, e.g., Compare Dunning, 8. S.Ct. Provincial Motor Cab Co. v. 96 L.Ed. 288. id. at (1909) (automobile 260-62, 246-47, 248-49, rules). safety Sayre, 2 K.B. 599 72 S.Ct. at and supra, at 72. See, Masson, e.g.,

9. v. 2 Stonehouse K.B. 818 (1921) (strict liability telling); Regina for fortune Compare 12. 3 Ohio St. Miller v. 487 (1880) Bishop, (housing Q.B.D. v. L.R. 5 259 (1854) (requiring selling for offense of intent lunatics). minor); and alcohol to a Duncаn 26 (1846) (intent Humph. Tenn. 7 150 Stevenson, Compare Regina 10. 3 Fost. & F. transporting for offense of slave without (N.P.1862) (requiring proof 106 of butcher’s consent); master’s McCutcheon v. with 69 People, knowledge selling for offense of of unfitness un- (1873) (interpreting Ill. 601 Illinois statute meat), Corp., sound with v. Winchester 2 Hobbs adopted rea); requiring one as from the Ohio not mens (1910) (conviction K.B. 471 under Public Health Susqu. Steam State v. Baltimore require proof Act of 1875 does not that butcher Co., (no (1859) required). 13 Md. 181 intent unsoundness). could have known of meat’s Morissette, Supreme 13. Court the draws atten- Sayre, 11. See Francis Bowes Public Welfare Of 55, 62, greater regulation by (1933). tion the created fenses, need for 33 Colum. L.Rev. 64 by well; changes wrought the industrial Sayre’s aged revolution. Professor work has his article emphasizes Echoing Sayre, light penal- supplied "public the Court the label welfare offense” efficiency protecting ties and "the high places. controls has been influential The Su in preme presently social adopted deemed essential to the order as Court federal rule of statuto Morissette, ry boxing constituted.” 342 U.S. at construction his in strict criteria Morissette, Ultimately, though, liability crimes in 342 U.S. S.Ct. at 248. Court al- Although widely accepted, the mala jurisdictions between Some differentiate prohi- legislative approaches mala are mala in se and in se and discretion offenses that bita, liability only for the lat- allowing unsatisfactory. strict remain We note our view n. Sayre, supra n. at 70 traditionally ter. See re that even crimes which had Although court has relied on this differ- quired proof of criminal intent have been ence, jurisdictions’ these other decisions recharacterized as strict crimes. us, guidance See, McCutcheon, 601; as we have drawn little e.g., Ill. at Balti See opposite Co., conclusion from the distinction. Susqu. & Steam 13 Md. at 186. more Hentzner, (separate at 826 intent Nevertheless, reject any grants we rule that necessary not for offenses that are element impose legislature discretion to unbridled se). mala in exception An strict crimes. legislative requirement mens rea for “clear dispense Generally, those courts that with contrary” potential intent to the has the pro- criminal intent for crimes that are mala Speidel, we swallow the rule. As said is, immoral, patently have hibited explicit, even where a statute is legislature followed the rationale that the did require higher degree of will on occasion carry a these new offenses to intend culpability. (replacing P.2d at 80 very meaning The of ma- mental element. negligence threshold of AS 28.35.026 with a wrong it it prohibitum lum is that because standard). recklessness crimes, by prohibited. Common law wrongful, require their nature are scienter culpability inherent to the because moral principle 5. The reasonable deterrence however, reasoned, offense. The courts have appropriate place begin explana An penalized only that when conduct is because objective tion for fault crimes14 is with the command, legislative then the nature of objections them of those who would abolish solely proscription derives from that Hall, altogether. Negligent Be Jerome If the did not include a mandate. statute havior Should Be Excluded Penal Lia from (1963), element,

