109 Iowa 656 | Iowa | 1899
Defendant is the editor and publisher of a newspaper printed in the county of Buena Vista, one of the counties composing the Fourteenth judicial district of
In order to make plain our reasons for the conclusion .at which we have arrived, it will be necessary to consider, to some extent, the common law relating to this subject. First, let us say there have always been some material distinctions preserved between civil actions, in which damages were sought for this offense, and criminal proceedings. In a criminal proceeding at common law, the defenses wére but two,— a denial and a plea, of privileged communication. The truth of the matter charged could not be given in evidence by a defendant. It was a maxim that “the greater the truth the .greater the libel. A prosecution for this offense was founded on the thought that a publication of a libel was likely to provoke a breach of the peace, and the fact that it was true tended rather to increase the probabilities of such a result. 1 Kent Commentatries, 621. But, in a private action for pecuniary recompense, the truth of the charge could always be shown in justification, or in mitigation of damages, since as it is said, a man is entitled to no better reputation than his actual character would warrant. 1 Greenleaf_Evidence, section 421; J’Anson v. Stuart, 2 Smith Lead. Cas. 986, note. In course of time, the rule was adopted in many of the states of the Hnion allowing the truth of the charge to be shown as a defense. In our own state this principle is embodied in the constitution. Article 1, section 7. But with us it is qualified. The truth can be shown only when the pub-
We have, then, this question, somewhat narrower than discussed by appellant’s counsel, presented: Where the publication of libelous- matter is shielded by no privilege, can a defendant in a criminal proceeding exonerate himself by showing a belief on his part in the truth of the charge ? We know of no authority in support of the affirmative of this proposition. In all the cases where evidence of the good faith of the defendant has b'een admitted, it was not as a direct defense, but only as tending to establish one essential element of a qualified privilege. Mott v. Dawson, 46 Iowa, 533; Bays v. Hunt, 60 Iowa, 251, and State v. Conable, 81 Iowa, 60, relied on by defendant, go- no further than this. Tor the reasons stated, we think the evidence of defendant’s good faith was inadmissible. What we have said sufficiently indicates, also, our reasons for holding that the court properly refused the instructions asked by defendant. The charge
II. An original hook of records from Pocahontas
III. A witness was allowed to say what person was county auditor at a certain time. It is argued that this was a conclusion and inadmissible. All that was sought was to show who was acting as county auditor. This could be done with