STATE OF OHIO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LEONDRE HARRIS, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 114569
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
August 7, 2025
2025-Ohio-2774
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: August 7, 2025
Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case No. CR-24-688197-A
Appearances:
Michael C. O‘Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Patrick White, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Flowers & Grube and Kendra N. Davitt, for appellant.
MICHAEL JOHN RYAN, J.:
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant Leondre Harris (“Appellant“) appeals his conviction and sentence on one count of felonious assault.1 For the reasons that
{¶ 2} On January 22, 2024, Appellant was indicted on one count of felonious assault (serious physical harm), a second-degree felony pursuant to
{¶ 3} Appellant filed a notice of self-defense during pretrial proceedings. The matter proceeded to a jury trial.2
{¶ 4} The facts that gave rise to this event occurred on Sunday, January 7, 2024, at Neighbors Bar and Grill in the Westpark neighborhood of Cleveland. Appellant went to Neighbors to order takeout. During his time at the bar, he harassed and inappropriately touched customers, including a nine-month pregnant woman. He also attempted to kiss a customer. Appellant eventually ordered his takeout but was upset with the cost of the food and demanded a refund.
{¶ 5} After roughly an hour, the bartender victim informed Appellant that if he did not stop harassing customers he would be asked to leave. Appellant did not comply and was asked to leave. Appellant refused. The bartender, leaning over the
{¶ 6} Appellant did not leave but remained in the bar arguing with employees. Several minutes passed and all had seemed to calm down when Appellant suddenly went behind the bar to where the bartender was attending to his injuries. Appellant began to push the bartender and then started punching him again, punching him several more times, while the bartender tried to defend himself from Appellant‘s blows. The attack seemed to stop again for several more minutes, but Appellant went at the bartender again. The bartender attempted to defend himself by holding a dishpan as a shield. Appellant still did not leave, but remained at the bar arguing with the bartender and other staff until the police arrived.
{¶ 8} A 16-minute video of the incident was played for the jury and entered into evidence.
{¶ 9} The jury found Appellant guilty of one count of felonious assault (deadly weapon) and one count of aggravated menacing but acquitted him of the other felonious assault (serious physical harm). The trial court found Appellant guilty of the attending specifications and sentenced Appellant to a total of 16 - 20 years in prison.
{¶ 10} On appeal, Appellant raises the following assignments of error:
- The trial court erred by denying Appellant‘s request for an instruction on self-defense.
- The trial court erred in prohibiting Appellant‘s use of the State‘s evidence during his examination of witnesses and in denying his motion for a mistrial based on the same.
- The trial court committed structural error by assisting the prosecution.
- The trial court erred as a matter of law by penalizing the Defendant‘s decision to defend himself at trial during sentencing.
- The cumulative impact of numerous errors at trial prejudiced Appellant by swaying the outcome of his trial.
{¶ 12} The trial court has the discretion to determine whether the evidence adduced at trial is sufficient to support a requested jury instruction, and its decision will not be disturbed absent an abuse of that discretion. State v. Singleton, 2013-Ohio-1440, ¶ 35 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Fulmer, 2008-Ohio-936. A trial court “abuses its discretion when it exercises its judgment in an unwarranted way with respect to a matter over which it has discretionary authority.” Hunter v. Troutman, 2025-Ohio-366, ¶ 64 (8th Dist.), citing Johnson v. Abdullah, 2021-Ohio-3304.
{¶ 13} The affirmative defense of self-defense is governed by
A person is allowed to act in self-defense . . . . If, at the trial of a person who is accused of an offense that involved the person‘s use of force against another, there is evidence presented that tends to support that the accused person used the force in self-defense . . . the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused person did not use the force in self-defense . . . .
{¶ 14} A self-defense claim under
(1) that the defendant was not at fault in creating the situation giving rise to the affray; (2) that the defendant had a bona fide belief that he [or she] was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm and that his [or her] only means of escape from such danger was in the use of such force; and (3) that the defendant did not violate any duty to retreat or avoid the danger.
{¶ 15} Defendants are required to present qualitative, legally sufficient evidence supporting each element of self-defense before the State‘s burden of persuasion under
{¶ 16} The parties concede that Appellant and the bartender‘s first encounter was “mutual combat,” meaning that the men were fighting each other, as opposed to just one of the men being the immediate aggressor. The evidence adduced at trial showed that Appellant was being an unruly patron, touching other customers inappropriately, and continually arguing with the bartender and his fellow employees. When Appellant did not follow the bartender‘s verbal attempts to get him to leave the bar, the bartender tried to physically remove Appellant from the bar. Appellant put his hand on the bartender‘s throat, and the bartender responded
{¶ 17} Pursuant to
{¶ 18} Appellant was initially lawfully on the bar premises. But after over an hour of disturbing other customers, he was asked to leave. He had the opportunity to leave several times. Instead of leaving and avoiding any conflict, Appellant
{¶ 19} Moreover, Appellant used more force than necessary to defend himself. “Implicit in th[e] second element of self-defense, i.e. that the defendant‘s use of deadly force was in “good faith,” is the requirement that the degree of force used was “warranted” under the circumstances and “proportionate” to the perceived threat.” State v. Ratliff, 2023-Ohio-1970, ¶ 31 (8th Dist.), quoting State v. Hendrickson, 2009-Ohio-4416, ¶ 31 (4th Dist.).