mental then the crime was not bility, 63 Colo. L.Rev. 632 Professor have one. meant to utility challenges alleged Hall of sanc prohibitum The malum in se dis /malum liability. tions based on and strict overlaps tinction with another theme this He contends crimes that are not based on area, legislative that of deference to di are, subjective by wrongdoing awareness of routinely rection. Courts hold that whether terms, extremely their not addressed to “the charged is an element of a offense scienter freedom, important degree au of individual question legislative a“is intent to be con tonomy, expressed and awareness ... by the Court.” States v. Bal strued United (voluntary) by action a normal Id. at adult.” int, 250, 252, 301, 302, U.S. S.Ct. doers, Merely negligent harm contends L.Ed. 604 Even Morissette concedes Hall, thought in the Professor “have not least the concerns raised exclusion of behavior, duty, dangerous of their their justify judicial mens rea “would not disre (footnote omitted). any sanction.” Id. at 641 gard of a clear command to that effect from difficulty with this thesis is that Morissette, Congress.” 342 U.S. at 254 n. legal regulations operate only can assumes Rice, Compare at 245 n. 14. S.Ct. State through the offender’s conscious reason. A (Alaska 1981). Since, by supplied by rebuttal is Professor Hart: terms, prohibitum its the malum offense is a law, pun- creature of statute rather than common the connexion between the threat of subsequent good it that to is is here courts will most often defer ishment and behavior legislative [always] pic- the rationalistic intent. of kind lows that it does not undertake “to delineate a 14. These are offenses that are based either on

precise comprehensive line set forth criteria negligence; they require or or do not strict distinguishing require that a for between crimes any subjective wrongdoing the awareness of on that do not.” It mental element crimes part. defendant’s area concedes that the in this is "neither law. settled nor static.” Id. guiding-type in case. The The fulcrum for deciding

tured level what something is the absolute for a punishment threat of is which intent minimum faculties, particular question offense is a an his when [the offender] causes to exert expectation of conformity individual rea something than enters as a is rather which sonable. Due under Alaska’s Con conforming for to law when he reason stitution that social be interests deliberating it or is whether to break not. weighed against those of the individual. perhaps goad is than a It more like a society’s compli While interest in obtaining guide. But there to be noth- seems to me regulations its strong, ance with is it can ing disreputable in the law allowing outweigh never individual’s interest way, arguable in this that function and it is punishment freedom from substantial for a way functions in than in it rather or reasonably violation he she could not way frequently rationalistic more is expected have been to avoid. The thresh generally allowed. then, question, old is whether the defen Hart, Responsibili- H.L.A. Punishment and society is something dant’s conduct which ty 134 reasonably expect could to deter. “goad,” guide, The law’s rather than its is principle The of reasonable de emphasized by also Professor LaFave. He imposition terrence allows the liabili of strict asks whether more than civil ty in Generally, sepa some circumstances. offense, be should for a criminal ratе mental element proved need be concludes “that there is no need to choose by when the failure abide inher rule is primary His one answer for all crimes.” ently occurs, in unreasonable. is on focus deterrence: stance, person’s where conduct hedged is principal policy question The is whether by regulation, such may readily that one objective punishment the threat of fault guid assume her routine his decisions are people conducting will deter from them- Thus, ed rules. strict permit is way risk selves such as to create heavily regulated ted for industries. See Though disputed, others. it matter App. Cole v. P.2d people seem that can would some be made 1992). operating in Persons envi rule-laden think, act, they possi- before about the ronments, whose actions have a substan consequences acting, ble so that health, public on impact safety, tial wel objective-fault crimes existence does fare, reasonably can assumed aware risky tend reduce conduct.... governing their codes. point legislature might, is that the in the type Anothеr of law whose violation police power, require subjec- exercise of its inherently unreasonable is in se the malum objective tive fault for some crimes and Hentzner, explained we offense. As these fault for other crimes. “reasoning are crimes which of so- members (footnotes omitted). LaFave 337-38 condemnable,” ciety regard that such of the commission nec- “awareness of the act here, grounded theory in a of reason- essarily carries with it an awareness deterrence, any explanation able for ob- wrongdoing.” 613 at 826. jective fault origins. crimes must its have Despite challenge, Professor Finally, exception regu- Hall’s cannot exists for those disputed punishment the threat of lations call for fine. modest necessarily Generally, deters. Even an offender underlying when their not so conduct is not of his own inherently does accord realize his unwholesome that it rea- can be many is wrongful, sonably conduct he can in cases be was assumed misdemeanant Indeed, to take care. causes wrongfulness. made Coercion that aware of its these pay important punishments usually offender to attention can aim to public serve coerce the aims by large, that would not achieved at are meant to social be influence behavior proscriptions very implied by come into effect when infliction. their There is no transgressor recognizes reasonably harm in assumption transgressor the the his that the behavior. her should have been aware he or she had 884 negligence necessary and sufficient Broad strict liabili- is both the law.

