State v. HaughtState v. Haught
Timothy H. Champion and Richard J. Steinle, for appellant.
{¶ 1} The judgment of the court of appeals is reversed and the cause is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings on the authority of State v. Pless (1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 333, 658 N.E.2d 766.
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK and F.E. SWEENEY JJ., concur.
PFEIFER, COOK and STRATTON, JJ., dissent.
COOK, J., dissenting.
{¶ 2} I continue to adhere to my view expressed in Larkins and in the Pless dissent that jurisdiction of a court will not be affected by a missing form or a missing time-stamp on such form where the certified record of the court demonstrates that the defendant waived a jury trial as required by
STRATTON, J., dissenting.
{¶ 3} The majority, following State v. Pless (1996), 74 Ohio St. 3d 333, 658 N.E. 2d 766, finds that failure to time-stamp a waiver of a jury trial in a criminal case divested the trial court of jurisdiction to conduct a bench trial due to a lack of strict compliance with
{¶ 4} In a criminal case, where the defendant is charged with a serious offense, in order for the defendant to waive his right to a jury trial, pursuant to
{¶ 5} This court has addressed the issue of the requirements for filing a waiver pursuant to
{¶ 6} In State ex rel. Larkins v. Baker (1995), 73 Ohio St. 3d 658, 653 N.E. 2d 701, the waiver was not time-stamped nor was it noted on the court‘s docket
{¶ 7} Most recently, in State v. Pless (1996), 74 Ohio St. 3d 333, 336, 658 N.E. 2d 766, 768, there was no evidence that the waiver was filed, nor was there any other evidence that the waiver was physically located in the court‘s file. In Pless, we found that the evidence indicated that the waiver was not “filed” pursuant to
{¶ 8} I believe that a time-stamp is but one indicium that a pleading has been “filed” with the clerk‘s office. See Tallmadge v. McCoy (1994), 96 Ohio App. 3d 604, 605-607, 645 N.E. 2d 802, 803-804. The purpose of
{¶ 9} This case is distinguishable from Pless and Dallman because, here, there is other evidence that Haught‘s waiver was filed despite the fact that it was not time-stamped. Similar to Larkins, I would hold that in the rare instances where “unique circumstances” exist, the fact that a waiver is not time-stamped will not amount to a jurisdictional defect. I would define “unique circumstances” as reliable
{¶ 10} In the case at bar, appellant, Glenn Haught, was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol, driving with a suspended license, leaving the scene of an accident, and failure to control. Haught pled not guilty to all charges. On May 26, 1994, the date of the trial, Haught executed a “Waiver of Trial to a Jury” pertaining to his case. The waiver was not time-stamped by the clerk‘s office. However, the waiver was physically located in Haught‘s court file and was noted on the court‘s docket as follows: “TRIAL: Waiver of Jury Trial signed by Defendant.” Pursuant to the bench trial, Haught was found guilty on all counts and was convicted. Haught appealed the conviction, arguing that the court failed to obtain a written waiver of his right to a jury trial pursuant to
{¶ 11} The record reflects that Haught‘s waiver was noted on the Cuyahoga Falls Municipal Court‘s criminal docket on May 26, 1994. Further, the waiver was physically present in Haught‘s case file in the Cuyahoga Falls Municipal Court. There is no denial by Haught that he signed the waiver. Haught merely seeks to have his conviction overturned on what is a meaningless technicality in this particular case.
{¶ 12} Therefore, pursuant to these unique circumstances, I would find that Haught‘s waiver of jury trial was filed for purposes of satisfying