State v. Hauan

keep during the owner’s incarceration. We affirm the trial court. The use that Townsend was to make of the AFFIRMED. random, predictable. car was casual or use it his wife had their car He would if neighbor pick did not the chil- if and he use it up dren at school would i/his wife had the car and he needed to if grocery usage store. The actual would If Bringle minimal. at 882. the use for furnished was an

which the vehicle was one, irregular, infrequent casual Iowa, Plaintiff-Appellee, STATE exclusionary would not come within the v. by policy. clause and be covered would Hines, 261 Casualty Iowa General HAUAN, Douglas Wayne 747-748, 124. 156 N.W.2d at The record Defendant-Appellant. supports finding by the trial court here 84-276. No. random, infrequent, unpredicta- casual or Appeals Court of of Iowa. exclusionary ble use and is not within the policy. provisions of the Nov. Factory We have considered Mutual Li Company ability Insurance America v. Co., Casualty 267 F.2d Continental (1959) (held by

819-20 three weeks rental of car

insured tourist for her exclusive use period said three-week rental under agreement put

rental no restriction on

the use of said car said tourist did not regular

constitute use of said vehicle policy).

tourist under the terms of her distinguish following cases where

coverage was denied: Allstate Insurance Johnson, F.Supp. Co. v. Estate (W.D.Ark.1982) (where insured was automobile);

principal driver nonowned (where

Bringle important at 882 consid

eration was the fact the vehicle was fur required by

nished whenever such was employer); Berry

insured’s Farm Co., F.Supp. Automobile

Mutual Ins. (E.D.Va.1972) (under parents coverage daughter in parents’ resided home

but was owner’s wife was entrusted car and she alone could determine put operation

when vehicle was

permission despite for its use fact wife infrequently while

drove husband mili abroad);

tary service Harrill v. Motor Ve Co., (D.C. F.Supp.

hicle-Cas.

1954) (where regular insured made use opposed

non-owned as automobile to casual use). infrequent Hanson,

Richard J. Hanson of Samo & Mills, defendant-appellant. Lake Miller, Atty. Thomas J. Gen. and Rebecca Claypool, Atty. plaintiff- L. Asst. Gen. for appellee.

OXBERGER, Judge. Chief petitioner here asserts error in the finding guilty him judgment trial court refusing interference with official acts for happened his name when he to be at lounge a search warrant was exe- court. cuted. We reverse the trial Lounge Douglas Hauan was at the C-C Joice, Iowa, May 1983. The A lounge is a club and restaurant. search warrant was executed that time property allegedly seize used in order to connection with sales agent prostitution. An with the Division Investigation Criminal identified himself person he encountered and then the first proceeded patrons, asking down a line of them to themselves. The officers they specifically indicated either did not important, as law officers to struct.” This is identify themselves claims, case, not remember if did. Hauan or could in an earlier the court because name, was asked for his When Hauan interpreted stated, the word “resist” and for,” responded, or words to that “What person charged if “It is sufficient en- told, effect, investigation” and was “an gaged opposition actual the officer replied Hauan being conducted. through the use of actual or constructive He he did not have to himself. making reasonably necessary force for approached by deputy and the was then carry to to the use out his force agent Both the same conversation ensued. Donner, duty.” 243 State N.W.2d in A deputy were not uniform. state (Iowa 1976) Defend- 854 uniform, in asked the trooper, who was ant claims this is the test which should be name, again saying for his defendant placed used and that he at no time the investigation. needed for an When the was position being required officer in a refused, again he arrested. defendant was carry duty. force use out any profanity during the Hauan did not use resisting The State claims that is not the incident, all and the law officers testified obstructing, same as and that Donner does thought defendant was free to They apply not the case refers to the any time. also all testified that the because requesting the defendant’s prior making sole reason code section it a crime to was because it was a identification “oppose” an “resist” or officer. State present at and the defendant was club says “op- Donner finds that “resist” or executed. time the warrant was pose” thing, mean the same but ob- many refers to more acts and the struct disagree and the defendant Instead, required. stricter standard is not regarding which standard should be used adopt says, the State we should the Black’s activity if certain falls to decide within obstructing justice. Dictionary Defendant also claims Law definition of “obstruct” duty questions, to answer the includes, had prevent “To hinder or from which suspect since he was not a or under arrest. check, progress, stop, also to retard the investiga- He also notes the nature of the of, progress accomplishment make of diffi- tion and the officer’s status was never impede; interpose cult and slow.... To made clear before he was arrested. impediments or frustra- hindrance service, tion of some act or as to obstruct The first raised involves inter- duty.” in pretation applicable Iowa Code. The an officer the execution of his passed (rev. Dictionary current section 1977 when 972 5th ed. Black’s Law entirely the Iowa Criminal Code was re- 1979).