stepped outside normally Negligence, run afoul of sort would Constitution. ty of this under Alaska’s it is allowed because process,15but here negligence, the mini- gross is rather light. penalties the mum, the neces- we believe it is not because case; every prosecutor’s in- sary element of then, deterrence, is the basic Reasonable deed, separate all have allowed a courts process balance principle of the due between dispensed showing culpability to of mental be ulti- and societal interests. The individual society altogether can with some circumstances. reason- question mate whether Rather, negligence the to conform his or is constitu- ably expect individual standard to the For the strict liabili- conduct law. tionally approximates her it permissible because separate showing depar- of a ty exceptions, at: an process guarantee aims what the due unnecessary, social mores is ture from im- be that criminal will assurance reasonably This presumed.16 be notion can posed only at issue when conduct conformity duty social of a of reasonable expect to society reasonably can something law of mens rea. undergirds the entire deter.17 understanding, of this confines Within ap negligence Partisans of the criminal legislature’s defer to the directives. we will proach expressed that an have the concern in- appropriately what conduct is decides ordinary the crimi negligence gives standard herently wrongful reasoning members of to unseemly proceeding nal an resemblance society and when the social interest Heck, 341 tort v. law. Commonwealth rea. without mens enforcement 183, 212, (1985), Pa.Super. aff'd, 491 A.2d 224 accorded, it must be for deference be (1987), 192, Pa. 517 535 A.2d 575 reasonably apparent that the enactment was minimum, adopts negligence as a criminal liability judgment. of such Strict exercise pur civil law serves notes that the applied simply expedite punish- cannot poses of criminal unsuited “harshness expecta- there is no reasonable ment when punishment.” simply Tort aims to “shift tion of deterrence. injuries respon economic of onto those costs sible for them.”18 Id. simple negligence sufficiency 6. The of pro to differentiate criminal desire exceptions, of these strict Outside simple ceedings appears to separate showing proceedings from civil though, LaBonte, 792, 177, 465, Tex.App. 794 v. 27 11 State v. 120 Vt. 144 A.2d 15. See Anderson 33, (1889) ("To (1958) ("the pros- power 34 coerce legislature S.W. to define a every person supervise per- all other ecution ordinary upon negligence has crime based been destroy things, sons and would division recognized jurisdictions”). in numerous Cf. responsibility by whiсh alone business labor 652, 530, Hedges, v. 8 Wash.2d 113 P.2d State safely Nothing conducted.... can be can (1941) (whether gross negligence use 536 effectually guarded everything when to be negligence province of is a "matter within the by everybody.") guarded legislature”). words, do In other even strict crimes noteworthy aspect 18.A ‍‌​‌​​‌‌‌​‌​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​​​​​‌​​‌‍is that while Heck requirement dispense with not Rather, statute there re- they pre- vehicular homicide at issue because rest on fair intent. unreasonableness, standard, they sumption quired do re- court the lower separately. quire that be shown negligence per had was se because found there traffic the defendant had committed a minor overwhelming majority also 17. We note that the 189, Heck, Pa.Super. 491 341 violation. See ordinary jurisdictions on allow crimes based A.2d While we to follow Heck's decline 190, People, 159 See Daniels v. Colo. adopting the criminal stan- lead in dard, 316, Miles, (1966); v. 317-18 State 203 process con- we that that court's due find 707, 166, (1969); 169-70 Com Kan. jury finding justified. Although cerns were Burke, 697, Mass.App.Ct. v. 383 monwealth sufficient, ordinarily ordinary negligence is Olson, (Mass. 1978); People 78-80 N.E.2d finding negligence pеr made when has not been (two (1989) Mich.App. 448 N.W.2d invoked; satisfy approach se is such does McKee, upheld); year People v. 15 Mich. sentence unless the requirement of criminal intent (1968); App. 166 N.W.2d State v. exceptions underlying meets infraction one of the Smith, (1988), N.C.App. S.E.2d 33 liability. for strict (1989); aff'd, 323 N.C. 374 S.E.2d State Jenkins, (1982); 294 S.E.2d 44 S.C. negligence. ordinary ap- of criminal negligence drive the definition code is standard typically plied through That is characterized as negligence” standard the words “civil or ordinary negligence. “something “ordinary more” negligence.” These added terms Director Prosecu See Andrews v. Pub. only differentiating are used when common (“similar (1937) tions, Crim.App. Rep. negligence negligence. from criminal Other- lack as will liabili of care such constitute civil wise, negligence always criminal is referred (Lord Atkin). ty enough”) is not Thus the specifically, “negligence” always to and de- only precision consensus available the ordinary, civil negligence.20 886 narrowly strictly against Honey v. read and construed meaning. See Neal

