OPINION
¶ 1 Jоhn Vonderhaar Haltom appeals his conviction for dealing in material harmful to a minor, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code section 76-10-1206 (2000). We affirm.
BACKGROUND
¶2 On August 4, 2000, just a few days after Dr. John’s Lingerie and Novelty store (Dr. John’s) opened for business, police in Midvale, Utah, sent BP, a seventeen-year-old girl, into the store to attempt to buy an adult film. She entered the store and was soon thereafter approached by Vadim Saprgeul-diev (Vadim), who asked to see her identification. BP gave Vadim, who was an employee of Dr. John’s but not actually on duty when BP entered, her driver license. He glanced at it and then gave it back and permitted her to shop. After wandering around the store for a few minutes, BP went to the adult video rack where she chose one at random and then went to the counter to make the purchase. As she shopped, Vadim called Hal-tom, a part owner of Dr. John’s, to the counter and asked him how one could determine whether a license was authentic. Hal-tom informed Vadim that if BP attempted to purchase an adult video, he would show him. As BP approached the counter, Haltom asked her for her identification and she again produced her driver license.
¶ 3 Haltom took the license and examined it. Among the relevant information contained on the license were BP’s photo, name, address, social security number, and her date of birth, which clearly showed that BP was born in December 1982 and was therefore just seventeen years old at the time. Hаltom carefully compared BP to the photo and then asked her to recite her social security number — printed next to her date of birth — and her address. When she gave an address with a street name rather than coordinates, Haltom became concerned and asked her to clarify her answer. She responded with the proper coordinate address, which corresponded with the address on the license, and Haltom handed back the license. Vadim then asked Haltom if he сould sell the video to BP and Haltom answered “What’s the problem? It’s her I.D. [and] she’s eighteen, right?” Vadim completed the sale as Haltom was talking with BP and she left the store.
¶4 Soon thereafter, BP returned to the store with Detective Brimley, the Midvale City Police officer who had sent her into Dr. John’s. Brimley informed Haltom that he had sold an adult video to a minor — BP—and BP identified Vadim and Haltom as the people she had dealt with during the transaction. Haltom was arrested for dealing with material harmful to a minor, in violation of Utah Code section 76-10-1206 (2000).
¶ 5 Prior to trial, Haltom petitioned to have the charges dismissed because, he argued, he had been entrapped as a matter of law. The State responded and a hearing was scheduled, during which Haltom presented just one witness — Curtis Gorman, a former employee who had been fired for stealing from Haltom and who had been referred to the Midvale Police Department by Haltom for that theft. Haltom argued that Brimley had established a relationship with Vadim, and that Brimley had used Vadim as a police agent to induce Haltom to sell the video to BP. Through Gorman’s testimony, Haltom introduced evidence that Brimley was interested in subverting a Dr. John’s employee, and that, at Brimley’s urging, Gorman had *46 talked with Vadim about meeting with Brim-ley. But, Gorman never again met with Brimley and he had no idea whether Brimley had been able to talk with Vadim, or if, assuming such an encounter occurred, Vadim had agreed to work with Brimley. Consequently, the trial court denied Haltom’s motion, but informed all parties that Haltom would bе given the opportunity to present his entrapment claim to the jury as a factual defense to the charge.
¶ 6 The case was subsequently tried in front of a jury, which convicted Haltom. Haltom filed a post-trial motion to arrest the judgment, which the trial court denied, and he was sentenced to a statutory term of imprisonment of zero to five years in prison. The trial court, however, suspended all but thirty days of that time and placed Haltom on probation. Haltom now appeals.
ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 1
¶7 Haltom arguеs that the trial court erred in concluding that he had not been entrapped as a matter of law. The trial court’s decision presents a mixed question of fact and law.
See State v. Beddoes,
¶ 8 Haltom next argues that the trial court erred in concluding that certain testimony was inadmissible hearsay. “Whether a statement is offered for the truth of the matter asserted is a question of law, which we review under a correction of error standard.”
State v. Perez,
¶ 9 Haltom also argues that the trial court’s decision on the relevance of certain statutory changes to the format of minors’ driver licenses was incorrect. “While relevant evidence is generally admissible, a trial court has broad discretion to determine whether proffered evidence is relevant, and we will find error ... only if the trial court has abused its discretion.”
State v. Harrison,
¶ 10 Finally, Haltom argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction both as a matter of law and of fact. Haltom’s argument falls into two categories. First, he asserts that his activities did not constitute a violation of section 76-10-1206 as a matter of law, which under these circumstances presents a question of statutory interpretation that we review for correctness.
See State v. Bluff,
*47 ANALYSIS
¶ 11 Haltom first argues that the trial court erred in failing to dismiss the complaint because he was entrapped as a matter of law. “Utah has never recognized a per se rule of entrapment.”
