Anthony Hawkins appeals from sentences imposed in the Superior Court (Cumberland County, Lipez, J.) following his convictions on three counts of aggravated trafficking in cocaine. See 17-A M.R.S.A. §§ 1103(1), 1101(17) & 1102(1)(F) (1983 & Supp.1992). We agree with Hawkins’ contention that the *79 sentences of twenty-five years are excessive. We therefore vacate the sentences and remand to the Superior Court for resentencing.
Hawkins was charged with three counts of aggravated trafficking in cocaine, a Schedule W drug. At trial, the State presented evidence that Hawkins sold cocaine to undercover drug agents 1 at the Wharfs End bar in Portland. There were three different transactions occurring in August and September of 1990. Hawkins received $300 from the first sale and $200 from the second. The third transaction involved one gram of cocaine.
Following a jury trial, Hawkins was convicted on all three counts. The court imposed concurrent sentences of twenty-five years’ imprisonment on each of the three counts, with all but eight years suspended, followed by four years of probation. The court specifically cited Hawkins’ “serious history of drug related offenses,” and the fact that the crimes had been committed while Hawkins was free on bail in connection with another criminal charge. The court also referred to Hawkins’ “continued denial of responsibility” without specifically describing this factor as an aggravating circumstance.
Pursuant to 15 M.R.S.A. § 2152 (Supp. 1992), Hawkins was granted leave to appeal his sentences.
Hawkins’ main contention is that his sentences of twenty-five years are excessive. Review of sentences is governed by 15 M.R.S.A. §§ 2154,2155 (Supp.1992). Our review of Hawkins’ sentences is for misapplication of principle and includes scrutiny of the suspended as well as the unsuspended portions of the sentences imposed by the trial court.
State v. Lilley,
Trafficking in cocaine is classified as a Class B offense with a statutory maximum period of imprisonment of ten years. In this case, however, Hawkins was convicted of aggravated trafficking that elevated the offense to Class A because of his prior conviction of trafficking in cocaine.
See
17-A M.R.S.A. § 1105(1)(B) (Supp.1992). The statutory maximum sentence for a Class A crime' is increased from twenty to forty years only if the offense is among “the most heinous and violent crimes that are committed against a person.”
State v. Lewis,
The sale of drugs is a serious problem for our society, and drug use is frequently involved when other crimes are committed. Drug sales have been appropriately classified
*80
in our criminal code as serious offenses.
3
The offenses of which Hawkins stands convicted were elevated to Class A offenses as a result of his prior conviction of drug trafficking and require a mandatory minimum sentence of 4 years’ imprisonment. 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1252(5-A) (Supp.1992). Sentences in excess of twenty years, however, may be imposed to punish only “the most violent and serious felony offenders.”
Lewis,
The drug sales involved here, although serious, cannot be classified as crimes of violence by any rational interpretation of legislative intent. Accordingly, Hawkins’ sentences of twenty-five years are excessive and constitute an error in principle, requiring resentencing. 4
The entry is:
Sentences vacated. Remanded to Superior Court for resentencing.
All concurring.
Notes
. The agents worked for the Bureau of Intergovernmental Drug Enforcement (BIDE).
. The three determinations that must be made by a sentencing court are: (1) the
basic
period of incarceration; (2) the
maximum
period of incar
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ceration; and (3) the
final
sentence.
State v. Hewey,
. See, e.g., 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1105 (Supp.1992) (drug trafficking is aggravated if drugs were furnished to a minor, the offender carried a firearm, 112 or more grams of cocaine were furnished, the transaction took place on a school bus or within 1000 feet of a school, or the offender conspired with a minor); 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1106 (1983 & Supp.1992) (unlawful furnishing of schedule W drugs, Class C); 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1107 (Supp.1992) (unlawful possession of heroin, Class C); 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1108 (Supp.1992) (acquiring schedule W, X, or Y drugs by deception, Class C); 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1110 (Supp. 1992) (trafficking in hypodermic apparatuses, Class C).
. Hawkins also contends that, in sentencing him, the court impermissibly considered the fact that these trafficking offenses were committed while Hawkins was on bail on other, pending charges that were ultimately dismissed. Hawkins, however, as a condition of that bail, expressly agreed to refrain from all criminal conduct. That these trafficking offenses also constituted a violation of that bail condition can legitimately be considered by the court as an aggravating circumstance. Other contentions of Hawkins, because they may not be presented when he is resentenced, need not be addressed.