ference in Andrews, (7th Cir.1994); 707 well, Inc., 860, government.” v. the State F.3d 863 33 (Alaska State, 900, opiniоn App.1985), Dep’t Reve P.2d 907 Parcel v. United Serv. Andrews, 85, nue, adopted by v. 86 P.2d 191 State 102 687 Wash.2d State, (Alaska 1986); v. 706 see also Wells (“It (Alaska App.1985) is well P.2d 713 that, IV. CONCLUSION with the rule established accordance lenity, ambiguities penal statutes must adoption of an ordi- Superior Court’s accused.”); in favor of the Man be resolved nary was not erroneous. negligence standard 1320, 1323 derson v. holding of the therefore REVERSE the We (“Since ambiguous App.1983) provision Appeals on issue. The case is Court [the defendant’s] and both the state’s and Appeals for consid- remanded to the Court of reasonable, interpretations arguably we originally any eration of unresolved issues interpretation] agree that defendant’s [the appeal.22 raised Hazelwood on U.S., prevail Bell 349 [v. should under the (1955)] 75 99 L.Ed. 905 U.S. S.Ct. FAJBE,JJ., not EASTAUGH and ”). Accordingly, lenity.’ ‘rule of the statute participating. require negli must be construed Justice, COMPTON, dissenting. Chief negligence.2 That gence, rather than civil I. INTRODUCTION should end the discussion. persuaded I am not that a criminal offense predicated proof negligence. on of civil can be Applica- B. Mandates Alaskа Precedent view, my existing precedent nor neither Negligence tion a Criminal Stan- policy supports I

