State v. Hager

Iowa, Appellee, STATE HAGER, Appellant.

Mary Jane

No. 99-1251. of Iowa.

Supreme Court 5, 2001.

July July

Rehearing Denied Noble,

and Michelle Chenowith and Jeff County Attorneys, appellee. Assistant CADY, Justice.

In this we if appeal, must decide reject a district court in a criminal case for the reason that sole court-imposed it was tendered after a plea agree- deadline for the submission of ments. conclude the We district court in refusing abused its discretion plea. judgment We reverse the and sentence imposed the district court and remand the case proceedings. for further Background I. Facts and Proceed- ings. giving

The facts rise to this criminal are proceeding frightening both and bi- They zarre. can best be described as a product of the human common inclination jump to conclusions based on the per- ceptions They of an began event. when son, Rob, Mary Hager learned that her suspect was a in a robbery bank with an accomplice named Michael Weckman. Hager acquainted was well with Weckman. had junior He been Rob’s friend since high school. It was not a friendship Hager words, encouraged. Hager’s Weckman was “evil.” On more than one occasion he Hager had threatened family оr her with violence.

Television reported newscasts that local FBI agents officials and were searching Rob, meanwhile, for the two men. left machine, messages Hager’s answering pleading help for her claiming and gun Weckman had a to his head. He also called girlfriend, Charity, his who told Hager that Rob wanted to surrender. Rosenberg Dean Stowers Law Charity planned to meet Rob under a Firm, Moines, appellant. Des bridge crossing the Des Moines River at SE 14th Hager agreed join Street. her. Miller, General, Attorney

Thomas J. Ryan, Roxann Attorney Hager M. Assistant Charity’s aрartment Gen- drove to eral, Sarcone, County John P. her Attorney, husband’s truck. She left a phone gun police Fright- with a Des detec- flash and heard another shot. message Moines waiting for plans. them, tive about their While ened that someone was out to kill call, Hager the detective to return her 14th they sped onto SE Street. gun from the truck.

retrieved a loaded Charity, Hager thinking and still Rob it thought might protec- she need She trunk, gave sixty chase at miles tion. The detective never returned her per Hager hour. dialed 911 on her cell call. phone help. to summon Brаdwell Charity, Hager along Charity’s ‍​​‌‌‌‌​​‌​‌‌​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​‌​‌​‌‌​‌​​​​​‌​​​‌​‍Howell, meanwhile, pulled into conve- sister, the Har- fifteen-year-old headed for parking nience store lot to police. call the on the Des Moines ramp riett Street boat car, they As ran from their Charity’s River in Ford It was Bronco. Charity saw them and realized their mis- they a.m. reached the about 2:30 When They dispatcher take. so advised the 911 leading ramp, of the hill down to the top police nearby gas and met at a station they facing a car the river with observed they immediately where were arrested. opеn. speculated its trunk lid The women The charged Mary Hager State body Hager, in trunk. that Rob’s was the intent, a terrorism with class “C” forcible open who was in the back seat of the intent, felony, going and armed with Bronco, yelled for her son but received no 708.6, See Iowa Code felony. §§ “D” class response. (1997).1 Hager’s .8 counsel filed defenses There were two individuals near the car capacity of diminished and self-defense or They next to the river. were Jason How- See Iowa Code defense of others. However, Lynett they ell and Bradwell. (intoxicants (de- drugs), §§ 701.5 or 704.3 up had no connection to the events to this others). preparing fense of self or While Instead, in point they time. were at the depositions, for defense counsel became fishing. began river Howell and Bradwell Hager’s concerned about mental state. uneasy the increasingly pres- to feel about continued, The trial date was to per- first at hill top ence of the Bronco the of the Hager’s psychiatrist mit consultation with They thought per- and decided to leave. and, later, psychiatrist to enable the haps the Bronco was stalled and the occu- complete psychiatric a formal forensic pants help. They put fishing needed their examination in a evaluation. The resulted in gear the trunk of their car and headed diagnosis post-traumatic stress disorder up ramp the toward where the Bronco was no time depression. and recurrent At stopped. Hager judged incompetent to stand trial or As Bradwell and Howell the approached in her assist defense. Bronco, they Hager lean over the saw back negotiations Plea between the State pointеd seat of the Bronco with her arms Hager ongoing. Hager, believing were out, Suddenly rang toward them. shot justified by her actions were fear for her They quick- and a bullet hit their vehicle. Bronco, life, the reluctance ly repeatedly expressed drove around saw another son’s 708.8, states, pertinent defining going 1. Iowa Code section 708.6 in Section the crime of part: intent, armed with states: person felony A commits a class "C” person goes any A who armed with dan- person, injure when the with the intent to gerous weapon with the use with- intent to another, provoke anger or fear or in shoots justification weapon against the out such at, into, dangerous weapon ... a in a ... or person of another commits a class "D” felo- thereby places ... vehicle the occu- ny- pants people apprehension or in reasonable injury.... of serious Prior the of the selec- substantially even to re- commencement plead guilty, jury, again with a recommendation offered charges duced tion of State probation. agreement did not Hager State but accept the court would believe Aрril eventually set Trial was point proceedings. Hager even- court conducted a the district tually expressed willingness accept At April pretrial final conference attorneys and the consult- conference, the State pretrial the final judge ed with the district court in cham- charges to reduce the again offered if bers to determine he would guilty.2 Hager, exchange for exceptions A bill of executed plea.4 however, her refusal to reiterated the proceedings: court summarized response, the district offer. attornеy: and her explained 19,1999 morning April prior On in this district that practice is the [I]t selection, jury to the commencement of that result in a must any plea offers the court was advised counsel for the no later than the last court place take parties State and the Defendant that the of trial.... day before the date in disposing were interested against pursuant

