State v. HaughawoutState v. Haughawout
Lead Opinion
On Junе 22, 1990, the appellant, Clifford Haughawout, Jr., was cited for driving while under a Financial Responsibility Act (“FRA”) suspension in
The case proceeded to trial wherein it was disclosed that Haughawout’s license had .expired in 1980. The FRA suspension in question went into effеct on July 5, 1989. Haughawout moved for an acquittal at the close of the state’s case, contending primarily that a valid driver’s license was a prerequisite to driving under a suspension. The trial court overruled Haughawout’s motion and Haughawout was found guilty.
Assignments of Error
“I. The trial court erred in denying appellant’s Rule 29 motion for acquittal made at the close of evidence.
“II. The appellant’s conviction was against the manifest weight of the evidence.”
As these assignments of error are interrelated, they will be addressed together.
Haughawout's primary contention is that his conviction of driving while under a suspension (R.C. 4507.02[B]) was improper, as a valid license is a necessary prerequisite to such a conviction. R.C. 4507.02(B)(1) providеs:
“No person, whose driver’s or commercial driver’s license or permit or nonresident’s operating privilege hаs been suspended or revoked pursuant to Chapter 4509. of the Revised Code, shall operate any motor vehiсle within this state, or knowingly permit any motor vehicle owned by him to be operated by another person in the state, during thе period of the suspension or revocation, except as specifically authorized by Chapter 4509. of thе Revised Code.”
R.C. 4509.01 provides:
“(C) ‘License’ includes any license, permit, or privilege to operate a motor vehicle issued under the laws of this state including:
“(2) The privilege of any person to drive a motor vehicle whether or not such persоn holds a valid license[.]”
Thus, the General Assembly, at least as part of the financial responsibility law, prohibited the operation of a motor vehicle while a person’s privilege to drive is suspended as well as his physical licensе. While the suspension of a license that has already expired would appear to be a vain act, such а suspension would prevent a license from being renewed until adequate security is provided and as such serves a рurpose even when the license has otherwise expired.
State v. Green
(Oct. 15, 1987), Cuyahoga App. Nos. 52629 and 52630, unreported,
For the aforementioned reasons, Haughawout’s assignments of error do not have merit and are hereby overruled.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
The primary issue before the court in these assignments of error is whether a valid operator’s license is аn essential prerequisite to a driving under a suspension charge.
A suspension is the physical temporary possessiоn of a license, ostensibly to be forwarded to the Bureau of Motor Vehicles; it acts as a temporary denial of total driving rights by the state, which may be modified to allow limited driving.
State v. Green
(Oct. 15, 1987), Cuyahoga App. Nos. 52629 and 52630, unreported,
R.C. 4507.02(B)(1), under which Haughawout was found guilty, provides:
“No person, whose driver’s or commercial driver’s license or permit or nonresident’s operating privilege has been suspended or revoked pursuant to Chapter 4509. of the Revised Codе, shall operate any motor vehicle within this state, or knowingly permit any motor vehicle owned by him to be operated by another person in the state, during the period of the suspension or revocation, except as spеcifically authorized by Chapter 4509. of the Revised Code.”
“No person, except those expressly exempted under sections 4507.03, 4507.-04, and 4507.05 of the Revised Code, shall operate any motor vehicle uрon a highway or any public or private property used by the public for purposes of vehicular travel or рarking in this state unless the person has a valid driver’s license issued under this chapter or a commercial driver’s license issued under Chapter 4506. of the Revised Code.”
This being a criminal case, the language of the penal statutes must be cоnstrued strongly in favor of the defendant, and all doubts must be resolved in his favor.
Tribble, supra,
A valid operator’s license is an obvious and essential precondition of a license suspension.
State v. Williams
(1984),
The record in the case at bar clearly discloses that Haughawout did not have a valid driver’s license at the time of the citation for driving under a suspension, as his license had expired in 1980. Nor was there proof of any othеr privilege to drive. As a valid license is an essential prerequisite to such a charge, the citation and conviction were improper. The proper charge in this instance would have been under R.C. 4507.02(A)(1) for driving without a valid operator’s license. While I am troubled by Haughawout’s driving record, the fact that he was mischarged in his citation necessitated his immediate discharge at trial.
State v. Kessler
(Mar. 30, 1984), Ottawa App. No. OT-83-28, unreported,
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.