{¶ 2} Appellant was charged in nine counts of a ten-count indictment filed December 13, 2005, with one count of theft, two counts of receiving stolen property, three counts of forgery and three counts of uttering. On July 19, 2006, he pleaded guilty to one count of theft, one count of receiving stolen property, and two counts of forgery, all fifth degree felonies. At a sentencing hearing held August 23, 2006, the court sentenced appellant to two years of community control on the condition that he refrain from all use of drugs and alcohol and pay restitution and a probation fee, as well as court costs.
{¶ 3} On January 11, 2007, appellant appeared before the court for a community control sanctions violation hearing. At the conclusion of that hearing, the court continued appellant's community control, but ordered that he should be supervised by the intensive special probation supervision unit. *4
{¶ 4} On May 3, 2007, appellant appeared before the court for another violation hearing, at which he admitted that he violated the conditions of his community control sanctions. At the conclusion of this hearing, the court terminated the community control sanctions and sentenced appellant to a term of nine months' imprisonment on each count. Three of these sentences were to run consecutive to one another but concurrent to the fourth, for a total of 27 months. The court further advised appellant that he was subject to three years' post-release control and that violation of the conditions of post-release control could result in an extension of post-release control, additional conditions, or a prison term of up to one-half the original prison term imposed.
{¶ 5} In his first assignment of error, appellant contends that the court had no authority to sentence him to a term of imprisonment because, at the original sentencing hearing, the court did not notify him of the "specific prison term" that could be imposed if he violated the conditions of his community control sanctions. He claims that notice of the "specific prison term" required the court to inform him that (1) his prison term could be extended by the parole board for certain violations of the prison rules, R.C.
{¶ 6} The Ohio Supreme Court addressed the meaning of the phrase "specific prison term" in State v. Brooks,
By choosing the word "specific" in R.C.
2929.19 (B)(5) to describe the *5 notification that a trial judge must give when sentencing an offender to community control, the General Assembly has made clear that the judge shall, in straightforward and affirmative language, inform the offender at the sentencing hearing that the trial court will impose a definite term of imprisonment of a fixed number of months or years, such as "twelve months' incarceration," if the conditions are violated. To comply with the literal terms of the statute, the judge should not simply notify the offender that if the community control conditions are violated, he or she will receive "the maximum," or a range, such as "six to twelve months," or some other indefinite term, such as "up to 12 months." The judge is required to notify the offender of the "specific" term the offender faces for violating community control.
{¶ 7} The court in Brooks construed the phrase "specific prison term" to mean a term of imprisonment of definite length. The court here complied with this requirement when it informed the defendant that "you're facing four 12 month sentences, that's 48 months, that's a lot of time. . . . So as well as your children, think about going to jail for 48 months." Nothing in Brooks or in R.C.
{¶ 8} In his second assignment of error, appellant urges that the court had no authority to sentence him to a term of imprisonment because, at the hearing for his first violation of community control sanctions, the court did not inform him that if he was later sentenced to a term of imprisonment for another violation, (1) his prison term could be extended if he violated prison rules, and (2) he would be subject to post-release control upon his release from prison. Appellant correctly notes that State v. Fraley,
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment *7 into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
*1JAMES J. SWEENEY, A.J., and FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., J., CONCUR.