public such a result. there- dard. fore dissent. decision, Turning to the merits of the opinion of the court does considerable vio- II. DISCUSSION Speidel precedent. lence to Ambiguity Required A. The as (Alaska 1969), rejected expressly P.2d 77 we Rea under Former AS Mens defining a civil standard 790(a) Application OS. Mandates U6. punishment. minimum mens rea for criminal Negligence the Criminal Standard. (“To person felony See id. at 80 convict a intent, proving ... is to deny The court that there is an without does law.”). deprive person of ambiguity required as to the mens rea such 46.03.790(a).1 distinguish- articulates no basis for conviction under former AS The court ing Speidel,3 concluding I see no basis for “Ambiguities criminal statutes must Hazelwood, apply 834 n. must be construed so as not to such 22. See State v. P.2d (Alaska 1993). standard. felony, 3.Speidel prosecution Indeed, involved for a rath- pages the court devotes several of dis- argued It could be er than misdemeanor. proper interpretation cussion to the issue of potеntial punishment, greater greater Maj. op. at 885-886. Such dis- of the statute. must be the minimum mens rea for the crime. unnecessary cussion would be in the absence of that since the crime at issue could then said any ambiguity as to the mens rea under misdemeanor, felony than a as in here is a rather the statute. Speidel, the minimum mens rea is civil rather than criminal any ambiguity in a It is well established that be resolved in of a construc preferable statute should favor Such a rule would be to that adopts. tion that does not raise constitutional concerns. the court A distinction on this basis misdemeanors, Borough holding See Kenai Peninsula Cook Inlet Re miti- would limit this Inc., (Alaska 1991) gion, expansive gating dangers inherent in more ("[S]tatutes support- holding. are to be construed to avoid a sub It also would seem to be more unconstitutionality adopt policy permit misdemeanor stantial risk of where able as matter of reasonable....”). negligence, ing based on civil than it is such a construction is permit felony penalties similarly. application our of a civil Since distinction, does the question, cаse law draws no such nor would raise a constitutional the statute control, or Speidel upon, does not that it does decisions all ap rest and refer with to, require application negli- proval See, of a criminal in Speidel. our e.g., decision Hentzner, gence 827; Kimoktoak, standard. 613 P.2d at 29; Alex, noted, P.2d at P.2d at 681. As Many upon of the decisions which the Speidel rejected negligence a civil standard reject liability court relies strict rather than in favor of requirement. a “criminal intent” negligence, Maj. op. civil as court the states. Speidel, intent,” 460 P.2d at “Criminal However, at 879. decisions in these fact do Speidel, as defined in Alex and does not not authorize civil as the mini include civil mum punishment. mens rea for criminal See, State, e.g., Hentzner 613 P.2d 825 argument court bases much of its on (Alaska 1980) “an (requiring awareness of (Alaska Guest, 1978), State v. 583 P.2d 836 in wrongdoing” liability); for criminal Alex v. which the statutory defendant was accused of (Alaska State, 1971) (hold 682 rape. We “the charge noted that of statuto- ing required that escape crime of intentional ry rape legally unsupportable is under the departure сustody); from Kimoktoak v. Alex, principles Speidel, and Kimoktoak State, (Alaska 1978) (im 29-30 unless a defense of reasonable mistake of age plying in a hit-and-run criminal statute a' is allowed.” Id. at 839. To fail to do so requirement that the defendant have know would impose be “to without ingly stop assistance), failed to and render any criminal mental element.” Id. We then superseded by on grounds statute other as observed that Wylie noted in 797 P.2d 660 n. 8 Although 11.15.120 any AS silent as to is. (Alaska App.1990). Demonstrably, these intent, requirement many this is true of proposition cases do not the support that a felony requirement statutes. The of crimi- provides civil standard the mini nal commonly intent is then inferred. mum mens rea for a criminal conviction. To fact, cases, in particular such where the contrary, reject the these decisions a strict public statute is not a type welfare in favor of a negli standard not civil offense, requirement either a of criminal gence requirement standard in favor of a but intent into must read the statute or it See, Hentzner, e.g., of “criminal intent.” must be found unconstitutional. Since (“[Cjriminal P.2d intent is an essential possi- statutes should construed where predicate Kimoktoak, liability.”); of criminal unconstitutionality, ble to avoid it is neces- 584 P.2d at (requiring “criminal intent” to sary requirement here to infer a of crimi- Alex, support conviction); 484 P.2d at 681 nal intent. (“[T]o guilt only constitute there must be not intention.”). wrongful act but a criminal (citations omitted). Id. and footnotes concludes, argued, could be court as the that The court mischaracterizes in Guest as any “criminal intent” means mental state the serting “upheld imposition that we legislature required to be determines for the simple, on the sanctions basis of particular crime, excepting only strict liabili Maj. ordinary negligence.” op. ty. However, Alex, at 879. To in the court noted that contrary, exist, only Guest for issue involved impera “criminal “[it] intent” to whether the “reasonable tive ... act defendant’s belief’ that an accused’s be other than simply Alex, age the victim was of consent neglectful.” inadvertent or added). negated necessarily P.2d at the criminal intent im (emphasis This state Guest, plied ment indicates the statute. 583 P.2d at 839- that “criminal intent” entails something “neglеctfulness” separate 40. The crime more than mere itself involved ordinary interpretation negligence. This mental state. The con discussion Guest belief,” strengthened cerning fact that the cited “reasonable which the court Moreover, adopt any argument

