70 Conn. 484 | Conn. | 1898
The Act creating the offenses charged, is directed against that form of gambling known as pool selling, including bets or wagers on the result of any trial of speed, skill or endurance (Public Acts of 1893, p. 240). It prohibits : 1. Keeping any place with apparatus or devices for the purpose of carrying on such gambling. 2. Keeping any place where pool selling of any kind, either directly or indirectly is permitted or carried on. 3. Keeping any place in which the business of transmitting money to any race track or other place there to be placed or bet on any horse-race, etc., whether within or without this State, is permitted or carried on. 4. Making any such wager or buying or selling any such pools. 5. Being concerned in buying or selling any such pools.1 6. Being concerned in carrying on the business of the transmission of money to any race track, etc.
The defendant is charged in the first count with a violation of the third prohibition, and in the second count with a ■violation of the sixth. The defense relies on the alleged unconstitutionality of the Act.
“The defendant claimed and offered evidence to prove and claimed he had proven, that in the receipt of said message- and of said money he was acting as the agent of his said employer in the ordinary course of business of a telegraph company engaged in the business of telegrapher of messages- and moneys. The defendant admitted that he knew the purpose for which said money was sent and said message transmitted.”
The defendant in writing requested the court to charge the jury as follows: “ 1. That if the jury shall find that the accused, as charged in the first count of the complaint of the prosecuting attorney, did possess, keep, manage, maintain, and occupy a certain room, office, and place in which the business of transmitting money to a certain race track or
The court refused to so charge the jury, but did charge the jury as follows: “ That notwithstanding the jury should find that in the keeping, etc., of the place as set forth in the complaint, the accused kept said place for the ordinary purposes of a telegraphic business, yet if the business of transmitting money for the purposes charged in the complaint was carried on in said place, the accused was guilty of a violation of the laws of this State, and the statute prohibiting such act was constitutional; and that if the jury should find that accused did, as charged in the second count of said complaint,, knowingly transmit (by telegraph) moneys from the city of Waterbury to a place without this State to be bet upon a horse-race, that the accused is guilty of a violation of the laws of this State, notwithstanding such transmission may have been in the ordinary course of the business of a telegraph company, and that the statute of this State prohibitive of such act is constitutional.”
To the court’s refusal to charge as requested, and to the charge as delivered, the defendant duly excepted.
We shall dispose of the appeal on the question to which the counsel on both sides have thus addressed themselves, and which they seem to agree in regarding as the only one presented on the record; assuming that the attention of the jury was properly directed by evidence and instructions, to which it was thought unnecessary to refer in the finding, to the necessity of proof, under the second count, that the defendant, at the time of transmitting the money to be bet, was unlawfully concerned in the carrying on of the business of the transmission of money to places without the State, there to be placed or bet.
The decisions in respect to the power of Congress to regulate commerce among the several States, which is granted by the Constitution, have been numerous and not altogether consistent; but they seem to have established the following propositions: A State law dealing directly and only with interstate commerce, is void; a State law purporting to deal with domestic matters, but being in its effect and essence merely a regulation of interstate commerce, is void; a State law plainly and in good faith dealing only with State mat
The power of regulating commerce covers such a wide field, that cases must arise where a law passed in the legitimate exercise of the power of domestic legislation, is also, in a sense, a regulation of commerce; but it is not therefore necessarily an invasion of the jurisdiction of Congress, i. «., an exercise of the “power.” of regulation; it is an exercise of the “power” of domestic legislation, and is valid unless it conflict with some existing law, or so essentially affects interstate commerce as substantially to disturb those channels of commerce which Congress has seen fit to leave undisturbed. In dealing with such legislation the courts have given a much wider latitude to what is called police legislation, than to other forms of domestic legislation; because police regulations are absolutely essential to the protection of society, and in the main can only be established by the State government. ■
The law in question is purely a police regulation. For more than two hundred years we have treated wagering as against public policy, and playing at the games which promote wagering has been illegal. The restrictions on playing the games have been removed, but playing for anything of value is still an offense. General Statutes, §§ 2557,2558. A wager of any hind is illegal; the loser can recover the money lost, and if he does not sue, any person may sue for and recover treble the amount. General Statutes, §§2552, 2553 (passed in 1797, Statutes of 1808, p. 361). Betting on horse-races is a penal offense. General Statutes, § 2556. Since the establishment of our government wagering has been held to be, if not absolutely immoral, yet so injurious in its results as to require suppression by penal legislation. Such legislation has for many years past been directed against the business of promoting wagering in its various
The Act of 1893 attempts to reach the root of the evil, by prohibiting the keeping of a place in which this kind of gambling in any of its ramifications is carried on. One of the most dangerous forms is that for which the telegraph is utilized. In prohibiting the keeping of a place in which such a business is carried on, or being concerned in such a business, the State does not attempt to and does not in fact exercise any exclusive power vested in Congress over interstate commerce; it simply prohibits in this State the business of aiding crime, and if such commerce is thereby affected at all, it is tho incidental effect of depriving those here engaged in telegraphing, of the profits they might make through the business of promoting gambling in this State. That bxxsiness is prohibited; and it is immaterial whether it be carried on by aix ixxdividual in his own house, or by a telegraph company apart from, or as a part of, its ordinary bxxsiness of telegraphing. In whatever place and by whomsoever the business of promoting gambling is carried on, the offense is committed; and canxxot be justified because in committing it a telegram is sexxt from Connecticut to New Jersey. In Plumley v. Mass., 155 U. S. 461, it was claimed that the power of regulating interstate commerce involved the right ixx all citizens to iixtroduce and sell in any State any harmless article of food, unrestricted by State legisla
In the case at bar the defendant’s sole claim was, that if he kept the place as charged and was concerned in the business as charged, yet inasmuch as some of the acts essential to constitute these offenses consisted in the transmission of the information and money to another State, he was guilty of no offense, because a law restricting the ordinary business of telegraphing among the States is void; and his sole grievance is that the court did not so charge. For the reasons given we think the charge on that point was correct. When one opens an office and makes arrangements and furnishes facilities to enable his customers to sit in his office and gam
For a telegraph company to transmit a single message, and make a single transfer of funds, such as is stated in the finding of the court in the case before us, would not, standing alone, constitute a carrying on of the business of transmitting money for betting purposes. It would, however, he relevant evidence to show that fact, and might he sufficient, in connection with proof that the company furnished special conveniences for the use of those desiring to make such bets, or had no substantial business of any other description.
There is no error in the judgment of the District Court.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.