Janet Hamilton appeals from the judgment of conviction and sentence of ten years, with a minimum period of confinement of three years, which was imposed after a jury found her guilty of embezzlement and forgery. I.C. Sections 18-2403(2)(b), 18-2407(l)(b). Hamilton argues that because of a lack of substantial competent evidence, the jury verdict should be revеrsed. She contends that there was error in the jury instructions *940 which denied her a fair trial. Hamilton also challenges the length of her sentence and the validity of the court-ordered restitution, arguing that the debt occasioned by the offenses was the subject of a settlement agreement approved by the court in Hamilton’s bankruptcy. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the judgment of conviction and sentence and the order of restitution as modified herein.
I.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A grand jury indicted Janet Hamilton on seven counts of grand theft by embezzlement, one count of grand theft by unauthorized control and one count of forgery. The charged criminal conduct related to the misappropriаtion of funds from Thomas Hormel, while Hamilton was in his employ as an accountant and financial planner. Hamilton entered a plea of not guilty on all counts. Before trial, the state amended the indictment, dismissing two counts of grand theft due to statute of limitation problems.
At trial, a jury convicted Hamilton of one count of embezzlement regarding funds which had been applied to the purchase of lots three and four in Silverwood Subdivision and one count of forgery relating to check no. 2864 in the amount of $72,902.17. Hamilton filed a posttrial motion for new trial or for acquittal, which was denied. The district court thereafter entered a judgment of conviction and sentenced Hamilton to a unifiеd ten years, with a minimum fixed term of confinement of three years. Upon the request of the state, the district court took the matter of restitution under advisement and ultimately entered an order of restitution, based only on the counts on which Hamilton was convicted, in the sum of $162,000. Hamilton appealed from the judgment of conviction and sentence and from the restitution order.
II.
DISCUSSION
A. Jury Instructions
Hamilton claims that she was denied a fair trial guaranteed under the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 7 of the Idaho Constitution. She asserts error in the district court’s instructions to the jury on the elements of embezzlement as set forth in the indictment instruction (Instruction B) which stated that the monies appropriated by Hamilton wеnt to purchase “lot 3 and/or lot 4.” By the use of the “and/or” wording, Hamilton claims that the instruction failed to address the requirement that the jury unanimously find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Hamilton applied the monies either to purchase lot three, lot four or both. Hamilton contends that the instruction as given allowed the jury to find guilt even if there was disаgreement among the members of the jury as to which lot had been purchased with the funds.
The instruction challenged by Hamilton reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
INSTRUCTION B
You are instructed that by Indictment the State of Idaho has charged the defendant, JANET HAMILTON, with the crimes of GRAND THEFT BY EMBEZ-ZLEMENT____ The defendant has previously entered a plea of not guilty to these charges. To find thе defendant guilty of one or more of the charge(s), each of the elements in the charge involved must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Otherwise, the defendant must be found not guilty of that charge.
COUNT TWO
1. That the defendant, Janet Hamilton,
2. on or between July 1,1989, and July, 1990,
3. in the County of Blaine, State of Idaho,
4. did, with fraudulent intent, appropriate to herself,
5. funds exceeding $150.00,
6. belonging to the owner of such property, Thomas Hormel,
*941 7. and applied those funds toward the purchase of Lots 3 and/or 4 of the Silverwood Subdivision,
8. during a time when the defendant was an employеe of Thomas Hormel and entrusted with the safekeeping of such funds.
The district court also gave an instruction defining grand theft by embezzlement as follows:
The crime of Grand Theft by Embezzlement occurs when a person lawfully received the possession of property, which may consist of money in excess of a value of $150.00 or a check in an аmount in excess of $150.00 of another upon any trust, express or implied, and, after receiving the property, with fraudulent intent appropriates the property to his own use.
In addition, the district court gave separate instructions defining “fraudulent intent” and “appropriate,” as well as an instruction pointing out that a defense to embezzlеment is proven when the owner of the funds is shown to have given express or implied authority to make the transfer which is the subject of the offense. Instruction 16 specifically apprised the jury that its verdict must be unanimous.
The question of whether the jury has been properly instructed is a question of law over which we exercise free review.
State v. Gleason,
The elements of the crime of embezzlement as given in the instructions are drawn from the theft statutes under which Hamilton was charged, I.C. Sections 18-2403, -2407, and correctly state the law.
See State v. Carpenter,
B. Post-trial Motion
In her post-trial motion, Hamilton requested that the district court grant an acquittal or a new trial, pursuant to I.C.R. 29 and I.C.R. 34 respectively, on the asserted basis that the jury’s verdict was not supported by substantial evidence and was contrary to law. Hamilton argued below that the evidence did not show any fraudulent intent on Hamilton’s part regarding the purchase of the Silverwood lots or the negotiation of check no. 2364, the transactions on which the jury found Hamilton guilty.
On appeal, Hamiltоn contends that the district court’s denial of relief on the post-trial motion was in error, however, only as to the forgery count. Hamilton argues to this Court the evidence which supports her position that she had a legal right to the entire check, subject only to Hormel’s right of contribution for fifty percent. She asserts therefore that her conviction for forgery cannot be sustained.
Hamilton’s motion for acquittal or for new trial challenges the sufficiency of the state’s evidence. In making our review of the sufficiency of the evidence, the appellate court is required to give full consideration to the right of the jury to determine the credibility of witnesses, the weight to be affоrded evidence, as well as the right to draw all justifiable inferences from the evidence before them.
State v. Erwin,
[W]e will not set aside the judgment of conviction if there is substantial evidence upon which any rational trier of fact could *942 havе found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
State v. Olson,
The district court found that check no. 2364 represented loan proceeds remaining from the purchase of the Columbine properties and that Hamilton admitted signing Hormel’s name on the back of the check. The district court also found that Hormel testified thаt he had never given Hamilton permission to endorse his name on the check, nor did the powers of attorney executed by Hormel include the Columbine properties. With these findings, we must agree.
