State v. HarrisState v. Harris
Defendant, Joseph Clinard Harris, was charged by grand jury indictment with second degree murder in violation of
On the evening of August 26, 1986, defendant approached three people, two apparent females (“women“)3 and one male, who were soliciting on Quida Mae Street near Airline Highway. Defendant gave the male twenty dollars and walked with one of the “women” into a nearby apartment building under construction.
The “woman” began performing the act of fellatio upon defendant. The “woman” ceased performing the act when it became apparent defendant was preparing to climax (reach orgasm). The “woman” demanded an additional twenty dollars from defendant in order to complete the act. Defendant picked up a large, loose piece of concrete and begand striking the “woman” on the head.
After inflicting multiple blows upon the victim‘s head, defendant strangled the victim with a knotted vinyl belt. The record indicates the victim was fighting for his life when being strangled. The cause of death was determined to be asphyxiation. Defendant dragged the victim‘s body for an approximate distance of twenty feet, through loose gravel and into an empty apartment. Defendant then fled the scene and, at approximately 1:45 a.m., phoned Hershel Allor.
Defendant asked Allor to pick him up at the Bi-N-Pak Grocery, near Earl K. Long Hospital. After Allor arrived at the Bi-N-Pak he called out defendant‘s name. Defendant walked out from behind the grocery building and entered Allor‘s vehicle.
Defendant‘s gray T-shirt was blood-stained and torn. He had two long scratch marks down his arms. When questioned by Allor as to his physical appearance, defendant explained his belief that he had killed a transvestite prostitute.
The victim‘s body was found the following morning lying in a pool of blood. The victim was clothed, but the trouser zipper had been zipped down.
Fearing his own and his family‘s safety, Allor repeatedly telephoned Crime Stoppers and anonymously reported the crime for a one-month period. It wasn‘t until the defendant began following Allor that he reported the crime to the district attorney‘s office.
Thereafter, sometime in mid-October, 1986, Allor reluctantly agreed to be outfitted with a wire transmitter and a microphone in order to provide the police with sufficient information to arrest defendant. Allor went to defendant‘s apartment, and he and defendant discussed the murder at length.
Defendant related that he dragged the victim for fifteen feet, that the victim weighed 130 pounds and was “a real skinny one, that he looked like a man because, because of the Adams’ Apple and the pointed nose and chin.” Defendant told Allor that “she was going 20/20 on him. In other words, charged him twenty and when he was about to ejaculate, charged him twenty more. And he said he had to go as high as fifty with some of `em and he just wasn‘t going to put up with it again.”
An arrest warrant issued for defendant‘s arrest. Defendant was apprehended and subsequently interrogated. Detective Robert Howle testified that defendant, in response to a question asking him why he had done it, responded, “I f___ing lost my mind.” Defendant was subsequently indicted by a grand jury.
In his sole assignment of error, defendant claims that his intoxicated condition precluded his ability to form the specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm. Defendant does not deny that he caused the victim‘s death; instead, he contends he committed the crime on the spur of the moment, in a drunken rage. Therefore, defendant‘s sanity is not an issue before this Court.
At the outset, we note that the proper procedural vehicle for raising the issue of the sufficiency of the evidence is by a
To be guilty of second degree murder, a defendant must have the specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm.
Specific intent is defined as the “state of mind which exists when the circumstances indicate that the offender actively desired the prescribed criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to act.”
Voluntary intoxication is a defense to a prosecution for a crime only when the condition precludes the presence of a specific criminal intent or of a special knowledge required in that particular crime.
The circumstances do not indicate that defendant‘s intoxication precluded the presence of the specific criminal intent required for second degree murder. Although defendant told Allor and Detective Howle that he had lost his mind, the record reflects that defendant, while appearing very intoxicated, was able to walk and give Allor specific directions as to his location after the crime.
The record reflects that defendant had a real hatred for women and that he wanted to kill a woman. This hatred was purportedly caused by defendant‘s resentfulness toward his mother. The evidence at trial revealed defendant‘s desire to go “creeping” (looking for an opportunity to possibly harm or kill prostitutes in the Airline Highway vicinity). The activity referred to by defendant as “creeping” manifests a sadistic desire to inflict pain or to kill prostitutes. Defendant related his sadistic fantasy to Allor on many different occasions prior to the instant crime and at least twice thereafter. The facts of record give rise to the reasonable inference that defendant went “creeping” on the evening of August 26, 1986. The fact that the victim was a transvestite and not truly female was insufficient to deter defendant.
Moreover, defendant‘s actions indicate that he knew exactly what he was
The jury, aware of the possibility that they could return a responsive verdict of manslaughter, concluded that this was a case of second degree murder. We have carefully reviewed the record and find that the evidence supports the jury‘s determination. We are convinced that, when the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact could reasonably have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant specifically intended to kill or do great bodily harm to Carl J. Franklin.
This assignment of error is without merit.
For the foregoing reasons, the defendant‘s second degree murder conviction is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.