vamped. yet appeared No case inter- has interpreting meaning preting wording the exact definition of the When statute, used. The statute states: construction ren we avoid which part superfluous ders a of the statute or per-A Acts. Interference Official redundant, knowingly presume who resists or obstructs instead that each son anyone known to be a purpose. part George of the statute has a performance any peace officer Wentz, Sabasta, H. Inc. v. 337 N.W.2d scope act is within the of the offi- (Iowa 1983). parts All of the statute duty authority, or who cer’s lawful together are read undue we do knowingly resists or the ser- obstructs importance part. to an isolated Iowa Beef per- any vice or execution authorized Processors, Miller, Inc. v. 312 N.W.2d process civil or criminal son (Iowa 1981). Instead, we look at the court, simple commits a order object accomplished, to be the evils to be misdemeanor. remedied, and legislature. the intent of the 719.1 Iowa Code Shidler v. All American & Financial Life Corp., (Iowa 1980). The defendant contends that the word N.W.2d thing legislature means the We also will “resist” same as “ob- assume that the existing appointed state of law. his office and his familiar with the execute duties R.R., without hindrance or v. Illinois Central obstacles and to Hines allow Gulf (Iowa 1983). proceed calmly, actions N.W.2d efficiently difficulty.” and without puts believe that the We 173, 197A.2d at 96. It went on to find that much reliance on Donner. that case too although the defendant in that case had interpreting only the court was the word shouted carrying obscenities out only deciding “resist” and if the statute investigation, no hindrance occurred. Donner, vagueness. was void for though Id. Even the officers had been at 853. The court used the N.W.2d words abused, verbally the threshold test had not defining “oppose” and “obstruct” been met of whether the acts constituted a “resist,” syno word those words are but hindrance of the officer’s duties. Id. necessarily nyms and do not mean the ex This, believe, key we it also the thing. act same not assume the will agree here. We with the state legislature inserted the words for no rea that “obstruct” is more broad than “re son, purpose using and believe it had a in sist,” putting and includes obstacles in the both “resist” and Each word “obstruct.” path of completing their duties. something different or it is must mean question must, The initial threshold how redundant. ever, acts, be reached of whether these Rather, it has been that the noted combi- although statute, possibly included the in nation and choice of words used statutes constitute a hindrance of the official duties. obstructing justice lends different meaning in each case. a statute When A search and seizure cannot be hin single contains the word “resist” it is strict- by dered the defendant if the offi ly interpreted. Obstructing 58 Am.Jur.2d scope cer’s acts are not within the of the §§ words, 10, (1971). Justice The “re- Obstructing search. 67 C.J.S. Justice at § sist, obstruct, broadly or are more argues abuse” 7. Defendant that since he was obstruct, “resist, op- freedom, interpreted than deprived not of his he under was § Obstructing pose.” 67 C.J.S. Justice duty questions presented answer (1978). has as “to Supreme Obstruct been defined him. He a recent cites Court case impediments, hin- interpose referring obstacles or proposition to the well-known der, impede, or in manner intrude or presented Terry first in v. Ohio that a Am.Jur.2d, prevent at person ques ...” not seized need not answer’ by officers. tions made law Florida v. The different effect of the variation 491, 497, 1319, Royer, 460 U.S. S.Ct. wording by was noted the courts of anoth 1324, 229, (1983). He ar 75 L.Ed.2d Neubauer, 2 jurisdiction er gues that if he seized in the alternative 169, (1963). 