State v. HatchState v. Hatch
The Appellate Division affirmed (122 N.J. Super. 538 (1973)) the Law Division‘s judgment acquitting the defendant of the charge that he unlawfully possessed a rifle and shotgun in violation of
The defendant Leonard E. Hatch, a resident of Erving, Massachusetts, was driving in New Jersey on his way to Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. He was stopped for a traffic violation on Route 22 in the Bound Brook area. The police officer saw a rifle and shotgun under some clothing in the rear seat of the defendant‘s car. The defendant told the officer that he was traveling from Massachusetts to Pennsylvania in the hope of finding employment in the heavy construction field and that he had taken the guns with him for hunting and related sporting use. He had a Massachusetts hunting license, was a member of a Massachusetts gun club, and had been issued a firearm identification card in accordance with Massachusetts law. He had no New Jersey “firearms purchaser identification card” (
The defendant was indicted for unlawful possession of the rifle and shotgun in violation of
In Lambert the Court dealt with a city ordinance which made it unlawful for any person convicted of a felony to remain within the city limits for more than five days without registering with the police; it held that the ordinance violates due process when applied to a person who has no notice or knowledge of his duty to register. 355 U.S. at 227, 78 S.Ct. 240, 2 L.Ed.2d at 231. In the later Freed case the Court dealt with a provision in the National Firearms Act which declares it unlawful to receive or possess an unregistered firearm. The defendant was indicted for possession of unregistered hand grenades but the trial court dismissed the indictment on the ground, inter alia, that it did not allege scienter. In reversing the dismissal and in holding that scienter was not required, the Court differentiated Lambert and determined that Congress had constitutionally declared that possession of the unregistered firearm is unlawful even though the defendant has no notice or knowledge of the lack of registration. 401 U.S. at 608-610, 91 S.Ct. 1112, 28 L.Ed. 2d at 362-363.
In United States v. International Min. & Chem. Corp., supra, 402 U.S. 558, 91 S.Ct. 1697, 29 L.Ed.2d 178, the Department of Transportation had adopted regulations governing the transportation of corrosive liquids and other dangerous
In Balint the Court was dealing with drugs, in Freed with hand grenades, in this case with sulfuric and other dangerous acids. Pencils, dental floss, paper clips may also be regulated. But they may be the type of products which might raise substantial due process questions if Congress did not require, as in Murdock, “mens rea” as to each ingredient of the offense. But where, as here and as in Balint and Freed, dangerous or deleterious devices or products or obnoxious waste materials are involved, the probability of regulation is so great that anyone who is aware that he is in possession of them or dealing with them must be presumed to be aware of the regulation. 402 U.S. at 564-565, 91 S.Ct. at 1701-1702, 29 L.Ed.2d at 183.
In United States v. Weiler, supra, 458 F.2d 474, the court pointed out that in Lambert the crime was one of omission rather than commission, the situation was one in which inquiry as to the applicable law was unlikely, and the purpose of the ordinance was simply to compile a list which might ultimately assist law enforcement agencies. 458 F.2d at 478. In contrast, statutes dealing with gun control are concerned with acts of commission, in situations where regulations abound and inquiries are likely, and where the purposes are to insure the public safety and protect against current acts and threats of violence. See Burton v. Sills, 53 N.J. 86 (1968), appeal dismissed, 394 U.S. 812, 89 S.Ct. 1486, 22 L.Ed.2d 748 (1969); Siccardi v. State, 59 N.J. 545 (1971). While there is much to be said in favor of the wide recognition of lack of scienter as a defense (State v. Hudson County News Co., 35 N.J. 284, 290-295 (1961); State v. De Meo, 20 N.J. 1, 13-14 (1955)), there are fields
In Garcia, supra, the court held that Indiana‘s statutory requirement for handgun permits applied equally to nonresidents and residents. 292 N.E.2d at 811-812. In Perez, supra, the court held that New York‘s statutory requirement for handgun permits was fully applicable to the defendant, a nonresident who was traveling through New York on his way to Massachusetts when he was stopped by a police officer and was found to have a handgun in his car. The defendant did not question the right of New York to apply its gun control regulations to nonresidents within or passing through its borders. See South Carolina State Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 58 S.Ct. 510, 82 L.Ed. 734 (1938); Neeld v. Giroux, 24 N.J. 224, 228 (1957); cf. Soap and Detergent Association v. City of Chicago, 357 F. Supp. 44, 47 (N.D. Ill. 1973). But he did contend, unsuccessfully, that New York‘s statute was infirm in that it failed to set up a permit procedure for nonresidents though it had a suitable one for residents. 325 N.Y.S.2d at 185-186. In this connection it is to be noted that New Jersey‘s statute clearly contemplates that applications for handgun permits and for firearms purchaser identification cards may be made
In the light of all of the foregoing we come now to the proper interpretation of the pertinent provisions of our Gun Control Law. L. 1966, c. 60;
When dealing with the carrying of handguns we find nothing in the statute which suggests any flexibility or any intent to exclude nonresidents within or passing through New Jersey from the strict permit requirement. However, we do find somewhat less strict legislative treatment of guns used in hunting. When Governor Hughes signed the bill which became L. 1966, c. 60 (
Although when read literally (cf. Lloyd v. Vermeulen, 22 N.J. 200, 205 (1956)) the statutory terminology presents difficulties, it is evident that the Legislature sought, as a matter of policy, to prohibit the transportation by licensed hunters of guns to hunting areas except in the mode specifically described in
Both the Law Division and the Appellate Division were evidently satisfied that the guns were intended for hunting and related sporting use as the defendant had testified and that he had acted in good faith and without notice or knowledge of New Jersey‘s requirement. Though they were in error in concluding that his lack of notice or knowledge was a legal defense, there had been no controlling judicial pronouncement and the Law Division‘s acquittal of the defendant
Affirmed.
For affirmance — Justices JACOBS, HALL, SULLIVAN, PASHMAN and CLIFFORD — 5.
For reversal — None.