State v. Beddoes,
¶ 12 Haltom argues that he would not have sold an adult video to a minor in the absence of Vadim’s alleged relationship with Brimley. However, at best, the evidence Haltom offered in support of this assertion is subject to multiple interpretations, ranging from the one offered by Haltom — that Vadim became an agent of the State — to the one offered by the State — -that Vadim did nothing to assist Brimley’s crusade against Dr. John’s. Moreover, had the evidence of Va-dim’s relationship with the Statе been less tenuous, this alone is still insufficient to establish entrapment as a matter of law. See id. (noting that exploitation of a relationship is a necessary factor to meet the requirements of entrapment). This is especially true given Haltom’s decision to ask BP for her identification and examine it. Once he did this, there is no evidence that Vadim attempted to coerce or convince Haltom to ignore her date of birth, or that Vadim told Haltom that he had already checked the birthdate and that there was no need to do so again. Rather than an issue that could be settled as a matter of law, Haltom presented the trial court with evidence that could have supported Haltom’s entrapment defense, but that also could have been interpreted as insignificant. Consequently, because reasonable minds easily could differ on the question of entrapment as a matter of law in this case, the trial court properly denied Haltom’s motion. 2 See id.
¶ 13 Haltom next argues that the trial court erred in suppressing a portion of Theresa Ferrone’s testimony as inadmissible hearsay. Rule 801(c) of the Utah Rules of Evidence defines hearsay as “a statement, other than one made by the declarant ..., offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Utah R. Evid. 801(e). “‘[I]f an out-of-court statement is “offered simply to prove that it was made, without regard to whether it was true, such testimony is not proscribed by the hearsay rule.” ’ ”
In re G.Y.,
*48 ¶ 14 Haltom argues that the trial court erred in concluding that he was offering Ferrone’s testimony concerning a conversation with Vadim for the truth of the matter asserted. Specifically, Haltom suggests that Ferrone’s testimony was offered to bolster Haltom’s claim that Vadim was an expert in the store’s policies and accepted methods for identifying and excluding minors from the premises. Assuming that Haltom’s version of the testimony is correct, we do not believe that the statements were offered for the truth of the matter asserted. 3 In fact, the excluded statement would have done nothing more than support Haltom’s claim that Va-dim was the store trainer and that he was quite aware of the store policy concerning the admission of minors.
¶ 15 However,
the
trial court’s erroneous exclusion of Vadim’s statements does not necessarily require the reversal оf Haltom’s conviction. “‘[W]e do not upset the verdict of a jury merely because some error or irregularity may have occurred, but will do so only if it is something substantial and prejudicial in the sense that there is a reasonable likelihood that in its absence there would have been a different result.’ ”
State v. Hutchison,
¶ 16 Haltom also argues that the trial court erred in denying his attempt to introduce subsequent legislative changes to the format of driver licenses for minors. “While relevant evidence is generally admissible, a trial court has broad discretion to determine whether proffered evidence is relevant, and we will find error in a relevancy ruling only if the trial court has abused its discretion.”
State v. Harrison,
¶ 17 The trial court in this instance did not exceed the permitted range of its discretion. Haltom’s defense was never predicated on a claim that he was unfamiliar with the format of Utah’s driver licenses, or that he was confused by BP’s identification in particular. Instead, his defense centered entirely upon his reliance on Dr. John’s policy of precluding minors from the premises, his expectation that his employees would not fail in enforcing the policy, and his claim that the Midvale police used Vadim to entrap Haltom. The subsequent legislative changes to the *49 driver license format were irrelevant to the defenses offered by Haltom, and therefore we conclude that the trial court acted well within its permittеd range of discretion in refusing to allow Haltom to introduce evidence of the changes.
¶ 18 Haltom’s final and most forceful argument is that the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to convict him of dealing in materials harmful to a minor. More concisely, Haltom asserts that the State failed to prove that he violated the statute when he sold the video to BP. To address Haltom’s challenge properly, we must first determine the culpable mental state required to violate sectiоn 76-10-1206. Only after doing so can we examine the merits of his argument.
¶ 19 Section 76-10-1206 states:
A person is guilty of dealing in material harmful to minors when, knowing that a person is a minor, or having failed to exercise reasonable care in ascertaining the proper age of a minor, he:
(a) intentionally distributes or offers to distribute; exhibits or offers to exhibit to a minor any material harmful to minors.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1206(1) (2003) (emphasis added). “When interpreting statutes, our primary goal is to evince the true intent and purpose of the Legislature.”
State v. Martinez,
¶ 20 At issue in the instant case is the meaning of the phrase “having failed to exercise
reasonable care
in ascertaining the proper age.” Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1206(1) (emphasis added).
4
“Reasonable care” is defined as “[t]hat degree of care which a person of ordinary prudence would exercise in the same or similar circumstances, [and fjailure to exercise such care is
ordinary negligence.”
Black’s Law Dictionary 1265 (6th ed.1990). Haltom has presented us with no reason to believe that the legislature intended a different meаning, or with any case law that would support his position in the face of this language.
Compare State v. Hamblin,
¶ 21 Having determined the simple negligence is sufficient to violate section 76-10-1206, we turn our attention to examining whether the evidence here was sufficient
*50
to support Haltom’s conviction.
5
“In making the determination as to whether there is sufficient evidence to uphold a conviction, an appellate court does not sit as a second fact finder.”
State v. Warden,
¶ 22 The jury was presented with evidence that BP entered Dr. John’s, that she selected an adult video, and that she took it to the counter. There, Haltom asked her for her identification after Vadim called him over and asked him to demonstrate how to confirm the authenticity of a person’s identification. BP gave Haltom her driver license, and Haltom compared the picture on the license to BP. Satisfied that the picture was indeed of BP, he asked her to confirm virtually every piece of material informatiоn on the license, including her address and social security number, but oddly not her date of birth. BP answered all of his questions, but Haltom became suspicious when the address she provided did not match the street address on the license. However, when questioned further, she provided an equivalent coordinate address that was identical to the one on the license. Satisfied that the identification was hers, Haltom instructed Vadim to sell BP the video.
¶ 23 Examining all of these facts, and the inferences that can be drаwn from them, in a light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, we conclude that, as a factual matter, the evidence was sufficient. Haltom held the license and examined it to ensure that it was authentic. He read every line material to ensuring the authenticity except the date of birth. Thus we cannot say that the jury’s decision that Haltom’s behavior did not constitute “reasonable care” is unsupported.
¶ 24 Haltom responds that the defense he presented eliminated any possible negligence finding as a matter of law. We disagree. At trial Haltom argued that it was, and is, Dr. John’s-policy to exclude from the store everyone under the age of eighteen. Under the policy, every patron’s identification was checked at the door, so he argues that it was reasonable for him to assume that she was over eighteen when she reached the counter. The State countered that in the few days that the store was operating in Midvale before Haltom’s arrest, the officer who eventually arrested Haltom had twice entered the store without being subjected to the “mandatory” identification check. The State also pointed to BP’s presence in the store as evidence that Dr. John’s policy was at best sporadically enforced. Thus, the jury was presented with conflicting information concerning Dr. John’s policy, and it was left to determine whether the policy alone amounted to “[t]hat degree of care which a person of ordinary prudence would exercise in the same or similar circumstances.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1265 (6th ed.1990).
¶25 Even accepting Haltom’s argument that a policy could be used to immunize him from prosecution — which is a position we do not necessarily accept — the evidence concerning the application of this policy was conflicting. Consequently, it was the role of the jury to determine whether the policy, and Haltom’s claimed reliance upon it, amounted to the reasonable care required by section 76-10-1206.
Cf. Little Am. Ref. Co. v. Leyba,
CONCLUSION
¶ 26 The trial court properly denied Hal-tom’s motion to dismiss the charges because Haltom fаiled to show that he had been entrapped as a matter of law. The court erred in denying Haltom the opportunity to introduce testimony concerning Vadim’s out of court statements, but Haltom was given the opportunity to present evidence to the jury that was sufficiently similar to the excluded testimony rendering the trial court’s error harmless. Finally, a showing of simple negligence is sufficient to support a conviction under section 76-10-1206’s expectation of “reasonable care.” The jury found that Haltom failed to use reasonable care in selling an adult video to BP and the evidence supports its verdict.
¶ 27 Accordingly, we affirm Haltom’s conviction.
¶ 28 WE CONCUR: JUDITH M. BILLINGS, Presiding Judge and RUSSELL W. BENCH, Associate Presiding Judge.
Notes
. Although on appeal Haltom argues that his due process rights were violated when Brimley erased the audio tape made during his interview with Gorman, he failed to preserve this argument below.
See State v. Dean,
. Haltom presents no challenge to the jury's refusal to accept his entrapment defense as a matter of fact.
. During her direct examination, Ferrone was asked if Vadim had provided her with any instruction or training in addition to that provided by Haltom. She responded "Vadim just told me, you know, you need to check every I.D .... ” at which point the State objected. The court sustained the objection. The State offered no reason for its objection, but the court informed Haltom that “[a]ny hearsay is off.”
. The statute also creatеs liability for selling “harmful material" to someone the seller knows to be a minor. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1206(1) (2003). However, Haltom is not, and has never been, accused of actually knowing that BP was a minor at the time of the sale. Accordingly, we limit our analysis to Haltom’s failure to determine BP’s age and whether that failure violated the statute.
. Although Haltom's conviction was based on the jury's finding that he was reckless when he sold the video, this error is not fatal to his conviction.
See State v. Perez,