State v. HaningtonState v. Hanington
William Blaine Hanington pled guilty to enticing children over the internet, a felony,
On appeаl, Hanington does not dispute the district court’s findings that he violated probation or that his probation should be revoked. Instead, Hanington asserts that the district court abused its disсretion in failing to further reduce his sentence in the enticement case and failing to reduce his sentence in the failure to register case.
After a probation violation has been established, the court may order that the suspended sentence be executed or, in the alternative, the court is authorized under Idaho Criminаl Rule 35 to reduce the sentence.
State v. Beckett,
Sentencing is also a matter for the trial court’s discretion. Both our standard of review and the factors to be considered in evaluating the reasonableness of a sentence are well established and need not be repeated here.
See State v. Hernandez,
In this matter, a dispute has arisen regarding the scope of our review when a sentence is ordеred into execution after probation is revoked. Based upon the following language in our decision in
State v. Adams,
Accordingly, we take this opportunity to make it clear thаt when we review a sentence ordered into execution after probation has been revoked, we examine the entire record encompassing еvents before and after the original judgment. We adopt this scope of review for two reasons. First, the district judge, when deciding whether to order execution of the оriginal sentence or of a reduced sentence, does not artificially segregate the facts into prejudgment and postjudgment categories. The judge naturally and quite properly remembers the entire course of events and considers all relevant facts in reaching a decision. When reviewing that decision, we should сonsider the same facts. Second, when a sentence is suspended and probation is granted, the defendant has scant reason, and no incentive, to apрeal. Only if the probation is later revoked, and the sentence is ordered into execution, does the issue of an excessive sentence become genuinely meaningful. Were we to adopt the state’s position that any claim of excessiveness is waived if not made on immediate appeal from the judgment pronouncing but suspending a sentence, defendants would be forced to file preventive appeals as a hedge against the risk that probation someday might be revoked. Wе see no reason to compel this hollow exercise. Neither do we wish to see the appellate system cluttered with such eases.
(Emphasis added.)
Based upon the following language in our decision in
State v. Chacon, 146
Idaho 520, 524-525,
When we review a sentence that is ordered into execution following a period of probation, we do not base our review upon the facts existing when the sentence was imposed. Rather, we examine all the circumstances bearing upon the decision to revoke probation and require execution of the sentence, including events that occurred between the original pronouncement of the sentence and the revocation of probation. State v. Adams,115 Idaho 1053 , 1055,772 P.2d 260 , 262 (Ct.App.1989); State v. Grove,109 Idaho 372 , 373,707 P.2d 483 , 484 (Ct.App.1985); State v. Tucker,103 Idaho 885 , 888-89,655 P.2d 92 , 95-96 (Ct.App.1982).
(Emрhasis added.) This standard has been expressed in numerous unpublished decisions as well. The State also cites
State v. Coffin,
Coffin may not now challenge the reasonableness of the sentence originally imрosed. Id.; State v. Paramore,119 Idaho 235 , 236,804 P.2d 1366 , 1367 (Ct.App.1991). The scope of our review is restricted to a determination of whether Coffin’s sentence now appears excessive in light of circumstanсes existing when the court ordered the sentences to be executed upon revocation of probation. Id.; see also State v. Tucker,103 Idaho 885 , 888,655 P.2d 92 , 95 (Ct.App.1982). Thus, we will look at all the circumstancеs bearing on the district court’s decision to reinstate the sentence, including events occurring between the original sentencing and the revocation of probation. Paramore,119 Idaho at 236 ,804 P.2d at 1367 (citing State v. Grove,109 Idaho 372 , 373,707 P.2d 483 , 484 (Ct.App.1985)).
Coffin,
A slightly different and perhaps clearer statement of our standard was set forth in
State v. Whittle,
When we review a sentence that is ordered into execution following a pеriod of probation, we do not base our review solely upon the facts existing when the sentence was imposed. Rather, we also examine all the circumstances beаring upon the decision to revoke probation and execute the sentence, including events that occurred while the defendant was on probation. State v. Adams,115 Idaho 1053 , 1055,772 P.2d 260 , 262 (Ct.App.1989); State v. Grove,109 Idaho 372 , 373,707 P.2d 483 , 484 (Ct.App.1985).
The Stаte has read our somewhat differing versions of the scope of review too restrictively. We have not intended to suggest that our review is limited solely to events occurring between the original imposition of sentence and the decision to order the sentence into execution. When we review a sentence that is ordered into execution following a period of probation, we will examine the entire record encompassing events before and after the original judgment. We base our review upon the facts existing when the sentence was imposed as well as events occurring between the original sentencing and the revocatiоn of probation.
Applying the foregoing standards, and having reviewed the record in this ease, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion by ordering execution of Hanington’s original sentences without further modification. Therefore, the orders revoking probation and directing execution of Hanington’s previously suspended sentences are affirmed.