court this such a rule in this case. serious to weaken “severe" potential impris- state, case involves a sentence of heightened require a mental days. penalty sufficiently onment for 90 culpable “simple less mens rea than is ordinari negligence,”4 der a wrongly equates with defense, required. no bear Beran v. ly had See involved C.J., convic App.1985) (Bryner, core ing on the elements Quest (“[T]he did charged legitimate offense itself. concurring) tion of the state has a negli “simple participants authorize conviction right [commercial to hold Moreover, asserts. gence,” as the court care fishing] industry higher standard of Speidel. Spei not overrule Since appropriate Guest did as a might otherwise be Guest, good notwithstanding del remains law responsibility.”). As predicate for criminal approved tanker, it is incorrect assert Guest captain of Hazelwood cer an oil cases, in all as does heavily tainly qualifies participant in a the ease at bar considers the court. Since AS industry. former regulated requirement in the con the “criminal intent” 46.03.790(a) participants applied not ques a core of the crime text of element to mem production operations, but also oil defense, tion, rather than in the context of a public. statute general of the The bers not apply. Guest does a require therefore cannot be construed to apply which could not to mem mental state jurisprudence recognizes ex- several Our accepts general public, one bers of unless to the minimum “criminal intent” ceptions proposition single a the troublesome that in the requirement outlined above eases. in a can have mean passage statute different are nor exceptions applicable, None of these for For this rea ings different defendants. purport apply any court of them. does thе son, apply the appeals the court refused to of recognized exception “public Speidel an for heavily regulated industry exception to this “health, offenses, relate welfare” which to the Hazelwood v. 912 P.2d case. public, safety, and of the and which welfare” (Alaska App.1996). parties have The “commonly relatively carry that challenged that decision. small, grave to an of- damage [do] no reputation.” Speidel, fender’s 460 P.2d exceptions mini- none Since of States, (citing v. 78-79 Morissette United in- requirement mum mens rea of criminal 246, 250, 240, 243, 96 L.Ed. U.S. S.Ct. appli- apply, precedent requires our tent (1952)). too The crime at issue here carries as negligence of a criminal cation potential for penalty imprisonment a severe — Speidel and Alex. we held ninety days exception. fall within this —to Rice, 626 P.2d See State Policy Imposition Public Precludes C. of 1981) (Matthews, J., concurring) (“[A]nypris- That Criminal Penalties Conduct for traumatic, important, on sentence is an even Merely under a Is Unreasonable Civil being_ in the life a human Fur- event of Standard. ther, any prison a likely to have sentence rep- considerable detrimental effect on one’s imposition accepts court of crimi The utation.”). any nal sanctions conduct which “is some for society reasonably expect recognized exception thing have an for could We also ac “heavily regulated Maj. op. within indus at 883. The court activities deter.” legisla try.” excep knowledges id. at Under that this test affords the See 107-08. that tion, heavily regulated complete impose participants in activi ture discretion merely process upon any as a conduct which is ties have reduced due interest sanctions Maj. op. at participation, negligent there under a civil standard. consequence diffi may subject approach fraught be un with fore to criminal 884-885. person’s may be penalties may imposed less not to belief. While unreasonable, belief whereas severe showing upon a of civil "negligent” as such. it cannot be Therefore, concepts negligence although the Indeed, "simple negli- Guest concern did not belief” both involve a "reason- and "reasonable standard, gence" a defen- but instead involved standard, they person” properly be cannot able accept the dant's I cannot "reasonable belief.” notion, single into a the court’s conflated person’s view that a reasonable or unreasonable interpretation requires. Guest "simple properly belief can be