State of North Dakota v. Michael Dean Hamilton
No. 20230052
IN THE SUPREME COURT STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA
DECEMBER 15, 2023
2023 ND 233
AFFIRMED.
Opinion of the Court by Tufte, Justice.
Julie A. Lawyer, State‘s Attorney, Bismarck, N.D., for plaintiff and appellee.
William Woodworth, Bismarck, N.D., for defendant and appellant.
State v. Hamilton
No. 20230052
Tufte, Justice.
[¶1] Michael Dean Hamilton appeals from a criminal judgment entered after he pled guilty to a charge of hindering law enforcement in violation of
I
[¶2] Hamilton argues the district court abused its discretion by rejecting his plea agreement.
[¶3] The State charged Hamilton with hindering law enforcement in violation of
[¶5] A change of plea hearing was held the next day. The district court explained, “Given the nature of the proceedings yesterday, the Court indicated it would not be taking a plea agreement in this case, and then any plea would need to be an open plea.” After the court reviewed Hamilton‘s rights and explained the procedure for an open plea, he pled guilty to the charge of hindering law enforcement. Hamilton acknowledged a jury would be presented with sufficient evidence to find him guilty of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt, referencing the Alford plea procedure. The State provided a factual basis. The court found Hamilton‘s plea to be knowing, intelligent, voluntary, and supported by a sufficient factual basis.
[¶6] Hamilton argues the district court abused its discretion by arbitrarily rejecting the plea agreement for lack of a sufficient factual basis but then accepting the open plea, because a factual basis is required for both. “Rule 11, N.D.R.Crim.P., governs pleas and provides the procedural framework for entering pleas. To be valid, a guilty plea must be entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. Generally, a defendant who voluntarily pleads guilty waives the right to challenge non-jurisdictional defects and may only attack the voluntary and intelligent character of the plea.” State v. Wallace, 2018 ND 225, ¶ 6, 918 N.W.2d 64 (cleaned up).
[¶7] After making an unconditional, open plea, Hamilton may only attack the voluntary and intelligent character of the plea. See State v. Trevino, 2011 ND 232, ¶ 6, 807 N.W.2d 211. Hamilton‘s argument that the district court abused its discretion by rejecting the previously-presented plea agreement was waived when he knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently pled guilty. He can no longer challenge such non-jurisdictional defects. Id.
II
[¶8] Hamilton argues the district court abused its discretion by substantially relying on impermissible factors. He argues the court impermissibly relied on facts outside the record, including: a Virginia court order finding the individuals he aided were “unsafe parents“; Hamilton‘s actions aiding removal of the children from the custody of their aunt; and the procedure for issuing and general seriousness of Amber alerts. Hamilton argues he was sentenced in an illegal manner because the main factors the court relied on were based on information outside the record, or unreasonable inferences from information in the record.
[¶9] This Court reviews a district court‘s sentencing decision under an abuse of discretion standard. See State v. Thomas, 2020 ND 30, ¶ 17, 938 N.W.2d 897. Our review is generally limited “to whether the court acted within the statutorily prescribed sentencing limits or substantially
[¶10] Hamilton did not object to the district court‘s discussion of or reliance on these factors during his sentencing hearing. When an issue has not been properly preserved, we review only for obvious error.
[¶11] During a sentencing hearing, a district court is not restrained by the rules of evidence except for the rules on privilege.
[¶12] We have held the district court relied on an impermissible factor when it misinterpreted a statutory definition of “dangerous weapon” to the detriment of the defendant. State v. Christensen, 2019 ND 11, ¶ 10, 921 N.W.2d 436. We have also held penalizing a defendant for exercising a constitutional right is an impermissible factor. State v. Hass, 268 N.W.2d 456, 463-464 (N.D. 1978) (holding it is impermissible to penalize a defendant for standing trial or remaining silent); see also Hoverson, 2006 ND 49, ¶¶ 35-36 (concluding consideration of either uncounseled guilty pleas without waiver of counsel or pending criminal charges is impermissible).
[¶13] Hamilton cites no clearly established law prohibiting reliance on information from outside the record or a court‘s use of its personal knowledge regarding such things as Amber alerts. Hamilton has not demonstrated that the factors the court considered were a clear deviation from the applicable statutory provisions, case law, or rules of evidence. The sentencing factors are outlined in
[¶14] We conclude the district court did not commit obvious error when it considered facts outside the record and relied on its personal knowledge regarding Amber alerts when deciding Hamilton‘s sentence.
III
[¶15] The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
[¶16] Jon J. Jensen, C.J.
Daniel J. Crothers
Jerod E. Tufte
Douglas A. Bahr