There is evidence in the record that Hamilton was given authority to conduct business on Hormel’s behalf, including but not limited to accounting duties, tax preрaration, communications with business associates, and the purchase and development of real estate. Hormel testified that he and Hamilton were involved equally in.the Columbine properties, but that he was unaware of the refund check or the circumstances of its negotiation and subsequent deposit into Hamilton’s account. Hormel denied on numerous occasions that he had ever authorized Hamilton to sign his name on any documents. Hamilton testified that she was a signatory on several of Hormel’s accounts. Regarding the Columbine properties, Hamilton claimed to have discussed with Hormel that there would be a refund check from the escrow. She testified thаt she asked Hormel if she could apply the check to the remodel, that she had informed him that the check would be in both their names and that she would have to sign his name because he would be out of town when the check was received. The verdict reflects that the jury rejected Hamilton's testimony. Based on our examination, we cоnclude that the record is sufficient to sustain the jury’s verdict on the forgery charge. Hence, we conclude that the district court’s denial of a new trial or acquittal was not error.
C. Order on Restitution
Hamilton contests the district court’s order requiring her to pay restitution in the amount of $162,000. Hamilton argues that the restitution order is improper in light of her settlement with Hormel whiсh was approved in her bankruptcy. In that settlement, Hormel acquired Hamilton’s interest in Silverwood lots three and four, plus other real and personal property, and agreed to dismiss the civil action he had filed to recover damages for Hamilton’s misconduct in her capacity as his accountant and financial assistant. Hamiltоn disputes the district court’s authority to impose an order on restitution which she alleges would result in punitive and legally unjustifiable double recovery for Hormel.
Under I.C. Section 19-5304(2), the district court is authorized to order restitution for any economic loss which the victim actually suffers. The decision whether to require restitution is within the trial court’s sound discretion.
State v. Aubert,
The initial question before us is whether the rеstitution order is barred by the approved settlement agreement in the adversary proceedings brought by Hormel and the subsequent discharge in Hamilton’s bankruptcy. In
United States v. Carson,
Restitution orders operate for the benefit of the state, not just for compensation of the victim,
State v. West,
Outside of the bankruptcy context, a civil settlement of the viсtim’s claim against a defendant does not bar a restitution order for the same loss.
State v. Iniguez,
Because restitution also promotes the rehabilitative purpose of the criminal law, and because civil damage payments may not be fully compensatory, the court is not automatically foreclosed from ordering some restitution simply bеcause the victim has received some compensation as a result of a civil action.
Id Thus, we regard the imposition of the restitution order following the discharge in bankruptcy as an appropriate facet of the criminal sentence in Hamilton’s case.
To uphold the order of restitution, however, we must be satisfied that thе district court acted within the bounds of its discretion in ordering restitution not as the result of arbitrary action but through the logical application of proper factors found in subsection (7) of I.C. Section 19-5304.
Bybee,
Before fixing the amount of restitution to be paid by Hamilton, the district court heard testimony regarding Hamilton’s earning capacity, financial resources and ability to pay restitution. The state contended that the amount that Hamilton unlawfully obtained through the crimes for which she was convicted was $132,851.90 in the Silverwood deal and $72,092.19 on the forgery count. These amounts, however, did not take into account the compensation that Hormel had already received through the bankruptcy settlement and compromise reached by Hormel and Hamilton. Information presented by the state as part of the presentence investigation, as prepared by Hormel’s independent counsel, revealed losses incurred by Hormel for which he was not compensated in the bankruptcy settlement. Those losses totaled $30,-099, which amount was attributable $11,311 to the Silverwood lots and $18,788 to the Columbine prоperties. Hamilton offered no evidence to rebut these figures.
The determination of the amount of restitution is a question of fact for the trial court, whose findings will not be disturbed if supported by substantial evidence.
Bybee,
*944 D. Excessive Sentence
Hamilton maintains that her sentence of ten years, with a minimum term of confinement of three years, was an abuse of the district court’s sentencing discretion. She asserts that in light of the facts contained in the record, her sentence exceeds what is required to protect society and achieve any or all of the objectives of sentencing.
When a sentence is challenged, we examine the record, focusing upon the nature of the offense and the character of the offender, to determine if there has been an abuse of the sentencing court’s discretion.
State v. Young,
In its sentencing remarks, the district court considered in mitigation Hamilton’s upbringing in an emotionally and physically abusive home. The district court concluded, based on the expert testimony, that Hamilton suffered from a personality disorder resembling an addiction, which prevented her from acknowledging the wrong she had committed. The district court, however, noted that Hamilton had previously been involved in similar crimes. The district court reviewed the objectives of sentencing and determined that a term of incarceration was necessary, specifically in order to protect society and to deter others. We conclude that the district court acted within its discretiоn in imposing a sentence of ten years’ incarceration, with a minimum term of three years, for the crimes of embezzlement and forgery.
III.
CONCLUSION
Hamilton received a fair trial, which was not tainted by due process violations. There was sufficient, competent evidence to support the jury’s verdict and to withstand Hamilton’s alternative motion for nеw trial or acquittal. Hamilton has failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion in imposing sentence or in ordering that restitution be paid. However, we modify the amount of the restitution to $30,099 to conform with the evidence. In all other respects, we affirm the judgment of conviction and sentence.
Notes
. However, Hamilton was asserting this figure as the full amount of her ill-gotten gains, not as the balance remaining after Hormel received remedial transfers of Hamilton's assets through the bankruptcy proceeding.