{¶ 20} This court has held that the force used to defend must be at once objectively reasonable and necessary under the facts and circumstances of the case. Ratliff at id., citing State v. Johnson, 2022-Ohio-2577, ¶ 15 (8th Dist.); see also Martin v. Cent. Ohio Transit Auth., 70 Ohio App.3d 83, 93 (10th Dist. 1990) (“The force used to defend must be objectively necessary and reasonable under the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the danger apprehended.“). Although the force used during the first altercation, which the parties described as “mutual combat,” may have been reasonable, the force used during subsequent attacks was neither reasonable nor necessary under the facts and circumstances of the case. After the first encounter ended, Appellant turned and attacked the bartender, punching him several times and hitting him over the head with a barstool. After separate breaks lasting several minutes, Appellant twice again attacked the bartender, punching him several more times.
{¶ 22} The first assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 23} In the second assignment of error, Appellant contends that the trial court erred to his prejudice when it did not allow him use of the State‘s evidence, i.e., the bar‘s surveillance video.
{¶ 24} A trial court has broad discretion in how it runs its courtroom. “A trial judge has authority to exercise control over the proceedings and the discretion to impose control over the proceedings.” State v. Brunson, 2020-Ohio-5078, ¶ 17 (8th Dist.). A trial court has “broad discretion in the admission of evidence, and unless it has clearly abused its discretion and the defendant has been materially prejudiced thereby, an appellate court should not disturb the decision of the trial court.” State v. Dobson, 2025-Ohio-2148, ¶ 54 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Issa, 93 Ohio St.3d 49 (2001).
{¶ 25} “Under
{¶ 27} A court has the discretion whether to declare a mistrial. State v. Price, 2025-Ohio-2218, ¶ 22 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Knuff, 2024-Ohio-902, ¶ 150. In order to establish an abuse of discretion premised upon a failure to grant a mistrial, the moving party must demonstrate material prejudice. State v. Easter, 2024-Ohio-1389, ¶ 21 (2d Dist.), citing State v. Adams, 2015-Ohio-3954, ¶ 198. “Mistrials need be declared only when the ends of justice so require and a fair trial is no longer possible.” State v. Franklin, 62 Ohio St.3d 118, 127 (1991).
{¶ 28} The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant‘s motion for a mistrial. Appellant was not precluded from showing the video entirely; in fact, Appellant was allowed to use the video to cross-examine the State‘s witnesses. Appellant has not shown he was materially prejudiced by the court‘s action.
{¶ 29} The second assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 31} A structural error is an error that affects the framework within which a trial proceeds rather than a mere error in the trial process itself. State v. West, 2022-Ohio-1556, ¶ 25. Structural error is “a violation of the basic constitutional guarantees that define the framework of a criminal trial; it is not susceptible to harmless-error review but rather, when an objection has been raised in the trial court, is grounds for automatic reversal.” Id. at ¶ 2, citing State v. Jones, 2020-Ohio-3051, ¶ 2, 20.
{¶ 32} Structural error is recognized only in limited circumstances where fundamental constitutional rights are involved. West at ¶ 26. Examples include “denial of counsel to an indigent defendant, the denial of counsel of choice, the denial of self-representation at trial, the denial of a public trial, and the failure to instruct the jury that the accused‘s guilt must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id., citing Weaver v. Massachusetts, 582 U.S. 286 (2017). The Ohio Supreme Court has recognized that “[t]he presence of a biased judge on the bench is . . . a paradigmatic example of structural constitutional error.” State v. Sanders, 92 Ohio St.3d 245, 278 (2001).
{¶ 33} Here, Appellant claims that the trial court demonstrated favoritism toward the State during the trial by questioning witnesses itself, limiting defense counsel‘s cross-examination of State witnesses, limiting Appellant‘s testimony, and
{¶ 34} Generally, a challenge to a trial judge‘s objectivity must comport with the procedures outlined in
{¶ 35} We note that if a trial judge forms an opinion based on facts introduced or events occurring during the course of the current or prior proceedings, that does not rise to the level of judicial bias. Johnson at id. An exception to this rule occurs if the judge‘s opinions “display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.” Id. at ¶ 26, citing State v. Hough, 2013-Ohio-1543 (8th Dist.), and Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540 (1994). Nothing in the transcript evidences that the trial judge displayed “deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.”
{¶ 36} As to the trial judge‘s occasional questioning of witnesses,
{¶ 37} We cannot conclude that the trial judge displayed favoritism to the State. We find no fault with the way the trial judge conducted trial; the trial judge displayed evenhandedness throughout trial and sustained objections of both parties.
{¶ 38} Accordingly, the third assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 39} In the fourth assignment of error, Appellant claims that the trial court erred by penalizing Appellant for going to trial, commonly known as the “trial tax.” Appellant argues that he was offered three years’ imprisonment as part of his plea deal with the State, so the trial court must have punished him when it imposed a 16 - 20 year prison sentence.
{¶ 40} We note that the parties stated at oral argument that the trial court never agreed to a three-year sentence. Therefore, although the State offered Appellant three years in prison as part of plea negotiations, there was no guarantee the court would have sentenced him to that amount of time had Appellant accepted the plea offer.
{¶ 42} Despite his claims to the contrary, Appellant is unable to show that the trial court sentenced him to 16 - 20 years in prison solely because Appellant decided to go to trial.
{¶ 43} Therefore, the fourth assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 44} In his final assignment of error, Appellant asserts his convictions should be reversed based upon the cumulative errors that occurred throughout the proceedings. Because, however, we find no error, there is no cumulative error. State v. Jackson, 2025-Ohio-109, ¶ 70 (8th Dist.); State v. Yeager, 2023-Ohio-2541, ¶ 70 (11th Dist.). Accordingly, the fifth assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 45} Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant‘s conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence.
MICHAEL JOHN RYAN, JUDGE
EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, A.J., and EMANUELLA D. GROVES, J., CONCUR