197 A.2d 93 Conn.Cir.Ct. go, not free to the actions of the offi and types court noted there were three of stat Supreme the improper, since cers were utes; one with the word “resist” which was stated, person’s propin “a mere Court has restrictive; the “re very one with words suspected independently quity to others obstruct, sist, oppose,” and a third and not, more activity criminal does without “resist, obstruct, statute with broad probable cause to search that rise to 197 A.2d at 95. abuse.” Id. (of probable requirement person.... This Neubauer, legislature had the Connecticut cause) by cannot be undercut avoided latter, the more liberal statute. Id. chose fact that coinciden simply pointing to the many The court found this statute included tally probable cause to search there exists the other Id. more activities than statutes. premises or to search the or seize another However, it on to hold that even went person may happen to be.” where the though more activities could come within 85, 91, 342, 100 Illinois, 444 U.S. Ybarra v. statute, key question the still remained the 338, 342, (1979). the officer’s acts were hindered. whether statute, stated, saying that the de- purpose responds It “the the The State might intent, name was needed since he legislative was to allow an officer to fendant’s presence. right That must more than It also be a material witness. have been possessed every liberty (again, by the citi- does not Terry claims that standard zen) questions persons, to other to address stop and frisk. apply since this was not a ordinarily person addressed has an apply disagree Terry that does We interrogator equal right ignore amendment allows us to here. Our fourth certainly need not away; walk submit and sei- from unreasonable search be free questioner’s protection.” to a frisk for zure, accordingly limited the and we have 32-33, 88 S.Ct. intruding all long of the law from into arm 1885-86, at 912. The 20 L.Ed. Florida Ohio, Terry 392 U.S. aspects of life. cited defendant indicates the state- case 1868, 1874, 20 L.Ed. 88 S.Ct. good today. Terry ments of are law There was no reason to believe Supreme pronouncements believe Court could a material witness aside be duty are that Hauan had no evident lounge present fact he was at the from the questions regarding his identi- answer the The search warrant the search. ty- specifically named seizure of records of viewpoint recently This has been reaf sales, prostitution, records Supreme discussing firmed Court illegal liquor, and records of members who said, comments when “[T]his might involved with of the above. ask a means detainee only named was Charles Ger- questions a moderate number of to deter hart, place only named was the build- identity try mine his to obtain informa seized, offi- ing. Defendant was not as the confirming dispelling tion the officer’s cers indicated. obligat suspicions. But the detainee is not And, respond. ed to unless the detainee’s person The of whether a provide probable the officer answers questions put to him or her must answer him, he cause to arrest must then be re Terry. addressed Justice White in — McCarty, leased.” v. U.S. Berkemer opinion discussing implications In his -, -, 3138, 3150, 104 S.Ct. decision, the court’s he commented: 317, (1984). 334 nothing There is in the Constitution We note there have been cases where prevents policeman from ad- a identify refusal to oneself amounts to ob- dressing questions anyone on the structing justice. But in each of these circumstances, special streets. Absent probable cases there was cause to believe person approached may not be de- the defendant was involved or connected to coop- may tained or frisked but refuse to activity. City some criminal St. Paul v. However, giv- way. erate and on his Willier, 430, 431, Minn. 304 231 N.W.2d circumstances, proper en the such as (1975) (defendant 488, stopped 489 after case, those in this it seems to me the violations); several traffic East Brunswick person may briefly against detained N.J.Super. Township Malfitano, v. pertinent questions his will while are di- 862, (defend- 244, 246, (1969) 260 A.2d course, 'person him. rected to Of suspected trespassing; case distin- ant answer, stopped obliged is not an- guished probable from situation with no may compelled, not be and swers refus- cause); 168, Logan Swift, 327 So.2d al to answer no basis (defendant (La.Ct.App.1976) suspected furnishes for arrest, although may alert the officer truancy). observation, the need for continued might While the defendant’s acts 34, 88 S.Ct. at purview have fallen of the stat within 1886, 20 L.Ed. at 