William Blaine Hanington pled guilty to enticing children over the internet, a felony, Idaho Code § 18-1509A. The district court withheld judgment and placed Hanington on probation for eight yeаrs. Hanington admitted to violating his probation and the district court revoked his probation and imposed a unified sentence of fifteen years with seven years determinаte. However, the district court retained jurisdiction. Following the period of retained jurisdiction, the district court again placed Hanington on probation. Hanington аgain admitted to violating his probation and the district court revoked his probation but suspended execution of the sentence and retained jurisdiction for a seсond time. Following the second period of retained jurisdiction, the district court once again placed Hanington on probation. Following yet another violаtion of probation, the district court revoked probation and ordered the underlying sentence into execution but reduced the determinate term to six years.
*28 In а separate case, Hanington pled guilty to the offense of failure to register as a sex offender, a felony, I.C. § 18-8309. The district court imposed a unified sentencе of five years with one year determinate, to be served consecutive to the sentence in the enticement case, and retained jurisdiction. Following the рeriod of retained jurisdiction, the district court suspended execution of the sentence and placed Hanington on probation for a period of five yеars. Hanington admitted to violating his probation and the district court revoked his probation and ordered the underlying sentence into execution without modification.
On аppeal, Hanington does not dispute the district court’s findings that he violated probation or that his probation should be revoked. Instead, Hanington asserts that the district сourt abused its discretion in failing to further reduce his sentence in the enticement case and failing to reduce his sentence in the failure to register case.
After a probation violation has been established, the court may order that the suspended sentence be executed or, in the alternative, the court is authorizеd under Idaho Criminal Rule 35 to reduce the sentence.
State v. Beckett,
Sentencing is also a matter for the trial court’s discretion. Both our standard of review and the factors to be considered in evaluating the reasonableness of a sentence are well established and need not be repeated here.
See State v. Hernandez,
In this matter, a dispute has arisen regarding the scope of our review when a sentеnce is ordered into execution after probation is revoked. Based upon the following language in our decision in
State v. Adams,
Accordingly, we take this opportunity to makе it clear that when we review a sentence ordered into execution after probation has been revoked, we examine the entire record enсompassing events before and after the original judgment. We adopt this scope of review for two reasons. First, the district judge, when deciding whether to order exeсution of the original sentence or of a reduced sentence, does not artificially segregate the facts into prejudgment and postjudgment categories. The judge naturally and quite properly remembers the entire course of events and considers all relevant facts in reaching a decision. When reviewing that deсision, we should consider the same facts. Second, when a sentence is suspended and probation is granted, the defendant has scant reason, and no incentivе, to appeal. Only if the probation is later revoked, and the sentence is ordered into execution, does the issue of an excessive sentence become genuinely meaningful. Were we to adopt the state’s position that any claim of excessiveness is waived if not made on immediate appeal from the judgment pronouncing but suspending a sentence, defendants would be forced to file preventive appeals as a hedge against the risk that probation someday might bе revoked. We see no reason to compel this hollow exercise. Neither do we wish to see the appellate system cluttered with such eases.
(Emphasis added.)
Based upon the following language in our decision in
State v. Chacon, 146
Idaho 520, 524-525,
When we review a sentence that is ordered into execution following a period of probation, we do not base our review upon the facts existing when the sentence was imposed. Rather, we examine all the circumstances bearing upon the decision to revoke probation and require execution of the sentence, including events that occurred between the original pronouncement of the sentence and the revocation of рrobation. State v. Adams,115 Idaho 1053 , 1055,772 P.2d 260 , 262 (Ct.App.1989); State v. Grove,109 Idaho 372 , 373,707 P.2d 483 , 484 (Ct.App.1985); State v. Tucker,103 Idaho 885 , 888-89,655 P.2d 92 , 95-96 (Ct.App.1982).
(Emphasis added.) This standard has been expressed in numerous unpublished decisions as well. The State also cites
State v. Coffin,
Coffin may not now challenge the reasonableness of the sentenсe originally imposed. Id.; State v. Paramore,119 Idaho 235 , 236,804 P.2d 1366 , 1367 (Ct.App.1991). The scope of our review is restricted to a determination of whether Coffin’s sentence now appears excessive in light оf circumstances existing when the court ordered the sentences to be executed upon revocation of probation. Id.; see also State v. Tucker,103 Idaho 885 , 888,655 P.2d 92 , 95 (Ct.App.1982). Thus, we will look at all the сircumstances bearing on the district court’s decision to reinstate the sentence, including events occurring between the original sentencing and the revocation of probation. Paramore,119 Idaho at 236 ,804 P.2d at 1367 (citing State v. Grove,109 Idaho 372 , 373,707 P.2d 483 , 484 (Ct.App.1985)).
Coffin,
A slightly different and perhaps clearer statement of our standard was set forth in
State v. Whittle,
When we review a sentence that is ordered into execution fоllowing a period of probation, we do not base our review solely upon the facts existing when the sentence was imposed. Rather, we also examine all the circumstаnces bearing upon the decision to revoke probation and execute the sentence, including events that occurred while the defendant was on prоbation. State v. Adams,115 Idaho 1053 , 1055,772 P.2d 260 , 262 (Ct.App.1989); State v. Grove,109 Idaho 372 , 373,707 P.2d 483 , 484 (Ct.App.1985).
The State has read our somewhat differing versions of the scope of review too restrictively. We have not intended to suggest that our review is limited solely to events occurring between the original imposition of sentence and the decision to order the sentence into execution. When we review a sentence that is ordered into execution following a period of probation, we will examine the entire record encompassing events before and after the original judgment. We base our review upon the facts existing when the sentence was imposed as well as events occurring between the original sentencing and the rеvocation of probation.
Applying the foregoing standards, and having reviewed the record in this ease, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion by ordering execution of Hanington’s original sentences without further modification. Therefore, the orders revoking probation and directing execution of Hanington’s previously suspended sentences are affirmed.