Thе defendant is engaged in tbe business of harvesting, selling and dealing in ice, which is a hazardous employment coming within tbe purview of tbe Workmen’s Compensation Act. He employs various persons in tbe conduct of bis business. Pursuant to tbe fixed and published Workmen’s Compensation Insurance Rates and Schedules, tbe defendant became liable to tbe North Dakota Wоrkmen’s Compensation Fund for certain premiums designated in pay-in orders issued by tbe Workmen’s Compensation Bureau. This action was instituted on August 26, 1937, to collect from tbe defendant prеmiums set forth in eight of such orders together with penalties 'thereon. Tbe orders were issued between tbe included dates of December 31, 1929, and March 12, 1937. The defendant pleads two dеfenses. The first defense is applicable to all orders issued prior to August 26, 1931. It *226 sets up that tbe cause of action based upon sucb pay-in orders did not accrue within six years prior to tbe commencement of tbe action, thus presenting tbe defense of tbe general statute of limitations provided by § 7375, N. D. Compiled Laws 1913, as amended by chapter 233, N. D. Session Laws 1935. Tbe trial court sustained this defense, and disallowed all items based upon premiums that accrued prior to August 26, 1931.
As to tbe remaining premiums, being four in number, represented by pay-in ordеrs issued between tbe included dates of January 4, 1934, and Idarch 12, 1937, representing aggregate premiums of $224.50 upon which penalties accrued amounting to $304, tbe defendant urges that suits for tbe enforcement of tbe collection thereof are governed by chapter 315, N. D. Session Laws 1931. This chapter provides for tbe determination of tbe premiums by tbe bureau, tbe issuance of pay-in orders, and tbe manner of notifying employers of tbe amount due. Tbe portion of this law upon which tbe defendant relies, provides that,
“Within twenty (20) days after any such default tbe Bureau shall . cause suit to bo brought for tbe collection of tbe premium and accrued penalties, together with further accruing penalties, in tbe courts of Burlеigh County, North Dakota, or in tbe courts of any county in which sucb employer is engaged in business; and, in sucb suits, it shall be unnecessary to comply with tbe provisions of chapter 38 of tbe Sessiоn Laws of North Dakota for tbe year 1921, and acts amendatory thereof, known as tbe Conciliation Law.
“Tbe payment of any judgment rendered in any sucb action, or tbe voluntary payment of tbe amount of premium, penalties and costs prior to judgment, shall entitle tbe employer, and tbe employees of sucb employer, to tbe benefits of tbe аct from the date of sucb pay-in-order. If tbe judgment cannot be paid in full, the Bureau shall determine tbe date upon which tbe right of tbe employees to participate in tbe Bund shall cease.”
Tbe defendant pleads that tbe failure of tbe bureau to cause suit to be brought for the premiums involved within twenty days after tbe default of tbe employer bars tbе bureau from maintaining this action. Tbe trial court ruled against this contention and ordered judgment for tbe premiums accruing within six years from tbe commencement of this *227 action and penalties thereon. From the judgment entered for these premiums and penalties, the defendant appeals.
The question before us is whether chapter 315, N. D. Session Laws 1931, making it the duty of the bureau to cause a suit to be brought for the collection of premiums and accrued penalties within twenty days after the default of the employer, may be pleаded as a bar to a suit brought after the period of twenty days has elapsed. It is argued by the defendant that the statute in question is either a statute of limitations or creates a сondition precedent which must be complied with before suit can be maintained by the bureau. It is clearly not a statute of limitations. It does not purport to bar the right of the bureаu to bring action after the lapse of twenty days but merely places upon the bureau the duty to cause suit to be brought within that time. The purpose of the statute is to expeditе the conduct of the administrative affairs of the bureau for the benefit of the Workmen’s Compensation Fund. It is not for the benefit of the defaulting employer. It may be generally stated that the purpose of statutes of limitation is to prevent the enforcement of stale demands when through lapse of time evidence concerning their true status has become lost or difficult to procure. Scott v. District Ct.
The appellant lays much stress upon the argument that the statute creates a condition precedent to the bringing of an аction for premiums by the bureau. Much that we have said with reference to a statute of limitations applies equally to this contention. The appellant cites Madden v. Dunbar,
*229 The right to maintain a suit against the Bonding Fund does not accrue until' there has been a presentation and refusal. Under the Workmen’s Compensation Act the right to maintain an action against a defaulting employer for premiums acсrues upon the default in payment. The statute enjoins upon the bureau the duty to bring the action within twenty days but does not purport to destroy or bar the right of action if suit is not brought within that time. Tо construe the statute in question as one of limitation or that fixes a condition precedent to the maintenance of an action would be to read into it a meaning thаt is neither expressed nor implied therein, and one which would benefit the defaulting employer to the detriment of the fund; a result clearly not intended by the legislature.
Affirmed.