State v. HarpState v. Harp
3. INSTRUCTION: Second Degree Murder: Direction for Malicious Assault. An instruction telling the jury that if they find from the evidence that defendant “wilfully, feloniously, premeditatedly and with malice aforethought did make an assault upon deceased with a pistol loaded with gunpowder and leaden balls, and did shoot him in a vital part of the body, with a leaden ball discharged from said pistol by defendant, thereby inflicting on him a mortal wound, from which said wound he then instantly died, you will find defendant guilty of murder in the second degree,” in its first portion directs the jury to find that defendant assaulted deceased with a loaded pistol, whereas he was charged with murder, and in its second part does not require them to find that defendant intentionally shot deceased, and was erroneous.
4. ——: Unnumbered. Where numerous instructions are asked it is well to separately number them.
Citations to Headnotes: 1, Homicide, 30 C. J. par. 653; 2, Witnesses, 40 Cyc. 2512; 3, Homicide, 30 C. J. par. 651.
RAILEY, C.—After reading the testimony presented in the record, we are satisfied that the statement of the case as presented by counsel for respondent is substantially correct, and is hereby adopted as our statement of the facts, as follows:
Appellant, Josh Harp, was charged by an information filed in the Circuit Court of Dunklin County, Missouri, on the 5th day of May, 1922, with the crime of murder in the first degree, in that he, on or about the 5th day of April, 1922, wilfully, deliberately, premeditatedly and of his malice aforethought shot and killed one Irving Spinks. He was tried on the 24th day of March, 1923, before a jury, and was found guilty of murder in the second degree as charged in the information and his punishment assessed at imprisonment in the penitentiary for a term of twenty years. Judgment was rendered in accordance with the verdict, from which appellant appeals to this court.
“The failure of the trial court to instruct on manslaughter was reversible error. Instructions on manslaughter and self-defense may both be given where the facts justify them. There was sufficient evidence of personal violence to defendant here (scuffle, blows and injury) to require an instruction on manslaughter. [State v. Burrell, 252 S. W. 709, l. c. 711; State v. Conley, 255 Mo. 185; State v. Wilson, 242 Mo. 481; State v. Brown, 188 Mo. 451; State v. Weakley, 178 Mo. 413; State v. Wensell, 98 Mo. 137; State v. Partlow, 90 Mo. 608.]”
We have set out the testimony heretofore and, after reading the record, without hesitation conclude that the confession of error by counsel for respondent is fully sustained by the law and facts of the case.
As the cause must be reversed and remanded, it is deemed advisable to consider some of the other assignments made by appellant.
II. Serious complaint is made in respect to the ruling of the trial court in permitting plaintiff‘s counsel to show that defendant‘s witnesses were in the service of the St. Louis Southern Railway Company by whom defendant had been employed.
In Russ v. Bakery Co., 210 Mo. l. c. 76, it was held proper for defendant, on cross-examination of plaintiff‘s witnesses, to show that they were members of the same labor union with plaintiff. The court there said: “This evidence was admitted for the purpose of showing the relation that existed between the plaintiff and his witnesses, in order that the jury might take that fact into consideration in determining what weight it should give to their testimony. Such evidence is always admissible.”
The principle of law announced in the above quotation was recently followed, by Court in Banc, in Sommer v. Cont. Portland Cement Co., 295 Mo. l. c. 526, and
The cross-examination of witnesses rests largely in the exercise of a sound judicial discretion on the part of the court. Upon reading the record and briefs in this case, we have reached the conclusion that some few of the questions propounded to appellant‘s witnesses might have been modified so as not to appear as a comment of counsel on the veracity of the witnesses. It is not likely that the matters complained of will be repeated on a re-trial of the cause.
III. The trial court is charged with error in giving to the jury the main instruction defining murder in the second degree, which reads as follows:
“Murder in the second degree is the killing of a human being wilfully, feloniously, premeditatedly and with malice aforethought.
“Bearing in mind the definitions heretofore given of the terms wilfully, premeditatedly, feloniously and malice aforethought, if you find and believe from the evidence that at the County of Dunklin in the State of Missouri, on or about the 5th day of April, 1922, the defendant Josh Harp, wilfully, feloniously, premeditatedly and with malice aforethought, did make an assault upon one Irving Spinks with a pistol loaded with gunpowder and leaden balls, and if you find and believe that the said defendant did shoot him, the said Irving Spinks, in a vital part of the body, with a leaden ball discharged from said pistol by the defendant, thereby inflicting upon him, the said Irving Spinks, a mortal wound, from which said wound he, the said Irving Spinks, then and there instantly died, you will find the defendant guilty of murder in the second degree, and unless you find the facts so to be, you will acquit the defendant.
“If you find the defendant guilty of murder in the second degree, you will assess his punishment at impris-
The first portion of this instruction charges defendant with having assaulted Spinks with a loaded pistol. He was prosecuted for murder, and not for an assault. For aught that appears in the remaining portion of said instruction, the defendant may not have intentionally shot deceased, etc. In defining second degree murder, the jury should have been required to find, in substance, that defendant wilfully, premeditatedly and of his malice aforethought, shot and killed Irving Spinks, etc. The instruction, as given, has been condemned by many decisions of this court, and so far as we are advised has been sustained in none. [State v. Murphy, 292 Mo. l. c. 292; State v. Emory, 246 S. W. (Mo.) l. c. 951; State v. Gallagher, 222 S. W. (Mo.) l. c. 467; State v. Conley, 255 Mo. l. c. 187, 194; State v. Clay, 201 Mo. l. c. 681, 686; State v. Birks, 199 Mo. 263; State v. Woodward, 191 Mo. l. c. 627; State v. Williams, 184 Mo. l. c. 263; State v. Privitt, 175 Mo. 215, 223; State v. Bauerle, 145 Mo. l. c. 18 et seq.; State v. Arnewine, 126 Mo. l. c. 572; State v. Moxley, 115 Mo. 644; State v. Green, 111 Mo. l. c. 588.]
In State v. Bauerle, 145 Mo. l. c. 18, the following instruction was held to be proper in a case of this character;
“The court instructs the jury that if you believe and find from the evidence in this cause, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant, at the County of Lafayette and State of Missouri, on or about the 26th day of April, 1896, willfully, premeditatedly and of his malice aforethought shot and killed one Amelia Bauerle, but without deliberation, you will find the defendant guilty of murder in the second degree and will assess his punishment at imprisonment in the penitentiary for a term of not less than ten years.”
This instruction just quoted has been expressly approved in State v. Murphy, 292 Mo. l. c. 292; State v. Emory, 246 S. W. (Mo.) l. c. 951, and State v. Gallagher, 222 S. W. (Mo.) l. c. 467. On a re-trial of the case, the main instruction relating to second-degree murder should follow in form, or substance, the principle of law contained in the above quoted instruction.
IV. On the trial of these cases where numerous instructions are asked, it would be well to have the same separately numbered.
We do not deem it necessary to pass upon any of the other questions raised in the case. On account of the errors heretofore pointed out, the cause is reversed and remanded for a new trial. Higbee, C., concurs.
PER CURIAM:—The foregoing opinion of RAILEY, C., is adopted as the opinion of the court. All of the judges concur, except Walker, J., absent.