STATE OF OHIO v. MAYSHAUN HALL
No. 112626
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT, COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
December 14, 2023
[Cite as State v. Hall, 2023-Ohio-4539.]
FRANK DANIEL CELEBREZZE, III, P.J.
Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. CR-19-637420-A
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: December 14, 2023
Appearances:
Michael C. O‘Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Tasha L. Forchione, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Russell S. Bensing, for appellant.
FRANK DANIEL CELEBREZZE, III, P.J.:
{¶ 1} Appellant Mayshaun Hall (“Hall“) appeals the decision of the trial court denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea and alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. After a thorough review of the relevant law and facts, this court affirms.
{¶ 2} In January 2019, a Cuyahoga County Grand Jury returned an 18-count indictment charging Hall for a series of crimes occurring between January 2017 and March 2018. The charges were as follows: Count 1 charged Hall with trafficking in violation of
{¶ 3} Due to the size of the case and nature of the charges, significant discovery and motion practice ensued. Hall‘s trial was ultimately delayed several times on Hall‘s own motions and the court‘s motions related to the COVID-19 pandemic.
{¶ 4} Nearly three years later, on February 17, 2022, Hall accepted a plea deal and pleaded guilty to an amended Count 1, modified by deletion of the one-year firearm specification and the MDO specification and a decrease in the amount of cocaine, reducing the charge to a third-degree felony; an amended Count 3, modified by deletion of the one-year firearm specification and a decrease in the amount of heroin, reducing the charge to a third-degree felony; Count 12 (possessing criminal tools); and Count 18 (money laundering). All remaining counts were nolled. Hall was instructed to forfeit the $78,094 in cash as well as numerous articles of personal property.
{¶ 6} On June 1, 2022, Hall, through his attorney, filed a motion to withdraw his plea. In the motion, Hall‘s counsel detailed that at the time Hall entered his plea, “[t]he parties agreed to a recommended three year sentence” that was expressed to the court at the time of the plea. In the motion, Hall‘s counsel noted that he told Hall that he may receive a sentence between three and six years, but “never advised [Hall] that it was even in the realm of possibilities that he would receive a nine year sentence.” Hall‘s counsel continued:
Counsel unintentionally misled [Hall]. Based on 25 years of experience, counsel had never seen 3 third degree felonies net in a 9 year sentence. The Defendant did not enter a knowing plea. He could not have known he was looking at a nine year sentence because his attorney gave him bad information. Counsel is asking that he be allowed to withdraw his plea and seek new counsel or try his case. The plea must be withdrawn to prevent a manifest injustice.
{¶ 7} The state opposed Hall‘s motion, arguing that no manifest injustice had occurred and argued that from an evidentiary standpoint, Hall failed to attach an affidavit or transcript of the plea hearing in support of his motion. Hall‘s counsel then supplemented his motion to withdraw with an affidavit, averring the same statements contained in Hall‘s motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
{¶ 9} Hall timely appealed from this entry, assigning two errors for our review:
I. The trial court erred in denying defendant‘s motion to vacate his plea, in derogation of defendant‘s rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution.
II. The defendant was denied the effective assistance of counsel, in derogation of his rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution.
II. Law and Analysis
{¶ 10}
{¶ 11} Hall argues that counsel‘s “wrong advice” induced him to take a plea. Hall argues that “[t]his was not a situation, as noted, where counsel simply made a prediction as to what the judge would do at sentencing, and the prediction proved inaccurate. Counsel, based upon his experience, believed that there was no possibility that the judge would impose maximum consecutive[] sentences on a plea” based on the nature of the charges. Because of this, Hall argues that his plea was not intelligent, knowing, and voluntary.
{¶ 12} Typically, a plea is entered knowingly and voluntarily if the trial court advised the defendant regarding the nature of the charge and the maximum penalty involved, the effect of entering a plea to the charge, and that the defendant will be waiving certain constitutional rights by entering the plea. State v. Kelley, 57 Ohio St.3d 127, 129, 566 N.E.2d 658 (1991);
{¶ 13} During the plea hearing, the trial court engaged Hall in a significant colloquy, confirmed that Hall had not been made any promises, informed Hall of the maximum penalty, which could be ten years, and further informed Hall that it did not have to go along with the sentencing recommendation. The court also confirmed that Hall was satisfied with his counsel.
THE COURT: Has anyone, including your attorney, the prosecutor, or this Court made any promises, threats or other inducements to you other than what has been said on the record here this morning?
* * *
DEFENDANT HALL: No.
* * *
THE COURT: Mr. Hall, you understand there‘s an agreed sentence between the State of Ohio and your counsel, but the Court has not agreed. Do you understand that?
DEFENDANT HALL: Yes.
THE COURT: Sometimes I go with it. Sometimes I don‘t. I don‘t know anything about you or this case except what I have heard thus far on your plea. Do you understand that?
