State v. HaleState v. Hale
GRADY, P.J.:
{¶ 1} Defendant, Doug Hale, appeals from his convictions for multiple sex offenses, which were entered on guilty verdicts returned by a jury. Defendant was sentenced to a prison term of from fifteen years to life. He filed a notice of appeal, and presents three assignments of error for review.
{¶ 2} “THE GUILTY VERDICT(S) AGAINST THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT WERE NOT SUPPORTED BY THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE.”
{¶ 3} We begin by identifying our standard of review with respect to the error assigned, which is applicable in relation to the presumption of correctness final judgments of the trial courts are afforded.
{¶ 4} “Sufficiency” of the evidence refers to its logical capacity to demonstrate both the criminal conduct and the culpable mental state that the alleged criminal liability requires. The test is whether all or some part of the evidence that was admitted in the trial would, if believed, convince the average mind beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of committing the offense charged. State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus.
{¶ 5} Defendant was convicted of two counts of Rape,
{¶ 6} Defendant denied committing the offenses of which he was convicted. On appeal, he argues that the State‘s evidence was therefore legally insufficient to support his convictions because that evidence consisted of accusations by the victims unsupported by corroborating evidence. We find these contentions to themselves be insufficient to support the error Defendant assigns.
{¶ 8} Other than a few desultory references to inconclusive matters in the record, Defendant‘s brief on appeal is wholly lacking in arguing a basis for the error he assigns. We are then left to surmise why and how the State‘s evidence was insufficient, perhaps by reviewing the seven hundred page evidentiary transcript ourselves to determine whether the State‘s evidence was sufficient. That is not an acceptable alternative to Defendant‘s failure to present a basis on which the presumption of correctness is rebutted. On the argument presented, the presumption that Defendant‘s convictions were supported by sufficient evidence is not rebutted.
{¶ 9} The first assignment of error is overruled.
SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
{¶ 10} “THE VERDICT(S) AGAINST THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.”
{¶ 12} Defendant makes the same arguments in support of this assignment of error; that because he denied the charges, the State‘s evidence consisting of the uncorroborated allegations of the victims was unpersuasive. Defendant fails to explain how that evidence was unpersuasive of its truth or why those truths fail to preponderate in favor of his convictions.
{¶ 13} With respect to one of the two Sexual Imposition convictions, Defendant points to the testimony of the victim, A.V., who when asked, “Did he grope or grab your crotch at all?“, replied, “I can‘t remember him doing that; but there might have been a time that he did it; but I really can‘t remember.” (Tr. 376).
{¶ 14} The question and A.V.‘s response followed her testimony that Defendant made highly inappropriate sexual remarks when the two were together in a car. When asked what else happened, A.V. testified:
A. He would reach over and touch my breasts or if we would – he would do the same – like if I was to get up like the way the couch was set up, the couch – there was a coffee table in front of it, and the recliner was right next to the coffee table; and if I would get up to go toward the kitchen and I would try to climb over, you know I mean, walk past him, he would slap my
butt or something like that; or he would pinch the inside of my leg. Q. Did he grope or grab at your crotch at all?
A. I can‘t remember his doing that; but there might have been a time that he did it; but I really can‘t remember.
Q. When he would do this, when he would grab your boobs or, you know, smack your butt or pinching the inside of your leg, would he say anything to you when he would do those things?
A. The same things, just . . .
Q. Same type of stuff that you already talked about?
A. Yeah.
Q. How did you play it off when he would actually touch you?
A. I would just kind of, you know what I mean, push away, laugh it off, because I didn‘t really know how to react to it in the first place. Nobody had ever done that to me; and like I said, he was – yeah, want to make a big deal of it and him being like my father, I wanted to keep thinking of him like that.
Q. And you liked him, right?
A. Yes. I loved him as my dad. I really did.
Q. And at this point, were you scared to do anything else to upset the family or upset Doug?
A. (Nods head.) Yes. (Tr. 376-377).
{¶ 16} The second assignment of error is overruled.
THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
{¶ 17} “THE TRIAL COURT MADE A SENTENCING ERROR BY NOT MERGING COUNTS ONE AND TWO, TOGETHER WITH COUNTS THREE, FOUR, FIVE AND SIX.”
{¶ 18}
{¶ 19} (A) Where the same conduct by defendant can be construed to constitute two or more allied offenses of similar import, the indictment or information may contain counts for all such offenses, but the defendant may be convicted of only one.
{¶ 20} (B) Where the defendant‘s conduct constitutes two or more offenses of dissimilar import, or where his conduct results in two or more offenses of the same or similar kind committed separately or with a separate animus as to each, the indictment or information may contain counts for all such offenses, and the defendant may be convicted of all of them.
{¶ 21} When determining whether two offenses are allied offenses of similar import
{¶ 22} All of the offenses charged in the indictment were alleged to have occurred between February 24 and November 26, 2008. Defendant argues that the two Gross Sexual Imposition offenses charged in counts three and five and the two Sexual Battery offenses charged in counts four and six must therefore merge pursuant to
{¶ 23} The object of the sex offenses prohibited by
{¶ 24} A defendant who argues on appeal that the trial court erred by not merging multiple offenses bears the burden to show not only that the offenses are allied offenses pursuant to
{¶ 25} Defendant does not argue that any of the offenses he claims must merge were committed by engaging in the same conduct. Absent that commonality, and even when they share the same animus, merger of two or more violations of the same statutory offense is not mandated by
{¶ 26} The third assignment of error is overruled. The judgment of the trial court will be affirmed.
FROELICH, J., And HARSHA, J., concur.
(Hon. William H. Harsha, Fourth District Court of Appeals, sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Ohio.)
Copies mailed to:
Lisa M. Fannin, Esq.
Antony A. Abboud, Esq.
Hon. Richard J. O‘Neill