35 N.J.L. 537 | N.J. | 1871
Tlie opinion of the court was delivered by
By the sixth section of their charter, (Pamphlet Laws, 1832,) the New Jersey Railroad and Transportation Company are invested “ with all the rights and powers necessary to the survey, laying out, and construction and repair of a railroad not exceeding sixty-six feet in width,” &c.; and by the seventh section it is provided “ that the said corporation may build bridges, fix scales and weights, raise embankments, or make any other works neces»
Provisions in the charters of incorporated companies, similar to the one thus presented for construction, have, on several occasions, received consideration from the courts of this state, and, in some of their aspects, must now be understood as having a settled meaning. Thus, in an early case, it was decided that the exemption from taxation, according to the true import of the clause, extended not only to the privileges or franchises of the-company, but had the effect to exonerate the company and its property generally from all taxes, whether for state, county, or township purposes. State v. Berry, 2 Harr. 80; The Camden and Amboy R. R. Co. v. Hillegas, 3 Harr. 11; Camden and Amboy R. R. Co. v. Commissioners of Appeal, 3 Harr. 71.
These cases conclusively settled the general rule, that the property of the corporation was to be free from taxation • and it would seem, that upon principle, this should have absolved from this kind of burden everything which the corporate body had the legal right to acquire and hold. This, apparently, would have afforded the most definite and practical measure by which to ascertain the extent of the immunity of these companies. But a different rule was adopted, and is so completely established by a line of decisions as to forbid the least idea of a change. In the case of The State v. The Com
It is obvious from this array of authority, that the rule, at present pertinent, is not, in the least degree, in doubt — the only question is as to its application. As has been already remarked, not all the property which an incorporated company may actually hold, is protected by the exemption, but such part only as is necessary to carry into effect the powers granted. The decisions cited, as well as the circumstances of the present case, show that the application of this rule lias not been devoid of difficulty, and it seems plain that the embarrassment has arisen from the uncertain meaning in this connection, of the word necessary. What property is necessary to a railroad company for the accomplishment of the objects of their incorporation ? In the case of The State v. The Commissioners of Mansfield, already mentioned, this term, “ necessary,” is put in sharp contrast to the word “convenient.” But this, I think, is clearly a mistake; and it is a mistake which has introduced confusion. The word necessary, in this use, is so far from being contra-distinguished from the word convenient, that 'the former term comprehends much that, in strictness, is embraced in the latter term. Power necessary to a corporation does not mean simply power which is indispensable. Such phraseology has never been interpreted in so narrow a sense. There are few powers which are, in the strict sense, absolutely necessary to those artificial persons, and to concede to them powers only of such
The test applied in the court below, to ascertain the immunity of a corporation from taxation by force of exempting clauses similar to the one under consideration, appear to me entirely inadmissible. -It was supposed that such exemption never obtained, except with respect to property which the company could take by condemnation. This would subject to taxation almost all the appendages of these companies, such as depots, car-houses, wood-yards, &c., for it will be found that in most charters, a mere privilege to purchase property for such purposes is conferred, and that it cannot be taken in invitum. That property obtained for such objects cannot be taxed, has long been the admitted rule — a rule which has received the express sanction of this court in the case of Gardner v. The State, 1 Zab. 557. The subject of taxation in that case was land which the company had acquired, but had not the right to take by condemnation; and such taxation was pronounced illegal. •
The judgment should be reversed.
For reversal — The Chancellor, Chief Justice, Justices Bedle, Dalrimple, Depue, Judges Clement, Kennedy, Ogden, Olden, Wales — 10.
For affirmance — None.
Cited in State, C. & A. R. R. Co., pros., v. Woodruff, 7 Vr. 95; State, Gregory, pros., v. Jersey City, 7 Vr. 168; State, D., L. & W. R. R. Co., pros., v. Fuller, 11 Vr. 330; Inhabitants of Greenwich v. E. & A. R. R. Co., 9 C. E. Gr. 223.