opinion of the Court:
INTRODUCTION
T 1 The sole question before us is whether a police officer may search two backpacks belonging to a passenger in an automobile after receiving only the driver's consent to search the vehicle. The district court's factual findings are not sufficiently particularized for us to conclusively make this determination. We therefore remand with instructions for the district court to make additional factual findings.
BACKGROUND
1 2 Tina Harding was one of three passengers in a vehicle that was stopped by Officer Jeffrey Westerman on February 22, 2008. Officer Westerman had the driver exit the vehicle, issued her a citation, and then told the driver she was free to leave. While the passengers remained in the vehicle, the driver returned to ask Officer Westerman a question. At that time, Officer Westerman asked the driver if he "could take a look in the vehicle," and the driver consented. Officer Westerman then asked the passengers to exit the vehicle and wait with a back-up officer while Officer Westerman "took a look in the vehicle." Officer Westerman found several bags, including two backpacks,
T3 The State charged Ms. Harding with possession of methamphetamine, possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person, provision of false information to a peace officer, and possession of paraphernalia. The false information and paraphernalia charges were dismissed. Ms. Harding moved to suppress the evidence discovered during the search. The parties stipulated that the initial traffic stop was legal and that Ms. Harding had standing to challenge the search because she had a legitimate expectation of privacy in her backpacks and she never abandoned them. The district court denied Ms. Harding's motion, holding that. it would have been reasonable for Officer Wes-terman to have understood the driver's consent to extend to Ms. Harding's backpacks. Ms. Harding thereafter entered a conditional guilty plea to the methamphetamine possession and dangerous weapon charges.
T4 Ms. Harding appealed her conviction to the Utah Court of Appeals. As to the sole question now presented, she asserted that Officer Westerman had improperly assumed the driver had authority to consent to the search of her backpacks. A majority of the panel of the court of appeals affirmed. State v. Harding,
1 5 Judge Thorne dissented, reasoning that "the State bears the burden of demonstrating that one who consents to a search has the authority to do so." Id. 124 (Thorne, J., dissenting). Relying on the district court's determination that the officer "had no way of knowing whose bags they were," Judge Thorne concluded that the officer could not "be said to have had a reasonable belief as to the driver's ownership of the bags." Id. 1 22 (Thorne, J., dissenting). "[TJhe only indicia of ownership or control of the bags was their mere presence in the driver's vehicle, along with multiple passengers and in an area accessible to those passengers." Id. 125 (Thorne, J., dissenting). Thus, Judge Thorne concluded that under the facts of the case, "(alt best" ownership of the bags was ambiguous. Id. 126 (Thorne, J., dissenting). According to Judge Thorne, when ownership is ambiguous, an officer must make further inquiry to determine ownership before proceeding. Id. (Thorne, J., dissenting). .
T6 We granted Ms. Harding's petition for a writ of certiorari as to the following issue: "Whether the majority of the panel of the court of appeals erred in its analysis and/or application of the Fourth Amendment standards governing the apparent authority of a person to consent to a search of another person's property."
STANDARD OF REVIEW
17 On certiorari, we review a decision of the court of appeals for correctness. Harold Selman, Inc. v. Box Elder Cnty.
ANALYSIS
{8 Ms. Harding argues that Officer Wes-terman violated her Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches by searching her backpacks, which were located in the cargo compartment of the SUV in which she was riding, without her consent. She contends that it was unreasonable under the circumstances for Officer Westerman to believe that the driver's consent to search the vehicle extended to her backpacks. We agree.
T9 At the outset, we note that Ms. Harding's claim was brought wholly under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Ms. Harding has not argued that her rights under the Utah Constitution have been violated. Thus, despite our pronouncement that "we will not hesitate to give the Utah Constitution a different construction where doing so will more appropriately protect the rights of this state's citizens," State v. DeBooy,
110 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits unreasonable searches. See U.S. Const. amend. IV. A warrantless search is per se unreasonable unless it comes within one of a few recognized exceptions. Kentucky v. King, - U.S. -, -,
111 Whether a third party has actual common authority over property is determined by the test articulated in United States v. Matlock,
112 Whether a third party has "apparent authority" to consent to a search of another's property is governed by the standard articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Rodriguez,
118 The Rodriguez apparent authority rule applies only to mistakes of fact; Rodrigues cannot "validate a search premised upon an erroneous view of the law." United States v. Brown,
114 The State does not contend that the driver had actual common authority to consent to the search of Ms. Harding's backpacks, nor is there evidence that the driver possessed such authority. Rather, the State's only argument is that the warrantless search was constitutionally permissible under the Rodriguez apparent authority doctrine. Thus, we will uphold the search of Ms. Harding's backpacks only if Officer Westerman could have reasonably believed that the driver either owned the backpacks or had common authority over them.
1 15 We have never addressed the applicability of the apparent authority doctrine in the context of a search and seizure case. And, although the United States Supreme Court sketched the legal contours of the doctrine in Rodrigues, the Court has not applied the apparent authority framework in the automobile context. But other state and federal courts have. These courts have engaged in a fact-specific, totality-of-the-circumstances inquiry to determine whether it would have been reasonable for the police officer to believe that the driver had the authority to consent to the search of the passenger's belongings.