913. Harlan also Justice circumstances, ute under other we do not holding, clarify wrote to the court’s com- person sitting in private that a a believe menting, policeman “If and a has a when bar or restaurant the execution of a right ... to disarm such a for his has, more, warrant without interferred protection, own he must first have the refusing present officer’s duties right country not to him in his avoid but to be identification. This is not a where green prostitution. and In present his or her sales furtherance of an individual must legitimate investigation, papers at the whim of a the officers re- proper card and officer, quested the defendant’s jail. gave Defendant identification be- law or face private cause it was a club and suspicion by inop- be- no reason to arouse lieved he have had information as to lounge. at portune presence criminal activities at the establishment. were not hin- duties of the law officers present Since defendant was on the dered. We reverse the conviction. very night law officers detected criminal REVERSED, VACATED. JUDGMENT activity, likely it is the defendant would be grand jury called before a or needed as a DONIELSON, Judges except concur All illogical It is not witness. to assume a J., who dissents. club, person present at a which is DONIELSON, Judge (dissenting). being investigated liquor prostitu- for respectfully, vigorously, I dissent. but tion, is a member that club and hence a majority heavily language relies possible grand a jury witness before in one Ohio, 1, 88 S.Ct. from U.S. fashion or another. The defendant’s refus- (1968)and 20 L.Ed. 889 Berkemer v. clearly al to himself obstructed the — U.S. -, McCarthy, 104 S.Ct. 82 investigation in respect. this This not a (1984), support its reversal persons L.Ed.2d 317 situation where public place a I randomly of this case. believe such reliance is were asked for identification for apparent misplaced. Terry involved a confrontation reason. Nor is it a situation merely had the reason- public on a street between a citizen suspicion necessary able and articulable investigating suspi officer who was stop. a Terry The officers had met the at cious circumstances. 392 U.S. standards of a search warrant and were 20 L.Ed.2d at 896. In S.Ct. legally properly non-public at a estab- highway patrol stopped McCarty, a lishment. Iowa Code 719.1 observing weaving high on a a car after — situation, such a the balance between the at -, way. U.S. right conducting legitimate investiga- stop L.Ed.2d at 324. The traffic was held protection privacy tion and of individual analogous stop. to a Terry to be allowing falls favor of the officers to -, L.Ed.2d at 104 S.Ct. at investigative carry out a traditional func- principle to be derived from these tion in an unhindered fashion. appropriate cases is that under circum may briefly in stances a be detained majority indicates that the defendant investigate investiga- order the circumstances did not know the “nature of the However, tion” the “officer’s status was never provoked suspicion. be clear arrested.” I am made before was cause there is a fine line between random not aware of law that indicates that stop Terry stop, rights and a constabulary required to inform wit- is investigating appropriately are lim possible nesses or a defendant of the na- stopping person frisking him. ited to investigation being ture of which is questions, While an officer ask — agree I offi- conducted. Nor can that the respond. McCarty, detainee need not cer’s status was not made clear. One of at -, U.S. patrol- three officers was a uniformed at 334. man. It seems to me that this would make Contrary majority’s opinion, to the how- quite his status clear. ever, principles I do not believe the set Accordingly, I affirm the would convic- applicable Terry McCarty forth in are tion. court here. The fact situation before this unquestionably distinguishable from a stop. pri- officers entered a Law pursuant proper, to a unchal- vate club

lenged to seize search warrant order

property in connection with

Case Details

Case Name: State v. Hauan

Court Name: Court of Appeals of Iowa

Date Published: Nov 20, 1984

Citation: 361 N.W.2d 336

Docket Number: 84-276

Court Abbreviation: Iowa Ct. App.