State v. HarlowState v. Harlow
Omak Police Officer Andrew Ditzel kept a list of city residents who were believed to hаve suspended drivers’ licenses. Officer Ditzel stopped Beverly Harlow when he saw her driving and remembered her name was on the list. She was arrested and booked into jail for driving while her licensе was suspended. Her motion to dismiss the citation was denied and she appeals, contending the maintenance of a suspended licenses list is an unconstitutional search and an unreаsonable invasion of her private affairs. We affirm.
When Officer Ditzel began training as a police officer, his trainer, Officer Mike Marshall, was keeping a list of people who had suspended licenses. These were people Officer Marshall had personally cited for driving with suspended licenses. Officer Marshall gave the list to Officer Ditzel, who maintained the list by checking the names every week and adding new names as he cited drivers himself. According to Officer Ditzel, he and Officer Marshall knew on sight each of the approximately 55 people on thе list.
On February 16, 1995, Officer Ditzel saw Ms. Harlow driving. He had run a check on his list of suspended licenses the day before, and knew she was probably driving without a valid license. Ms. Harlow pulled into her driveway just as Officеr Ditzel recognized her. He pulled in behind her and asked her to get back in her car while he ran a driver‘s check. When dispatch confirmed that she still had a suspended license, he arrestеd her.
Ms. Harlow was charged in district court with third degree driving while license suspended.
Ms. Harlow contends both Article I, Section 7 of the Washington Constitution and the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provide protection against police maintenance of a suspended licenses list. She argues the list and the weekly checks of the drivers’ records constitute warrantless searches and invasions of privacy.
When a defendant alleges viоlations of rights under both the state and the federal constitutions, this court first independently interprets and applies the state constitution. State v. Young, 123 Wash.2d 173, 178, 867 P.2d 593 (1994). The Washington State Constitution may provide greater protection than the federal constitution. Id. at 179, 867 P.2d 593. To determine whether Article I, Section 7 provides greater protection here, it is necessary to apply an analysis of the six nonеxclusive factors of State v. Gunwall, 106 Wash.2d 54, 720 P.2d 808, 76 A.L.R.4th 517 (1986). Young, 123 Wash.2d at 179, 867 P.2d 593; State v. Boland, 115 Wash.2d 571, 575, 800 P.2d 1112 (1990). Briefly, the Gunwall factors are (1) the textual language, (2) comparison of the language in the texts of both constitutional provisions, (3) constitutional history, (4) preexisting state law, (5) structurаl differences and (6) matters of particular state or local concern. Gunwall, 106 Wash.2d at 58, 720 P.2d 808; State v. Johnson, 75 Wash.App. 692, 702 n. 4, 879 P.2d 984 (1994), review denied, 126 Wash.2d 1004, 891 P.2d 38 (1995). In the context of Article I, Section 7, factors 1, 2, 3 and 5 were adopted by the Washington Supreme Court in Boland, 115 Wash.2d at 576, 800 P.2d 1112. Accordingly, we only address the Gunwall faсtors of preexisting state law and matters of state and local concern. Johnson, 75 Wash.App. at 702, 879 P.2d 984; City of Seattle v. Yeager, 67 Wash.App. 41, 45, 834 P.2d 73 (1992), review denied, 121 Wash.2d 1027, 854 P.2d 1086 (1993).
Washington cases have not addressed privacy rights in driving records.
Gunwall‘s sixth factor, whether the privacy interest is of state or local concern, is easily met. Law enforcement measures and regulation of drivers on state highways are both matters of local concern. Young, 123 Wash.2d at 180-81, 867 P.2d 593; Yeager, 67 Wash.App. at 46, 834 P.2d 73. There is no need for national uniformity on use of state drivеrs’ records.
In light of the above, we review this matter on independent state constitutional grounds.
Fixed sobriety checkpoints of all oncoming motorists were held to violatе both the Washington
The closest analogous cases concern the use of utility records and driver‘s license checks based on articulable suspicion. In State v. Maxfield, 125 Wash.2d 378, 392, 886 P.2d 123 (1994), the court held that although police may not inspect a person‘s electrical utility records without a written statement that they suspect the person of a crime and reasonably believe the records could resolve that suspicion,
In contrast, motor vehicle records are kept by the State primarily for state use. Drivers are presumed to know that the records are availаble to the police as well as to employers, insurance carriers and others. Similarly, citizens have no reasonable expectation of privacy in warrants records, which are readily accessible by the police. See State v. Williams, 50 Wash.App. 696, 700, 750 P.2d 278 (1988) (warrant checks are reasonable routine police procedures). It is not reasonable to believe a police officer will not have access to a driver‘s license record. Further, in this case the officers did not go on a fishing expedition. Only those people whom they had personally cited for driving with suspended licenses were placed on the lists. The records were not accessed to search for evidence of a crime, but merely to update the lists for accuracy.
We note that several jurisdictions recognize the authority of police to run random computer checks of passing vehicle licenses, without suspicion of criminal сonduct. See, e.g., People v. Sampson, 255 Ill.App.3d 825, 827, 627 N.E.2d 772, 774, 194 Ill.Dec. 435 (1994) (computerized report that owner of vehicle has suspended license is sufficient to justify temporary stop to check driver‘s license); Village of Lake in the Hills v. Lloyd, 227 Ill.App.3d 351, 591 N.E.2d 524, 169 Ill. Dec. 351 (1992) (random check of vehicle license reveals owner has revoked license; creates reasonable suspicion and stop is not random); State v. Lewis, 288 N.J.Super. 160, 671 A.2d 1126 (1996) (random license plate cheсks of passing vehicles; no expectation of privacy in vehicle license (which is exposed to public view) or in owner‘s driving record); State v. Owens, 75 Ohio App.3d 523, 525, 599 N.E.2d 859 (1991) (random investigatory check of license plate not an invasion of Fourth Amendment rights); and other cases cited in Yeager, 67 Wash.App. at 47, 834 P.2d 73. Officer Ditzel was not running random checks here, however; the only people on his list were those he and Officer Marshаll had personally cited and knew had suspended licenses. The records information was obtained pursuant to statutory authority,
Although Article I, Section 7 provides broader privacy protection than the Fourth Amendment, the blanket of protection covers only those privacy interests citizеns have come to expect and should expect. Goucher, 124 Wash.2d at 782, 881 P.2d 210. The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches that intrude on a citizen‘s subjective and reasonable expectation of privacy. Maxfield, 125 Wash.2d at 395, 886 P.2d 123; Young, 123 Wash.2d at 181, 867
Affirmed.
THOMPSON and KURTZ, JJ., concur.