State v. HartkeState v. Hartke
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Sweeney
The question here is whether extending juvenile jurisdiction retroactively to collect restitution violates the ex post facto prohibition of the federal and state constitutions.
FACTS
Daniel Hartke, a juvenile, pleaded guilty to five counts of second degree burglary, one count of first degree theft, and one count of third degree malicious mischief for criminal acts committed at a residence, the Chelan Library, Chelan High School, and Chelan Golf Course. On October 20, 1988, the court entered a disposition order. On January 19, 1989, the court ordered Daniel to pay restitution and held him jointly and severally liable with three others including his brother Eric Hartke. To collect restitution, the juvenile court extended jurisdiction to February 13, 1997, the date Daniel turned 21 years old.
The Legislature amended the juvenile restitution statute effective June 13, 1994. Laws of 1994, 1st Spec. Sess., ch. 7, § 528;
Jurisdiction over Eric expired on September 20, 1994. Although the amendment to
DISCUSSION
We presume a statute is constitutional. State v. Ward, 123 Wn.2d 488, 496, 869 P.2d 1062 (1994). The party challenging a statute must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that it is unconstitutional. Id. “ ‘ “[Wjherever possible, it is the duty of this court to construe a statute so as to uphold its constitutionality.” ’ ” State v. Furman, 122 Wn.2d 440, 458, 858 P.2d 1092 (1993) (quoting World Wide Video, Inc. v. City of Tukwila, 117 Wn.2d 382, 392, 816 P.2d 18 (1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 986, 112 S. Ct. 1672, 118 L. Ed. 2d 391 (1992)). Daniel makes two challenges. First, he says the statute imposes an ex post facto punishment. Second, he claims he was denied equal protection because the court extended jurisdiction over him but not Eric.
Ex Fost Facto. “The ex post facto clauses of the federal and state constitutions forbid the State from enacting any law which imposes punishment for an act which was not punishable when committed or increases the quantum of punishment annexed to the crime when it was committed.”
Ward,
123 Wn.2d at 496;
A law is “disadvantageous” when it alters the standard of punishment that existed under prior law. Ward, 123 Wn.2d at 498. We must determine whether the new law permits the imposition of a more severe punishment than was allowed when the crime was committed. State v. Edwards, 104 Wn.2d 63, 70-71, 701 P.2d 508 (1985).
Daniel contends the amendment to
The ex post facto prohibition applies only if restitution is punishment. In re Personal Restraint of Young, 122 Wn.2d 1, 18, 857 P.2d 989 (1993). Daniel’s argument assumes it is. He is mistaken. “A statute is penal in nature when a violation of its provisions can be punished by imprisonment and/or a fine.” State v. Eilts, 94 Wn.2d 489, 494 n.3, 617 P.2d 993 (1980) (citing State v. Hart, 136 Wash. 278, 283, 239 P. 834 (1925)). “Conversely, a statute is remedial when it provides for the remission of penalties and affords a remedy for the enforcement of rights and the redress of injuries.” Eilts, 94 Wn.2d at 494 n.3 (citing Haddenham v. State, 87 Wn.2d 145, 148, 550 P.2d 9 (1976)).
Restitution is the “financial reimbursement by the offender to the victim . . . .”
Because restitution is not punitive, the ex post facto doctrine is not implicated. The fact that a sanction, including imprisonment, might later be imposed for willfully violating a restitution order does not change the remedial nature of the restitution. See In re Marriage of Haugh, 58 Wn. App. 1, 5-6, 790 P.2d 1266 (1990) (imprisonment as contempt sanction for willful violation of court order was civil and not penal in nature).
Affirmed.
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A majority of the panel having determined that only the foregoing portion of this opinion will be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports and that the remainder, having no precedential value, shall be filed for public record pursuant to
Kurtz and Kato, JJ., concur.