This Cоurt granted the State’s petition for a writ of certiorari to review
State v. Hatcher,
I. FACTS
Hatcher was indictеd for distribution of crack cocaine and distribution of crack cocaine within one-half mile of a public park for selling crack to an undercover informant (“Buyer”) working with the Marlboro County Sheriffs Office on October 6, 2006.
At trial, the Buyer testified that he met with two officers on October 6, 2006 in downtown McColl. They searched the Buyer before providing him with $40.00 to make a drug purchase and fitting him with a concealed wire. The Buyer *89 went to Hatcher’s residence and purchased two pieces of crack cocaine from Hatcher. The two pieces were individually wrapped inside small pieces of plastic cut from the corners of a sandwich bag. The ends of the plastic were tied into knots. The Buyer estimated he was in Hatcher’s residence for about three to five minutes before he left and delivered the crack to the officers, who were waiting nearby. The Buyer identified State’s Exhibit 1, which included the crack and two baggies, as being the itеms that he received from Hatcher.
Sergeant Jeffrey Locklear of the Marlboro County Sheriffs Office testified that he and another officer, investigator Brittany English, met the Buyer at 12:25 p.m. on October 6, 2006. Locklear confirmed all of the details testified to by the Buyer.
Regarding the receipt of the drug evidence, Sergeаnt Locklear testified that the Buyer gave him the crack, which was contained in “two tiny plastic corners” cut from sandwich bags and tied into knots. Locklear placed the crack (still tied in their original packages) inside a plastic evidence bag and “sealed [it] with a glue-type seal.” He stated the only way the bag could be opened is by cutting it open. Locklear put identifying information on the bag, including the case number, the date of 10/06/06, the time of 12:39 p.m. when he retrieved the drugs from the Buyer, the approximate weight of the drugs, and that the purchase was made at Second Street in McColl from Ricky Hatcher. Locklear sеaled this package inside a second bag produced by the South Carolina Law Enforcement Division (SLED) specifically for the transportation of items to the SLED laboratory for testing. Locklear stated he personally transported the sealed evidence to SLED.
Locklear testified that after the drugs were tested, the SLED agent processing the case repackaged the drugs in a heat-sealed bag (that must be cut open) and marked the bag with blue writing. SLED returned the heat-sealed bag to the sheriffs office. Locklear identified the heat-sealed bag presented at trial as the same one that he had personally transported to the court that day.
A forensic scientist with SLED, Marjorie Wilson, testified as an expert in the analysis of controlled substances and stated that she was the person responsible for processing and *90 testing the drug evidence in this case at SLED. Wilson stated she retrieved the evidence from the Log-In Dеpartment at SLED and that it was still sealed in a Best Evidence Kit (or bag). 1 Wilson testified she broke the seal on the evidence bag and inside she found a second bag from the Marlboro County Sheriffs Department that contained “two clear plastic corner bags.” Both of the plastic corner bags were still knotted, with a rоck-like substance inside them.
Wilson removed the substances from the corner bags and analyzed them before re-packaging the contents into two Ziploc bags. She placed the repackaged evidence into a heat-sealed pouch and wrote her initials on it and the date it was sealed of “5/04/07.” She returned the pouch to SLED’s Log-In Department, which then gave the evidence back to the Marlboro County Sheriffs Department. Wilson identified the SLED heat-sealed bag, which was still sealed and bore her initials, as the one she had returned to the SLED Log-In Department. She confirmed that it was in the same condition as when shе had sealed it.
The State moved for the admission of State’s Exhibit 1, and defense counsel objected on the basis the chain of custody had not been sufficiently established. The trial judge overruled the objection and admitted the drug evidence. Wilson then further testified that she had performed preliminary and confirmatory testing on the rock-like substances in State’s Exhibit 1 and concluded that crack cocaine was in each of the two packages. Wilson confirmed that she performed her testing on May 4, 2007, and that she sealed the evidence with the notation, “MW, L0706559, Seal Intact,” and the date, “05/04/07.” She also placed identifying marking on the individual corner bags and on the Ziploc bags with the repackaged evidence.
*91
A jury found Hatcher guilty as charged, and the trial judge sentenced him to concurrent terms of fifteen years in prison. Hatcher appealed his conviction and sentence, and the Court of Appeals reversed on the basis the State failed to establish a sufficient chain of custody for the drug evidence.
State v. Hatcher,
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
“The admission of evidence is within the discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion.”
State v. Pagan,
III. LAW/ANALYSIS
“[T]his Court has long held that a party offering into evidence fungible items such as drugs or blood samples must establish a complete chain of custody as far as practicable.”
State v. Sweet,
“Where the substance analyzed has passed through several hands the evidence must not leave it to conjecture as to who had it and what was done with it between the taking and the аnalysis.”
Benton,
*92
“Proof of chain of custody need not negate all possibility of tampering so long as the chain of possession is complete.”