charges Defendant plea agreement whereby county to a procedure ... our standard in Under attorney charges Defendant could would reduce the County, the enter Polk charged against trial the Defendant and Defendant plea guilty a as once the but we have been disin- enter pleas date arrives would to reduced Alford charges to reduced pleas charges. explained clined to take The court to both counsel, trial morning of because of the April on the as it had on the record on 15, that causes for the [it] inconvenience disposition that such a on the morn- counsel, witnesses, courts, ... ing of trial contrary was court’s 3 jurors.... policy and was therefore unacceptable. in budge response refused to Hager prоceeded The case then to trial. The by the district court. The the admonition jury eventually guilty returned verdicts of the proceeding court then concluded charges to both of the trial information saying, plea accepted “The offer is not and following five-day a trial. After the dis- to trial.” simply go the case will trict court denied a motion for new trial and a in judgment, Hager The case then came before the district motion arrest of April court for trial as scheduled on to a term of was sentenced incarceration. plea bargain plea 2. The offered the State would 4.The basic difference between the dis- charges have reduced the to two counts of morning plea cussions on the of trial and the weapon, aggravated an assault with a misde- agreement pretrial offered at the conference meanor. plea bargain morning that the plea. Hager earnestly trial involved an Alford plea policy 3. The deadline was an unwritten her believed that actions were not criminal implemented by judges rule the district in circumstances, under the and she could not County. It was Polk established after the plead guilty a crime she believed she did Judge of the Fifth Judicial cre- Chief District plea not commit. The would have al- Alford improve processing ated a committee to Hager plea lowed to enter a without an ad- felony County. policy cases in Polk The guilt. mission of provided that the district court would not accept plea agreements charges to lesser day compelling trial circum- without good stances or cause.

833 post-trial hearings justice.” con- Subsequent the administration of Santobello York, 257, 260, rejected v. New 404 firmed that the district court U.S. 92 S.Ct. 495, 498, 427, (1971). 30 L.Ed.2d 432 solely presented offer because it was Foremost, the prompt “[i]t leads to after the deadline. The court ex- ... final disposition of most criminal a plained during hearing on motion for 261, 498, cases....” Id. at 92 S.Ct. 30 new trial: L.Ed.2d at 432. prosecu- This affords the record is clear as to what tran- [T]he tor additional in leverage prosecuting oth- spired morning The [on trial].... crimes, er and allows defendants who ac- Court indicated to counsel on the morn- knowledge guilt spare themselves and set, ing of trial a deadline had beеn public an expensive trial. See United expired deadline had as Jackson, 570, 584, States 390 U.S. consequence, go the case would to trial. 1209, 1217-18, S.Ct. 20 L.Ed.2d motion, overruling the district (1968). Yet, as common as plea agree- court further remarked: in justice ments are our criminal system, a simply a This is case which the court right defendant has no constitutional guilty very good set deadline for Wenzel, accept guilty plea. have reasons and the Defendant did not avail Instead, 306 N.W.2d at 771. “courts have herself of [it].... discretion to refuse to [a] This is not form over substance. This is Glanton, plеa[].” Farley v. 280 N.W.2d Mary Hager concern not about Jane but (Iowa 1979); see Iowa R.Crim. P. every Mary about other Jane 8(2)(b) (“court may refuse to a plea need access to our courts and guilty”). necessary This discretion is [e]nsuring ample judges, that there are light of the variety of considerations inher- witnesses, jurors, counsel available to in the process. ent deal with all of them. There be a number of reasons for Hager appeals. She raises numerous accept plea bargain. courts to refuse to a However, issues. our review is confined to reasons, however, "normally Those have single issue of whether the district on centered doubts with the defendant’s by court abused its discretion refusing to guilt. Farley, See 280 at N.W.2d 413-16 plea agreement solely entertain the based (trial accept plea to when it refused policy refusing pleas on the court’s possible believed defendant had entrap- morning of trial. defense); Marsan, ment see v. also State (Iowa 1974) (no 278, 221 N.W.2d 280 re- II. Standard of Review. quirement that court refuse when rec- supported guilt). ord defendant’s This review a We decision of the dis рresents case time we have con- first reject trict court to guilty plea a for an ability sidered the court’s to refuse a plea Wenzel, abuse of discretion. See State v. bargain it presented because after 769, (Iowa 1981). 306 771 N.W.2d To the for pleas deadlines established process extent the issue also raises due court. concerns, our review is de novo. State v. (Iowa 1997). 370,