116 Courts applying Rodriguez's apparent authority doctrine are generally in agreement that an officer's search of a passenger's belongings based only on a driver's consent is unreasonable where the facts clearly indicate the driver has no authority over the items to be searched. For example, courts are unanimous in holding that it is unreasonable for an officer to search a female passenger's purse after obtaining only the consent of a male driver because it is unreasonable to believe that the man has authority over the woman's purse. See United States v. Welch,
1 18 The court concluded that the evidence obtained pursuant to this search must be suppressed because the officer could not reasonably have determined that the driver had authority to consent to a search of Ms. James' purse. Id., 206 IIlDec. 190,
{19 The recent case of United States v. Munoz,
120 The court concluded that Munog's Fourth Amendment rights were violated when the officer conducted a warrantless search of Munog's backpack without first obtaining his consent. Id. at 928. The court reasoned that "there were two people in the car who each had been sitting in the passenger seat during the trip." Id. In such a circumstance, the officer "did not reasonably believe that Smith had authority to consent to the search of the backpack." Id. Because the backpack could logically have belonged to either Smith or Munoz, the officer could not reasonably rely on Smith's consent alone; rather, the officer should have determined who owned the backpack before proceeding to search it. See id.
{21 Similarly, in State v. Frank,
122 In Norris v. State,
123 Courts do not always resolve ambiguous ownership situations in favor of the defendant. For example, in State v. Sawyer,
124 In upholding the search, the court stressed that the officer made it clear when seeking consent that he would be searching for drugs, thereby making it "logical for the police to assume that they had permission to search containers inside the car that might contain drugs." Id. at 1212. The court also emphasized that the item searched was a cassette tape or compact dise case, a type of container that an officer could reasonably believe the driver either owned or had common access to. Id. at 1212-18. The fact that the bag was behind the driver's seat strengthened the reasonableness argument. Id. Finally, the court noted that the passenger did not object to the search of his bag. Id. at 1218.
1 25 In a similar case, the Supreme Court of New Jersey upheld an officer's search of a bag belonging to a passenger in a vehicle based only on the driver's consent to search the car. State v. Maristany,
126 Over a vigorous dissent, the court upheld the search of the blue canvas bag, concluding that the officer could reasonably have believed that the driver had the authority to consent to the search of the bag. Id. at 1069. The court stressed the driver's knowledge of the contents of the trunk, reasoning that his "knowledge of the contents of the
127 The dissenting justices took the majority's opinion to task, stating that it "cere-ates the wrong incentive" and "puts a premium on ignorance" because under the majority's opinion, "as long as police officers do not know whose property they are searching, they can search at will." Id. at 1071 (Pollock, J., dissenting). According to the dissent, the facts known to the officer "would have left a reasonable person in doubt about [the driver's] authority to consent to search both bags." Id. at 1072 (Pollock, J., dissenting). Because the passenger was unaware that the driver had consented to a search of the vehicle, Id. at 1067, the dissenting justices were particularly concerned with the majority's suggestion that the passenger had impliedly consented to the search by failing to claim ownership of the bag. Id. at 1072-78 (Pollock, J., dissenting). The dissent also reasoned that, given a situation where there were two occupants in the car and two bags, the officer "should not have concluded, without having solicited contrary information, that one man owned both bags and the other owned neither bag." Id. at 1078 (Pollock, J., dissenting).
128 As these cases demonstrate, courts measure the reasonableness of an officer's actions against a variety of factors when applying the apparent authority doctrine in the context of a vehicle search. The type of container searched is often significant, For example, it is reasonable to believe that the driver of a vehicle has access to certain items found in the vehicle, tending to support the reasonableness of the officer's search of such items, even if it ultimately turns out that the particular item belongs exclusively to the passenger.
29 Courts also routinely consider the conduct of the passenger in connection with the search Courts reason that an officer's search of a passenger's belongings is more reasonable when the passenger remains silent when he could be expected to object to the search of his belongings.
30 Courts also consider whether there is anything on the exterior of the container, such as identification tags, that would indicate that it does not belong to the driver.
{31 Finally, the location of the container in the vehicle can be significant. An officer's search of a passenger's belongings is often unreasonable when the belongings are located in or near the area in which the passenger was sitting.
1382 After considering the totality of the cireumstances presented here, we conclude
133 In this case, similar to James, Frank, and Norris, there were four passengers and several bags in the vehicle. In such a situation, the probability that one or more of the bags belonged to one of the passengers is extremely high. Thus, as in James, Frank, and Norris, it likely would have been unreasonable for Officer Westerman to believe that all of the bags in the car belonged to the driver.
1 34 The State makes much of the fact that the backpacks did not contain labels identifying Ms. Harding as the owner. It is true that some courts have emphasized such evidence, see, eg., Hammons,
The location of Ms. Harding's backpacks in the vehicle is also significant. Unlike James and Norris, Ms. Harding's backpacks were located directly behind the seat in which she was sitting, in the cargo compartment of the SUV rather than on or next to a passenger seat. However, in contrast to the trunk of a vehicle, which is typically controlled only by the driver, the cargo compartment of an SUV is an area to which the rear seat passengers typically have access and over which they may exercise some control. It is certainly reasonable to assume that a back seat passenger in an SUV would place her belongings in the cargo area directly behind the seat.
