State v. HatlerState v. Hatler
- Reporters:
- , , ,
- Before:
- Leaphart, Gray, Nelson, Trieweiler, Cotter
For Respondent: Honorable Joseph P. Mazurek, Attorney General; Cregg W. Coughlin, Assistant Attorney General, Helena; Mike McGrath, County Attorney; Pam Bucy, Deputy County Attorney, Helena.
JUSTICE LEAPHART delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Appellant Mark Christopher Hatler (Hatler) entered a guilty plea to charges of driving while under the influence (first offense); operating a motor vehicle while his license was suspended or revoked; and failure to have proof of liability insurance. He appeals from the First Judicial District Court‘s denial of his motion to suppress evidence. We affirm.
¶2 On November 11, 1998, Highway Patrol Officer Joe Cohenour observed a brown pickup traveling south on Interstate 15 near Sieben Flats. The speed of the vehicle was oscillating between fifty and sixty miles per hour. All other vehicles were passing the pickup. Cohenour observed that the truck‘s license plate was new, shiny and clean, in contrast to the rest of the truck. Cohenour ran a license plate check. After determining that the license plate matched the truck, he had dispatch ascertain the registered owner. Dispatch informed Cohenour that the registered owner was Mark Hatler. Dispatch further informed Cohenour that Hatler‘s driver‘s license was expired but that he did have a valid Montana ID card.
¶3 Cohenour then initiated a traffic stop. When asked for his driver‘s license, Hatler handed Cohenour his Montana ID card.
¶4 Hatler presents the following issue: Did Officer Cohenour, based upon his observations and the information he received from dispatch, have particularized suspicion to believe that Hatler had committed or was committing an offense?
Standard of Review
¶5 The standard of review of a district court‘s denial of a motion to suppress evidence is whether the district court‘s findings of fact are clearly erroneous and whether those findings were correctly applied as a matter of law. State v. Grimes, 1999 MT 145, 295 Mont. 22, 982 P.2d 1037.
Discussion
¶6
Investigative stop. In order to obtain or verify an account of the person‘s presence or conduct or to determine whether to arrest the person, a peace officer may stop any person or vehicle that is observed in circumstances that create a particularized suspicion that the person or occupant of the vehicle has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense.
¶7
Drivers to be licensed. (1) No person, except those expressly exempted under 61-5-104, shall drive any motor vehicle upon a highway in this state unless such person has a valid Montana driver‘s license....
¶8 Hatler contends that the
(2) A nonresident who is at least 15 years of age and who is in immediate possession of a valid operator‘s license issued to the nonresident by the nonresident‘s home state or country may operate a motor vehicle, except a commercial motor vehicle, in this state.
¶9 Hatler takes the position that although Cohenour was aware that he did not have a valid Montana driver‘s license, he did not know, until after the stop, that Hatler‘s Idaho license had been suspended. In effect, Hatler argues that unless and until a Highway Patrol Officer checks to see whether a driver has a valid license in any other state,
¶10 An officer only needs to possess a reasonable suspicion, based upon objective data, that an offense has been committed. In State v. Lafferty, 1998 MT 247, ¶ 9, 291 Mont. 157, ¶ 9, 967 P.2d 363, ¶ 9, we held that “[w]hen circumstances create a particularized suspicion that a person is committing an offense, a peace officer may stop the person or the vehicle containing the person to determine whether to arrest the person.
¶11 The requirement of particularized suspicion does not require an officer, before making an investigative stop, to possess proof beyond a reasonable doubt that a crime has been committed, to the exclusion of every possible innocent explanation or legal exception. The possibility that Hatler‘s circumstances might come within one of the numerous exceptions listed in
¶12 Officer Cohenour ascertained that Hatler was driving with an expired Montana driver‘s license. This alone was obviously objective data from which Cohenour, an experienced officer, could form a particularized suspicion that Hatler was committing an offense—that is, driving without a valid Montana driver‘s license, in violation of
¶13 We hold that the District Court‘s findings of fact are not clearly erroneous and that those findings were correctly applied as a matter of law. The judgment of the District Court is affirmed.
CHIEF JUSTICE GRAY, JUSTICES NELSON, TRIEWEILER and COTTER concur.