State v. HasslerState v. Hassler
Lead Opinion
{¶ 1} Nearly 20 years ago, in Newark v. Lucas (1988),
{¶ 2} The issue confronting us is whether, in light of Mayl, a blood sample taken outside the two-hour window set forth in
Relevant Background
{¶ 3} A January 12, 2005 one-car accident resulted in the death of Leondra Mayo. Appellee, Michael Hassler, was taken to the hospital, where police questioned him. His demeanor suggested to the police that he was intoxicated, but Hassler declined to provide a blood sample, and the parties stipulated that at least seven hours later, police obtained blood samples pursuant to a search warrant.
{¶4} On March 25, 2005, the Delaware County Grand Jury returned an indictment against Hassler, charging him with violating
{¶ 5} Hassler filed a motion to suppress the results of his blood-alcohol test, based in part on the fact that his blood was drawn for testing outside the two-hour time frame laid out in a former version of
{¶ 6} The state appealed the trial court’s order to the Fifth District Court of Appeals. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s judgment. We accepted jurisdiction over the state’s discretionary appeal, which asks us to determine the following: whether in a prosecution for aggravated vehicular homicide that alleges driving under the influence of alcohol in violation of
Analysis
{¶ 7} We begin our analysis with
{¶ 8} In Lucas, we were confronted with a situation similar to the one sub judice. Lucas had been charged with a violation of Section 434.01(a)(1) of the Newark Codified Ordinances, which proscribes operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. The alleged violation occurred at 2:51 a.m., yet Lucas’s blood was not withdrawn for blood-alcohol tests until 5:30 a.m.
{¶ 9} The Newark ordinance and
{¶ 10} In reviewing Lucas’s case, we first noted that in 1983, the General Assembly had amended
{¶ 11} We affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals as to the motion to suppress regarding the per se violation. But we held that in prosecutions for violations of driving while impaired, “the behavior of the defendant * * * is the crucial issue. The accuracy of the test is not the critical issue as it is in prosecutions for per se violations.” Lucas,
{¶ 12} Our recent decision in Mayl complements the Lucas holding. In Mayl, the defendant, who had been hospitalized after an accident, had had his blood drawn for medical reasons by nurses who, though perhaps qualified for permits under administrative regulations by the Ohio Department of Health (“ODH”), had not obtained them. Mayl, who was then charged with a violation of
{¶ 13} Mayl contended that “the regulations pertaining to ‘standards of observations, qualifications of personnel,’ and other provisions relating to ‘the taking and keeping of blood samples’ were violated.” Id. at ¶ 6. The state countered that the requirements of
{¶ 14} The majority in Mayl held that despite the reliability of blood tests taken according to medical standards, in law-enforcement contexts, the law nevertheless requires the state to show substantial compliance with ODH regulations in vehicular-homicide cases. Id. at ¶ 55.
{¶ 15} As outlined above, Lucas and Mayl deal with two distinct issues. Lucas focused on the two-hour window prescribed in the statute, while Mayl addresses the nature of substantial compliance with the ODH regulations. In fact, like Lucas before it, Mayl acknowledges that the purpose of substantial compliance with the ODH regulations is “to ensure the accuracy of bodily substance test results,” Mayl,
{¶ 16} Furthermore, since Lucas was decided in 1988, the General Assembly has amended
{¶ 17} Consequently, case law interpreting this statute, including Lucas’s distinction between per se and under-the-influence offenses, was incorporated into
{¶ 18} Because the state prosecuted Hassler for a violation of
Conclusion
{¶ 19} For the foregoing reasons, we hold that a blood sample taken outside the time frame set out in
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
Notes
.
. Per se offenses make the blood-alcohol content an element of the offense. The trier of fact must find only “that the defendant operated a vehicle * * * and that the defendant’s chemical test reading was at the proscribed level.” Lucas,
. Am.Sub.S.B. No. 82, 145 Ohio Laws, Part I, 879, 928-929; Am.Sub.S.B. No. 22, 148 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 8353, 8406; Am.Sub.S.B. No. 123, 149 Ohio Laws, Part II, 2467, 2959; Am.Sub.S.B. No. 163, 149 Ohio Laws, Part II, 3553, 3577; 2003 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 87, effective June 30, 2003; 2003 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 163, effective September 23, 2004; 2005 Sub.S.B. No. 8, effective August 17, 2006; 2006 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 461, effective April 4, 2007.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
{¶ 20} I am not unsympathetic to the end result in this case: a more severe punishment than if we held that the blood sample was inadmissible as evidence because it was taken outside the time limit established in former
{¶ 21} The General Assembly must have had a reason for including a bright-line standard in
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
{¶ 22} Respectfully, I dissent.
{¶ 23} In my view, this case presents a straightforward issue of statutory construction. This court’s purpose in construing statutes is to “ascertain and give effect to the legislative intent.” Carter v. Youngstown Div. of Water (1946),
{¶ 24} The relevant version of 4511.19(D)(2) stated: “In a criminal prosecution * * * for a violation of division (A) of this section or for an equivalent offense, if there was at the time the bodily substance was withdrawn a concentration of less than the applicable concentration of alcohol specified in divisions (A)(2), (3), (4), and (5) of this section, that fact may be considered with other competent evidence in determining the guilt or innocence of the defendant.” Am.Sub.S.B. No. 163, 149 Ohio Laws, Part II, 3553, 3577 (“S.B. 163”). That provision, however, must be read in pari materia with the rest of
{¶ 26} It is my view that we read these sections in pari materia in order to determine the meaning of the General Assembly. Hence, the time limit for the extraction of the bodily substance specified in
{¶ 27} It is true that this court refused to read an earlier version of this statute in an exclusionary manner in the context of
{¶ 28} Here, in contrast, the parties stipulated that the blood sample was extracted more than seven hours after the offense occurred. My departure from the majority view in this case is a purely factual one. Under no circumstances could a sample withdrawn seven to eight hours after an alleged violation constitute either actual or substantial compliance with the time requirement set forth in the applicable version of
{¶ 29} This case arose at a time when an earlier version of
{¶ 30} Although the majority baldly concludes that “[t]he time frame at issue here does not by itself implicate the accuracy of the test results,” nonetheless, the General Assembly has incorporated a time limit for the extraction of bodily
{¶ 31} I would hold that the state failed to comply with the statutory directive to timely withdraw the blood sample from Hassler for chemical analysis, and therefore, this evidence should not be admitted at trial, as the statute does not authorize its admission into evidence. Accordingly, I dissent.