characterized as conduct, negligence." "Negligence” refers to cutties, adopted Moreover, punishment. as a mat of criminal and should not be policy. ter specifically standard is calculated to “in proof ordinary sure[ ] civil view, my notions fundamental fair- give will not liability.” rise to criminal Com ness, process issues, which underlie all due mentary on the Alaska Revised Criminal require something showing more than Code, Supplement Senate Journal No. 47 at reasonably5’ “failure to act before a defendant 142-43, 1399, quoted 1978 Senate Journal may imprisonment. subjected See Melendez, Andrew v. Ariz. 1066 n. 5 State (Aaska (1992) (“The App.1982). course, touchstone of due Of the fact that fairness.”). ... legislature is fundamental pun Professor has restricted criminal “general LaFave feeling” notes that a has ishment to conduct culpable which more among judges arisen than “slight” does not render [Sjomething legislature constitutionally more [i]s forbidden to ordinary negligence abrogate than the that restriction. the cur liability. which is for tort sufficient rent definition of criminal pro thought this: When comes to com- [i]s persuasive argument vides a that societal person pensating injured for damages per notions of fundamental fairness do not suffered, negligently has the one who in- imprisonment mit simple neglectful jured ought pay an innocent victim to ness in civil negligence embodied stan it; but is problem when the one of whether notions, turn, dard. shape right Such impose punishment to on the one process. injury, something who caused the then ex- “[mjere It is well established that negli ordinary beyond negligence tra — —should gence justify is insufficient an award of required. be punitive damages.” Higgins Johnson & of 1 Wayne Scott, R. & LaFave Austin W. Blomfield, Alaska Inc. v. Substantive Law 326 Criminal 1376 (Alaska1995) punitive that (holding damages position persuasive. negligence pro- Civil may only be “where wrong awarded acceptable vides an of fault for allo- doer’s conduct can be characterized as outra cating any neglectful burden which conduct geous, such as acts done with malice or bad However, creates. that standard does not motives or a indifference to the in reckless provide an adequate levying sepa- basis for a others.”) (quoting Bridges terests of v. Alas punishment neglectful rate person. on a Auth., ka Hous. particular, punishment imprisonment of 1962)); (Second) see also Restatement of sufficiently severe that should not be im- (1965) (“Punitive § damages Torts 908 cmt. b posed, possible exception with the of the inadvertence, are not awarded for mere mis noted, only eases for conduct which involves take, like, judgment errors of and the right civil process to due ordinary negligence constitute [but are re support imprisonment truly would gross involving stricted conduct some to] element deviation from “reasonable” conduct. It does of outrage usually similar to that found not, view, my support imprisonment for crime.”). accept proposi It is difficult every deviation whatsoever from “reason- tion that action which cannot form the ableness.” punitive basis for a fairly civil award can be negli Our current definition imprisonment. Admittedly, sanctioned with gence prevailing demonstrates the view that prohibition punitive damages for con something greater civil negligence merely negligent duct which is has not been should be authorize criminal prohibition constitutionalized. Jury sanctions. Alaska Pattern Instruction provides yet strong another indication that (Criminal) 81.900(a)(4) “[cjrimi- provides that judicially accepted notions of fairness fore something nal more than the imposition explicitly punitive close the slight degree negligence necessary sup negligent measures for which is conduct un port damages negli a civil action for and is ader civil standard. gence degree as to gross deserving so accept I proposition Since cannot punishment.” This definition suggests imprisonment fundamentally punish- “slight” is a fair degree negligence re quired “deserving” support for civil is not ment for I nеgligence, cannot process all due to remove the court’s decision negligent to the criminalization

