193 Iowa 657 | Iowa | 1922
— Sierk and wife were living on a farm in Pottawattamie County, and the appellant, Plarbour, was in their employ.' George Mikesell and his wife, Ruth, lived in the town of Carson. Ruth Mikesell was formerly the wife of Harbour, from whom she was divorced, and later married George Mikesell. At the time of the alleged crime, a horse belonging to Mrs. Mikesell was being pastured on Sierk’s farm. Sierk, not desiring to keep the animal longer, notified its owner to take it away. On June 2, 1920, Mikesell, his wife, mother, and a young girl drove to the farm in an auto, for the purpose of getting the horse, and there met Sierk and wife and the appellant. Sierk and wife and Mrs. Mikesell had some conversation in regard to payment for the pasturage, a matter of $2.50. The woman asserted a small counterclaim against Sierk. There does not appear to have been any serious quarrel, but evidently there was some degree of irritation over the matter of settlement. After this conversation, Sierk, with the assistance of one or two of the Mikesell party, caught the horse, and Mrs. Mikesell led it to the road, and-called her husband. The party entered the car, and, with Mikesell driving, and Mrs. Mikesell leading the animal, started in the direction of home. As they drove away, Mrs. Sierk upbraided her husband for letting the horse go without getting pay for the pasturage, and said to him:
“If you haven’t nerve enough to stop that horse and get your money, I have; and if you will back the car out, I will go down the road and either get the money or the horse.”
The appellant then said:
“I will go with you; that is the way they have paid their debts all their life.”
The husband then backed their car out of the garage. Mrs. Sierk went into the house and immediately returned, armed
We shall not attempt any .further statement of facts. It was enough to take the question of defendant’s guilt to the jury. That the party with which he acted, were the aggressors, and that they were armed with deadly weapons, is beyond question. They sought the conflict over' a matter of the most trivial character, and manifested a most reckless disregard of the law. On* no tenable theory can it be said that the verdict and judgment are not amply supported by the record. Indeed, appellant’s counsel do not assert any lack of evidence as a ground for reversal, but base their complaint entirely upon alleged -errors in the charge to the jury and certain rulings upon the admissibility of testimony. Of the assignments of error relied upon, some are entirely too general and indefinite to be considered on appeal. Others, reasonably sufficient in form and substance, are as follows:
We are of the opinion that the evidence fully warranted an instruction upon this subject. The.pursuit of the Mikesell party by the accused persons, armed with deadly weapons, for the avowed purpose of compelling by physical force the payment of a small sum of money or the surrender of the possession of the horse, is sufficient to justify the jury in finding that they were acting together, to effect an unlawful design; and the circumstances attending the attack or affray would further justify a finding that the killing of Mikesell was the direct and natural result of an attempt by appellant and his codefendants to carry out such unlawful purpose. It was proper, therefore, to inform the jury upon the subject of conspiracy, and that, under such conditions, each member of such conspiracy, if proven, was chargeable as a principal in the commission of the crime.. See State v. Shelledy, 8 Iowa 477, 504; State v. Munchrath, 78 Iowa 268, 274; State v. McCahill, 72 Iowa 111, 116; State v. Mushrush, 97 Iowa 444.
II. Had the effect of the instructions been to put the appellant on trial for murder in the first degree under an indictment charging only murder in the second degree, it would probably be held reversible error. State v. Boyle, 28 Iowa 522; Stale v. McNally, 32 Iowa 580. But such is not the record nor the
III. It is next said:
“The court erred in failing to charge the jury that, on the defendant’s plea of self-defense, it was incumbent on the State to disprove such plea beyond a reasonable doubt. ’ ’
There is not the slightest evidence in the record tending to show that the fatal wounds were inflicted by any person other than the three persons charged with the murder, and such an instruction would have been wholly out of place. The first proposition states a manifestly unsound rule of law. If it be true
V. The other assignments of error are wholly insufficient to call for consideration at our hands. They are simply general statements of alleged errors, without setting out or specifying the reasons therefor.
We find no reason for interfering with the judgment below. The crime was of a flagrant and inexcusable character, and the conviction is well sustained by the evidence. The judgment of the district court is, therefore, — Affirmed.