136 We also find it significant that the driver provided Officer Westerman with only general consent to "take a look in the vehicle." By doing so, the driver merely represented authority over the vehicle; she did not represent authority over the personal items in the vehicle that belonged to other occupants.
137 Taken together, the above factors weigh in favor of a finding that Officer Wes-terman could not have reasonably believed that the driver had authority to consent to a search of Ms. Harding's backpacks. But Ms. Harding's conduct in connection with the search is also a factor that bears upon the reasonableness of the search. Whether Ms. Harding's behavior could have been construed as suggesting that the driver had apparent authority to consent to a search of the backpacks is of critical import. We note that, on the record before us, there is little evidence suggesting Ms. Harding overheard the driver give consent to search the vehicle. For example, the record clearly establishes that Officer Westerman obtained the driver's consent only after the driver returned to the officer's patrol car. And it is undisputed that, at this point, Ms. Harding was in the other vehicle. But these facts do not completely foreclose the possibility that Ms. Harding was somehow made aware of the driver's consent before Officer Westerman began his search. If on remand the court finds that Ms. Harding was aware of the driver's consent but failed to object, that could suggest her acquiescence in the search and could weigh in favor of a determination that the officer reasonably believed that the driver had authority to consent.
T 38 Similarly, there is little indication that Ms. Harding ever became aware of the grounds for the search. Ms. Harding was asked to exit the car and wait with a back-up officer while Officer Westerman conducted the search. Officer Westerman did not mention specifically to the passengers that he was searching the vehicle based on the driv
139 Additionally, the nature of the bags in the cargo compartment of the SUV is an important factor in the reasonableness analysis. As noted above, Officer Westerman found the incriminating evidence in a backpack directly behind Ms. Harding. Many backpacks, like purses or fanny packs, are very personal items and therefore are not generally objects for which two or more persons share common use and authority. However, some backpacks are more like large suitcases that could easily be shared by fellow travelers. Without more specific factual findings, we cannot conclude that Ms. Harding's backpack was the type of personal item generally excluding common usage and authority. The parties' failure to elicit specific testimony bearing upon Ms. Harding's conduct or the general nature of the backpacks can reasonably be attributed to the fact that this is a case of first impression; we have never before articulated the above mul-tifactor test. In such a cireumstance, remand is appropriate so that the district court may enter particularized findings of fact bearing upon the following questions: (1) whether Ms. Harding's conduct can be construed as suggesting that the driver had apparent authority to consent to a search of the backpacks and (2) whether it was reasonable for Officer Westerman to assume the driver had authority to consent to a search of the backpacks based on their nature and characteristics.
140 If, after considering the additional factual findings, the district court concludes that, based on the totality of the cireum-stances, the facts available to Officer Wester-man at the time of the search would not "warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the [driver] had authority over" the items searched, Rodrigues,
CONCLUSION
141 The evidence adduced in the district court supports the conclusion that Officer Westerman could not have reasonably believed that the driver had authority to consent to a search of Ms. Harding's backpacks. The probability that the backpacks did not belong to the driver was high because there were four occupants in the vehicle and the backpacks were located directly behind the seat in which Ms. Harding was seated. But the district court did not make any particularized findings as to whether Ms. Harding's conduct in relation to the search suggested the driver had apparent authority to consent to a search of her backpacks or as to the general nature of the backpacks searched by Officer Westerman. We therefore remand this case for further factual findings bearing on those issues.
Notes
. Upon its review of the district court's denial of Ms. Harding's motion to suppress, the court of appeals concluded that Officer Westerman searched Ms. Harding's "bags," rather than her backpacks. Specifically, the court noted in a footnote that the only witness who testified at the district court hearing, Officer Westerman, testified that they were "bags" rather than "backpacks." The court of appeals' characterization of the facts is incorrect. We have reviewed the hearing transcript in its entirety. In it, Officer Westerman repeatedly refers to Ms. Harding's "backpacks." For example, in response to questioning by the prosecutor, Officer Westerman testified to the following: "Directly behind the area where the defendant was seated were locat
. As framed, the question on certiorari does not present any issue as to whether the driver of the vehicle had actual common authority to consent to the search of Ms. Harding's backpacks. And the State does not contend that the automobile exception applies. In addition, Ms. Harding's standing to challenge the search is not at issue because the State stipulated that Ms. Harding had a legitimate expectation of privacy in her backpacks and that she never abandoned them.
. See also Brigham City v. Stuart,
. See also State v. Brown,
. See also United States v. Davis,
. See also State v. Worwood,
. See also United States v. Jaras,
. See Sawyer,
. See also Brown,
. See United States v. Navarro,
. See Jaras,
. See United States v. Hammons,
. See, eg., James, 206 IIl.Dec. 190,
. See Munoz,
. See Hammons,