barriers of substantive due

conduct.5 Issues most basic public policy at their

are issues of public policy is agree that

level. I cannot im- free rein to by giving legislators

served con- upon whatever

pose criminal sanctions may be ‍‌​‌​​‌‌‌​‌​‌‌​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​​​​​‌​​‌‍unreasonable. jury find to

duct

III. CONCLUSION policy a matter of agree,

I either as cannot may person precedent, that

or a matter of upon subjected to criminal alone, except

showing of civil view, height- my circumstances.

rare in criminal stat- punishments contained

ened constitutionally permissible

utes proven guilty of conduct a defendant is

when minimum, is, negligent. I grossly at a of the court of affirm the decision

would

appeals. Alaska, Appellant,

STATE of SIMPSON, Appellee. P.

Michael SIMPSON, Appellant,

Michael P. Alaska, Appellee.

STATE A-5942,

Nos. A-5952. Appeals of Alaska.

Court

Oct. 1997. Rehearing

As on Grant of Modified

in Part Oct. J., (Matthews, concurring) asser- 626 P.2d (stating 116 n. must take issue with the court's I also carry possibility that all cases which liberty property interests are af- tion rea re- must include a mens of incarceration right protections under the forded the same Indeed, not). do quirement, unlike cases which property process. Maj. op. at 885. Both and criminal law the distinction between civil liberty protected under Due interests imprisonment entirely potential for rests on the say it is inaccurate to Process Clause. accompanying prosecutions, and the protections apply to both interests. that the same potential actions. I absence of such liberty deprivation principle that contention that due therefore find the deprivation property, than a more serious act context are satisfied in concerns greater protections, has and one which context which serves in a civil the same standard Rice, Maj. op. unpersuasive. at 884-885. jurisprudence. See to be in our surfaced before notes negligence definition of criminal that it is is legisla- Hazelwood also that contends the negligence.19 not civil 46.03.790(a) history points tive of AS to an tort This fear of standards is unfounded. incorporate negligence intent to a criminal response allegations similar that civil to Specifically, standard. relies on he Governor protect, Michigan standards the Su- do transmittal accompanying Sheffield’s letter just preme is as Court has noted that “[i]t proposed eventually the bill that added the process much a of the due clause of violation § negligence standard to 790.21 The letter it property the Constitution take is to proposed change states that the aims to liberty person.” People take the bring existing provisions the into conformi- McMurchy, Mich. 228 N.W. 723 ty language penalty with levels in the (1930). words, constitu- other same Criminal Revised Code.... governs tional clause the criminal end, this it changing [To recommends] prosecution pro- govern also civil would provision the criminal “state mind” ceeding, undisputed pro- due and it that “knowing,” from “willful” to for class A negligence cess is satisfied standard misdemeanors, making clear while that that forum. “negligent” violations are intended to be simple persuaded We are not B class misdemeanors.... ordinary negligence civil is inade- standard 1984Alaska Senate Journal 2079-80. quate protect Hazelwood’s interests. We Superior adoption conclude that the Court’s Hazelwood contends that reference to ordinary negligence of an mens rea stan- suggests the Revised Criminal Code an in jury dard in its did not instructions adopt negligence” tent the “criminal constitute a denial under arti- defined in We standard the Code. draw the I, cle section 7 the Alaska Constitution. opposite inference. The letter Governor’s an awareness Code exhibits of the and its B. The Statute provisions, neg which included the criminal ligence only standard. Yet the letter Hazеlwood next contends convicted, speaks negligence, special crimi not the he statute under which was former 46.03.790(a), nal test. We can conclude incorporates AS itself crimi that the Governor’s office knew of the crim argu nal mens rea His standard. provision unconvincing. consciously inal legislature ment is The made “negligence” liability. forego exacting the standard of Una chose to more dorned, commonly simple this word understood favor inter ordinary negligence, pretation mean consistent with settled rule gross negligence. implies in language Nowhere that a difference a dif adopts legisla- 19.The Model Penal Code also the crimi- That is the heart of what be said in can negligence standard. tive terms. nal The commentators however, Code, 2.02, concede, § ModelPenal cmt. quite impossible tautological it is to avoid ar- construction, a like 20. For see Commonwealth v. question. ticulation of the final tribunal Berggren, 398 Mass. 496 N.E.2d perception Johnson, must the actor's failure (1986); evaluate State v. 12 Utah 2d whether, LaBonte, 1019-20 (1961); and stances, under circum- determine all the State enough was be con- serious 144 A.2d Vt. 794-95 fault, jury demned. The must find and must 77, 8, unjustified. § find that it was substantial and Ch. SLA 1984.

Case Details

Case Name: State v. Hazelwood

Court Name: Alaska Supreme Court

Date Published: Oct 3, 1997

Citation: 946 P.2d 875

Docket Number: S-7602

Court Abbreviation: Alaska