State v. Carter,
In finding the chain of custody insufficient in Hatcher’s case, the Court of Appeals stated that “Officer Locklear and [SLED] Agent Wilson both acted as custodians of the еvidence,” but “neither is directly linked to the other by testimony or documentary evidence.”
Hatcher,
The Court of Appeals acknowledged that South Carolina case law provides that the chain of custody need be established only “as far as is reasonably practicable” and that each person who handled the evidence is not requirеd to testify, but nevertheless stated that “South Carolina courts have consistently held that all persons in the chain of custody must be identified and the manner of handling the evidence must be demonstrated.” Id. at 377,
The Court of Appeals relied in large part upon its opinion in
State v. Chisolm,
Although Hatcher asserts our cases hold all individuals must be identified without exception, this appears to be an extrapolation of the general observation that where all individuаls in the chain are, in fact, identified and the manner of handling is reasonably demonstrated, it is not an abuse of discretion for the trial judge to admit the evidence in the absence of proof of tampering, bad faith, or ill-motive.
See, e.g., Sweet,
In a case involving the chain of custody of a blood sample in a paternity case, we reiterated the standard set forth in
Benton v. Pellum
that the chain of custody must be established as far as practicable, and we specifically stated that “we have never held the chain of custody rule requires every person associated with the procedure be available to testify or identified personаlly, depending on the facts of the case.”
South Carolina Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Cochran,
In Cochran, this Court found the chain of custody was sufficient even though the courier who transported the samples from the collection site to the testing facility was never identified, where “the samples arrived at the testing facility sealed and intact”:
The testimony presented by DSS indicаtes the blood samples were secure when Rejales took the samples at the collection site. The testimony also indicates the samples arrived at the testing facility sealed and intact. Additionally, each person involved in the actual testing procedure once the samples arrived аt the facility, testified as to their handling of each respective sample and the chain of custody. Generally, we will uphold the chain of custody if the safeguards instituted ensure the integrity of the evidence, even if every person associated with the procedure is not personally identified. Other courts arе in accord.
Id.
at 629,
In
Cochran,
this Court noted that “[w]hether the chain of custody has been established as far as practicable clearly depends on the unique factual circumstances of each case.”
Cochran,
“It is unnecessary ... that the police account for ‘every hand-to-hand transfer’ of the item; it is sufficient if the evidence demonstrates a reasonable assurance the condition of the item remains the same from the time it was obtained until its introduction at trial.”
State v. Price,
Courts have abandoned inflexible rules regarding the chain of custody and the admissibility of evidence in favor of a rule granting discretion to the trial courts.
United States v. De Larosa,
Considering those factors here, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial judge’s admission of the drug evidence in Hatcher’s case. We agree with the Court of Appeals that the mere fact that evidence is sealed upon presentation for testing does not, in itself, estаblish a sufficient chain of custody. Evidence is still required as to how the item was obtained and how it was handled to ensure that it is, in fact, what it is purported to be. However, we have consistently held that the chain of custody need be established only as far as practicable, and we reiterate that every persоn handling the evidence need not be identified in all cases.
In this case, the Buyer who purchased the drugs from Hatcher, the police officer who received the drugs from the Buyer and transported them to SLED in two sealed, tamper-evident bags (one inside the other), and the SLED agent who retrieved the drugs from the Log-In Deрartment at SLED (still double-sealed) and tested them, all testified about the chain of custody and their handling of the drugs and the fact that there was no evidence of tampering. The ultimate goal of chain of custody requirements is simply to ensure that the item is what it is purported to be. The record here indicates the drugs received for testing were in fact, those taken from Hatcher without any alteration, tampering, or substitution.
IY. CONCLUSION
The State need not establish the identity of every person handling fungible items in all circumstances; rather, the standard is whether, in the discretion of the trial judge, the State has established the chain of custody as far as practicable. This determination will necessarily depend on the unique factual circumstances of each case. We conclude the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in finding a sufficient chain *96 of custody existed to allow admission of the drug evidence. Consequently, we reverse the decision of the Court of Apрeals.
REVERSED. 2
Notes
. Wilson explained that when an officer receives drug evidence, the officer places it in what is called a "Best Evidence Kit” on which is printed, "SLED Drug Analysis Security Envelope,” and the seal on this envelope "is tamper evident,” meaning any attempt to open that bag will be evident to anyone looking at it. Wilson stated officers bring evidence to SLED in the sealed containers, and it is logged in by SLED's Log-In Department, which gives evidence a unique SLED laboratory case number.
. An issue concerning the trial judge’s charge on reasonable doubt was also raised in the briefs. The Court of Appeals did not reach this issue due to its reversal based on the chain of custody. Counsel for Hatcher conceded at oral argument that the trial transcript reveals no objection was made at trial to preserve the jury charge issue for our review. We agree based on our review of the record, and we appreciate counsel's candor in this regard.