State v. HallState v. Hall
DeWayne F. Hall was charged by bill of information with armed robbery in violation of
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 1
Defendant contends that the trial judge erred in overruling his exception to the jurisdiction of the court.
At trial, defendant claimed that the district court lacked jurisdiction to try him because the juvenile court which transferred him to district court for trial as an adult lacked personal jurisdiction over him. Defendant abandons this argument on appeal and contends instead under this assignment of error and in brief to this court that the statutes authorizing the transfer of certain juveniles to district court and providing rules for the conduct of a transfer hearing,
In State v. Everfield, 342 So.2d 648 (La.1977), we held that the due process requirement of access by defense counsel to all social, prоbation and other reports relevant to the issue of transfer or considered by the court in making its determination is a procedural safeguard implicitly embodies in our transfer statute. Accordingly here, as in State v. Everfield, we find it unnecessary to rule our transfer statute unconstitutional. Moreover, in the instant case the written reasons for transfer rendered by the juvenile judge reflect that the juvenile‘s defense counsel was given notice of his right to examine all judicial and social records and that an order was directed to the custodian of the records to insure their availability. Hence, the procedural safeguard of access to all such relevant material was accorded in defendant‘s case.
Defendant‘s argument that the transfer statute is unconstitutional for permitting the appointment of a different attorney to represent a defendant at the transfer hearing and subsequent trial in district court is similarly without merit. Whilе access to effective assistance of counsel at a juvenile transfer hearing is constitutionally required, Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 16 L.Ed.2d 84 (1966), we have been cited no authority for the proposition that a transfer statute is unconstitutional unless it provides for representation by the same attorney at the subsequent trial. It may be preferable to have a single attorney represent a defendant throughout the entire procedure; however, there is no constitutional right in this regard. Moreover, defendant makes no allegation that his representation by a different attorney in district court was in any way prejudicial to his defense. Nor does he claim ineffective assistance of counsel.
Hence, we find no merit in defendant‘s contention that the statutory provisions for transfer of juveniles for trial in district court are unconstitutional either on their face or as applied.
For the first time in brief, defendant additionally asserts that his triаl in district court constituted double jeopardy after the transfer hearing. It is well settled that a new basis for an objection cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. State v. Marks, 337 So.2d 1177 (La.1976). In any event, the United States Supreme Court in Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 95 S.Ct. 1779, 44 L.Ed.2d 346 (1975) held that double jeopardy bars retrial in a criminal district court only after an adjudicatory hearing in juvenile court. The Court clearly
Assignment of Error No. 1 is without merit.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 5
Defendant contends the trial judge erred in denying his motion for a new trial.
In his motion for a new trial, defendant urged that two rulings of the trial judge pursuant to defense objections demonstrated prejudicial error. The first ruling complained of concerned jurisdiction of the juvenile court which held the transfer hearing in the instant case. Defendant abandons this basis for his new trial motion on appeal. Defendant secondly complained of the ruling of the triаl judge denying his motion to suppress an oral confession. Defendant contends that the confession was not free and voluntary because the Miranda warnings given him prior to his confession did not include an additional warning that he might be transferrеd for trial as an adult in criminal court. We find no merit to this argument. In In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967), the United States Supreme Court extended its holding in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) to juveniles. The decision did not, however, indicate that juveniles are entitled to be warned respecting concerns beyond the issues of self-incrimination and right to counsel addressed in Miranda. We are satisfied that there is no constitutional requirement that a juvenile be instructed as to the courts in which he may be tried or the potential penalties which may accompany his offenses before he сan waive his Miranda rights and make a free and voluntary confession. The “warnings” proposed by defendant would require arresting officers to offer legal counsel as to whether a particular juvenile might be subject to transfer proceedings. In many cases, such advice would require familiarity with a juvenile‘s past record. Indeed, in the instant case, the arresting officers were not even aware that defendant was a juvenile. As a matter of fact, defendant was originally booked and charged as an adult in the district court by mistake prior to his transfer to the juvenile authorities.
The record reflects that defendant in this case was fully informed of his Miranda rights on several occasions and that he signed a waiver of rights form. It additionally demonstrates that defendant was not threаtened, abused, coerced or promised anything in return for his confession. Defendant
The third basis for defendant‘s new trial motion was that he was denied a trial by a jury of his peers inasmuch as he was not tried by a jury of juveniles. The record revеals that defendant neither filed a motion to quash nor made any objection at trial to the composition of the jury. Accordingly, defendant has waived his objection to this alleged error.
Defendant finally argues that the provisions of
In view of the foregoing, we are unable to say the trial judge erred in denying defendant‘s motion for a new trial. Assignment of Error No. 5 is without merit.
For the reasons assigned, the conviction and sentence are affirmed.