State v. HaskellState v. Haskell
OPINION
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Nathan Haskell (“Haskell“), appeals from the judgment of conviction and sentence of the Common Pleas Court of Seneca County entered on a jury verdict in which defendant was found guilty of one count of Intimidation, in violation of R.C.
{¶ 2} On November 24, 2002, Haskell was arrested by a Seneca County Sheriff‘s deputy. To summarize, when Haskell was taken into custody he was uncooperative, acted unruly, kicked and flailed his legs, spit and made a threat to Deputy Mark Lawson. On December 11, 2002, Haskell was indicted by the Seneca County Grand Jury for Retaliation and Harassment by an Inmate. Because the state later found that Retaliation was not the correct charge, the state filed a motion to dismiss the indictment. The state‘s motion was granted and the indictment was dismissed without prejudice. Thereafter, on March 12, 2003, Haskell was once again indicted by the Seneca County Grand Jury for one count of Intimidation in violation of R.C.
{¶ 3} During the jury trial, several officers testified that Haskell was disorderly during booking and that after booking was completed and Haskell had been placed in the jail cell, Haskell threatened Deputy Lawson by stating that “Deputy Lawson better have eyes in the back of his head” because Haskell was going to “hunt Deputy Lawson and his family down with an AK-47 rifle and kill them.”
{¶ 4} Haskell was convicted on Count One of the indictment, Intimidation, in violation of R.C.
Haskell now appeals the judgment of the trial court and sets forth five assignments of error for our review. For clarity of analysis, Haskell‘s third and fifth assignments of error are discussed together.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. I
The evidence is insufficient to supрort a conviction under O.R.C.
{¶ 5} Intimidation, as defined by R.C.
{¶ 6} “A reviewing court will not reverse a jury verdict when there is substantial evidence upon which a jury could reasonably cоnclude that all the elements of an offense have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Seiber (1990) 56 Ohio St.3d 4, 13, quoting State v. Eley (1978), 56 Ohio St.2d 169, syllabus; citation omitted.
{¶ 7} In his brief to this court, Haskell concedes that R.C.
{¶ 8} Haskell, however, specifically maintains that because he made the threat toward Deputy Lawson and the Deputy‘s family only after the conclusion of the booking process, Deputy Lawson could not have been hindered in the performance of his duties. Hence, the elements of Intimidation cannot be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
{¶ 9} Haskell‘s assertion fails for two reasons. First, “R.C.
{¶ 10} Second, although Haskell made his threat after he had been completely booked and behind bars and, thus, was not an immediate threat to Deputy Lawson, the duties of Lawson in the case were not yet complete. Lawson‘s involvement in the detentiоn and booking of Haskell gave rise to a strong likelihood that Deputy Lawson would later be required to act as a witness against Haskell in any criminal proceeding stemming from the incident. In fact, Deputy Lawson was required to testify against Haskell knowing that Haskell threаtened to kill Lawson and Lawson‘s family.
{¶ 11} Based upon the foregoing, there is substantial evidence upon which the jury could reasonably conclude that all the elements of Intimidation were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, appellаnt‘s first assignment of error is overruled.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. II
The trial court erred by denying a Rule 29 motion for acquittal at the close of the state‘s case.
{¶ 12} “The decision of the trial court to deny a motion for judgment of acquittal pursuant to Crim.R. 29(A) based on the sufficiency of the evidenсe will be upheld if, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the state, the reviewing court finds that any rational fact finder could have found the essential elements of the charge proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Myers, 3d Dist. No. 7-99-05, 2000-Ohio-1677, quoting State v. Dennis (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 421, 430. “Pursuant to Criminal Rule 29(A), a сourt shall not order an entry of judgment of acquittal if the evidence is such that reasonable minds can reach different conclusions as to whether each material element of a crime has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Seiber (1990), 56 Ohio St.3d 4, 13, quoting State v. Bridgeman (1978), 55 Ohio St.2d 261, syllabus.