Griffin, 564 N.W.2d 372 possessed by The discretion trial courts to refuse to a plea is III. Plea Deadline. Farley, broad but not unlimited. 280 Yet, Plea bargaining long parameters ‍​​‌‌‌‌​​‌​‌‌​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​‌​‌​‌‌​‌​​​​​‌​​​‌​‍has been N.W.2d аt 415. lines, recognized component as “an essential this discretion have no clear 834 agreements deadline. Plea are not criteria or stan- are no established

there within the realm of courts. solely in the exercise of discre- See dards to consider Robertson, Robertson, v. 45 F.3d tion. States 45 F.3d at 1437-38. The differ- United Cir.1995) (10th 1423, (citing prosecutor 1 Charles the court and the ing 1437 roles of justice Proce- Wright, system Alan Federal Practice and within our can either (1982)). Thus, § we must ex- or narrow the discretion of courts dure 175.1 broaden reject of this pleas depending type аmine the boundaries discretion enough presented. it is broad considering plea agreement whether While reject offer permit agreements impact sentencing powers a trial court reason that it is made after the fall within the generally sole of courts discre- court, pleas. in- expiration plea bargains of deadline tion of the which charging primarily volve decisions are A that a number of courts have held prosecutor. within the discretion of the trial court acts within its discretion Thus, See id. at 1437. the court’s role ten refusing plea аgreement plea agreement becomes limited when the deadline. See dered after United presented to the court does bind Gamboa, 1327, v. 166 F.3d 1331 States sentencing powers of the court. See Unit- (11th Ellis, Cir.1999); United States v. 547 (9th Miller, 562, ed v. 722 F.2d 564 States 863, (5th Cir.1977); People F.2d 868 v. Cir.1983); Maggio, United States v. 514 Cobb, 578, Cal.Rptr. Cal.App.3d 139 188 (5th Cir.1975). 80, F.2d 82 The doctrine of 712, (1983); People Jasper, v. 17 P.3d 716 judiciary separation powers compels Grove, 807, (Colo.2001); People v. 813-14 give respect independence to the of the 439, 547, (1997); 455 Mich. 566 N.W.2d 558 Miller, 722 executive branch. F.2d at 565. 369, Brimage, N.J.Super. State directly When a does not (App.Div.1994). A.2d 908-09 Other court, impact sentencing powers of the courts have determined that trial courts case, inas the decision to reduce the by rejecting plea abuse their discretion charges primarily rests the discretion they agreements because did not meet a prosecutor. id. at See 564-66. This deadline. guilty plea See United States v. impeded discretion is when the court exer- (D.C.Cir. Shepherd, F.3d 562-63 by refusing cises its discretion to accept 1996); Robertson, 1438; 45 F.3d United plea. the See id. at 566. Moore, 1131, v. 916 States F.2d 1135-36 (6th Sears, Cir.1990); v. State 208 W.Va. agreements Plea also аffect 700, (2000); 863, 542 S.E.2d 867-68 see fundamental interests of the defendant. Ct., 540, v. Superior also Hare 133 Ariz. Although the defendant has no constitu (1982) (rule 652 P.2d 1388-90 impos right present plea, tional to a the process ing acceptance pleas deadlines on the nevertheless involves as interests funda jurisdiction). