{¶ 2} On July 10, 2002, appellant pled no contest to the charges. By judgment entry filed July 11, 2002, the trial court found appellant guilty and sentenced him to a total aggregate term of one year in prison.
{¶ 3} On December 5, 2002, appellant filed a motion to withdraw his plea. By judgment entry filed January 3, 2003, the trial court denied said motion.
{¶ 4} Appellant filed an appeal and this matter is now before this court for consideration. Assignments of error are as follows:
{¶ 9} Because appellant's motion to withdraw was based upon the pretrial negotiated plea, we will address these issues together.
{¶ 10} Crim.R. 32.1 governs withdrawal of guilty plea and states "[a] motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest may be made only before sentence is imposed; but to correct manifest injustice the court after sentence may set aside the judgment of conviction and permit the defendant to withdraw his or her plea." The right to withdraw a plea is not absolute and a trial court's decision on the issue is governed by the abuse of discretion standard. State v. Smith (1977),
{¶ 11} Following his no contest pleas, appellant was sentenced to an aggregate term of one year in prison. Thereafter, appellant filed a motion to withdraw, claiming the trial court failed to follow the terms of the pretrial negotiated plea. Said document filed on May 14, 2002 is not a "negotiated plea," but simply a pretrial entry. Although the trial court noted the possibility of no jail time, the trial court also set a jury trial date and listed the number of potential witnesses. Further, on July 10, 2002, appellant signed admissions of no contest wherein he acknowledged the possible prison sentences, agreed "[n]o promises have been made to me as part of this plea agreement" and admitted "I enter this plea voluntarily." These points were discussed during the change of plea hearing. T. at 6, 8-9, 12-15.
{¶ 12} The trial court did not fail to follow the "plea agreement" as there was no plea agreement. As a result, there was no need to correct a "manifest injustice" after sentencing. Appellant's allegations in his motion regarding the purported plea agreement are clearly contradicted by the record and therefore a hearing was not required.
{¶ 13} Assignments of Error I and II are denied.
{¶ 15} As stated in the previous assignment of error, appellant was informed of the possible sentences via his admissions of no contest and the change of plea hearing. Appellant's trial counsel signed the admissions and during the plea hearing, appellant acknowledged reviewing them with his attorney and discussing "the matter of the pleas" with him. T. at 5, 12. Appellant admitted to being "satisfied with the services, counsel, advice and representation" of his attorney. T. at 12.
{¶ 16} As for the suppression of evidence, appellant claims his trial counsel should have moved to suppress "the breath test, the urine sample, the inconsistent statements and reports by police etc." See, Appellant's Brief at 7 and Defendant's Exhibit F. Because appellant pled no contest, "the alleged ineffective assistance of counsel must be such that the plea itself is rendered unknowing and involuntary before relief can be granted." State v. Taylor (March 5, 1985), Morrow App. No. CA 625. Had the matter gone to trial, all of the complained of evidence would have been subject to expert testimony and cross-examination. The lack of a filing of a motion to suppress did not affect appellant's plea.
{¶ 17} Assignment of Error III is denied.
{¶ 18} The judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Licking County, Ohio is hereby affirmed.
By Farmer, J., Gwin, P.J. and Hoffman, J. concur.