{¶ 13} The bаsis of Haskell‘s assignment of error herein is that because the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt an essential element of the Intimidation charge, i.e., hindrance in the performance of Deputy Lawton‘s duties, the trial court errеd by denying Haskell‘s Crim.R. 29 acquittal motion. Appellant‘s assignment of error is without merit. As reviewed in Haskell‘s first assignment of error, there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could conclude all of the elements of Intimidation had been proven. Thus, we conclude that the triаl court did not err in denying defendant‘s Crim.R. 29 motion. Accordingly, appellant‘s second assignment of error is overruled.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. III
Trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to preserve issues for appeal and in failing to renew his request for a Rule 29 acquittal at the close of the state‘s case again at the close of defendant‘s case and after the jury rendered its verdict.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. V
The court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the element of “. . . in the discharge of the person‘s duty,” of the offense of intimidation under O.R.C.
{¶ 14} A two-part test is utilized for determining whether a criminal defendant has been denied the effective assistance of counsel. The test first requires a defendant to show that his attorney‘s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668. In considering this prong of the test, appellate courts are to afford a high level of deference to the performance of trial counsel. State v. Bradley (1989), 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 142. We notе that attorneys licensed by the State of Ohio are presumed to provide competent representation. State v. Jones, 3d Dist. No. 02-2000-07, 2000-Ohio-1879, citing State v. Hoffman (1998), 129 Ohio App.3d 403, 407. Second, the defendant must show that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel‘s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland at 694. This prong requires a probability sufficient to undermine the confidence in the outcome of the trial. See State v. Hill, 3d Dist. No. 11-03-07, 2003-Ohio-5123.
{¶ 15} Haskell asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective because counsel: (1) failed to request a jury instruction spеcifically defining the element of “in the discharge of a person‘s duty” as found in R.C.
{¶ 16} “After arguments are completed, a trial court must fully and completely give the jury all instructions which are relevant аnd necessary for the jury to weigh the evidence and discharge its duty as the fact finder. (Crim.R. 30 [A], construed.).” State v. Comen (1990), 50 Ohio St.3d 206, at paragraph two of the syllabus. On the charge of Intimidation in the case sub judice, the jury was instructed as to the meaning of the words “threat,” “intimidation,” and “public servant” аs found in R.C.
{¶ 17} We find that further instruction of the phrase, however, was not necessary to enable the jury to properly weigh the evidence and perform its function as fact finder. Because the meaning of the phrase “in the discharge of the person‘s duties” is clear to a person of ordinary intelligence, the trial court did not err in failing to include a jury instruction on its own accord. And, because we find that further instruction on the term “in the discharge of a person‘s duty” as found in R.C.
{¶ 18} Haskill further contends that the motion for acquittal under Crim. R. 29, which was properly denied by the trial court at the close of the state‘s case, should have been renewed both at the close of the defendant‘s case and after the jury verdict. Failure to do so, Haskill argues, amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel.
{¶ 19} The discussion relating to the motion for acquittal in our analysis under appellant‘s Third Assignment of Error, supra, is applicable here, as well. Haskill does not point us to any place in the transcript where such evidence was admitted following the close оf the state‘s case that would alter our conclusion that there had been sufficient evidence presented to the jury such that reasonable minds could reach different conclusions. Thus, we conclude that had Haskill‘s trial counsel renewed the motion fоr acquittal either at the close of defendant‘s case or after the jury rendered its verdict, there was no reasonable probability that counsel‘s motion would have been granted. Failure to offer a motion for acquittal for which no reasonаble grounds exist is not ineffective assistance of counsel.
{¶ 20} Accordingly, appellant‘s third and fifth assignments of error are overruled.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. IV
O.R.C.
{¶ 21} There is a strong presumption in favor of the constitutionality of statutes. State v. Lewis (1999), 131 Ohio App.3d 229, 235, citing State v. Anderson (1991), 57 Ohio St.3d 168. The party challenging a statute must prove that it is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt. Id., citation omitted. Moreover, where there is more than one possible interpretation of a statute, a court will construe the statute so as to save it from constitutional infirmities. Id., citing State v. Sinito (1975), 43 Ohio St.2d 98, 101.
{¶ 22} The vagueness doctrine, which is premised on the Due Process Clause of the
{¶ 23} In short, Haskell asserts that R.C.
{¶ 24} Appellant‘s fourth assignment of error is, therefore, overruled.
{¶ 25} Having found no error prejudicial to appellant herein, in the particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Judgment affirmed.
Shaw, P.J. an