DEFENDANT HALL: Yes.
THE COURT: Do you understand I‘m not involved in that agreement?
DEFENDANT HALL: Yes.
* * *
THE COURT: * * * Felonies of the third degree are punishable by possible terms of incarceration of nine, 12, 18, 24, 30, or 36 months in prison as well as possible fines of up to $10,000. * * * Do you understand?
DEFENDANT HALL: Yes.
* * *
THE COURT: For you, Mr. Hall, I haven‘t added up the most you can get. It looks like 10 years. I‘m not saying you‘re going to get it, but if you did get it they could send you back up to five years after you have done your whole sentence if you violate. Nine months, nine — do you understand that?
DEFENDANT HALL: Yes.
(Tr. 11-13, 18.)
{¶ 15} When a defendant is induced to enter a guilty plea “by erroneous representations as to the applicable law, the plea has not been entered knowingly and intelligently.” State v. Mitchell, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2004-T-0139, 2006-Ohio-618, ¶ 15, citing State v. Engle, 74 Ohio St.3d 525, 527, 660 N.E.2d 450 (1996). Further, whether a guilty plea is entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily is based on the totality of the circumstances. State v. Davner, 2017-Ohio-8862, 100 N.E.3d 1247, ¶ 40 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Sojourney, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 92087, 2009-Ohio-5353, ¶ 14; State v. Lockhart, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 90754, 2009-Ohio-2395, ¶ 6. Here, there is no evidence in the record indicating that Hall‘s counsel made erroneous representations as to the applicable law; Hall‘s counsel‘s promise or prediction regarding Hall‘s sentence is not a representation regarding the law, especially because Hall‘s counsel indicated in his affidavit that Hall was informed regarding the effect of the sentencing recommendation, and told him that the trial court did not necessarily have to follow the recommendation.
{¶ 16} Additionally, the trial court cannot grant a motion to withdraw based on affidavit evidence that directly contradicts the record. State v. Makupson, 8th
{¶ 17} The record reflects that Hall entered his guilty pleas with knowledge of the potential sentence that he could receive, and Hall indicated his understanding. Hall also indicated that no promises were made to him related to his plea. Accordingly, Hall has not shown that his counsel did anything more than provide Hall with an educated guess as to what his sentence might be relative to his experiences as an attorney. See State v. Williams, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 88737, 2007-Ohio-5073, ¶ 34 (“The facts alleged by Williams, and supported by counsel‘s affidavit, show only that counsel, based upon his many years of experience, made a prediction that the judge would likely impose a sentence of less than 20 years.“).
{¶ 18} Having found no abuse of discretion by the trial court and no manifest injustice upon our own review, we overrule Hall‘s first assignment of error.
{¶ 19} In his second assignment of error, Hall argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.
{¶ 20} When asserting ineffective assistance of counsel in the context of guilty pleas, the defendant must demonstrate (1) that counsel‘s performance was deficient and (2) that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel‘s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and instead would have insisted on going to trial. State v. Drain, 170 Ohio St.3d 107, 2022-Ohio-3697, 209 N.E.3d 621, ¶ 36-38, citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-688, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 142-143, 538 N.E.2d 373 (1989); Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985). If a defendant claims ineffective assistance of counsel after entering a guilty plea, they “must also show that the ineffective assistance precluded [them] from entering the plea knowingly and voluntarily.” State v. Mays, 174 Ohio App.3d 681, 2008-Ohio-
{¶ 21} Hall has not argued the second prong — that but for his counsel‘s alleged ineffective assistance, he would not have pled guilty and would have insisted upon going to trial. See, e.g., Lockhart at 60 (“Petitioner did not allege in his habeas petition that, had counsel correctly informed him about his parole eligibility date, he would have pleaded not guilty and insisted on going to trial.“); State v. Bozso, 162 Ohio St.3d 68, 2020-Ohio-3779, 164 N.E.3d 344, ¶ 29 (“Bozso presents no contemporaneous evidence that but for his counsel‘s erroneous advice, he would have made a different decision.“). Further, we cannot find any evidence in the record indicating that Hall would have preferred to proceed with trial on the 21-count indictment. In fact, Hall‘s counsel‘s affidavit specifically avers that the two had “numerous lengthy discussions” regarding the “risks and rewards of going to trial or entering a plea.” Hall‘s failure to argue this second prong forecloses our review of the issue.
{¶ 22} Hall‘s second assignment of error is overruled.
III. Conclusion
{¶ 23} After a thorough review of the record, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Hall‘s motion to withdraw his guilty plea, and further, that Hall did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel.
{¶ 24} Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant‘s convictions having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
FRANK DANIEL CELEBREZZE, III, PRESIDING JUDGE
LISA B. FORBES, J., and MICHAEL JOHN RYAN, J., CONCUR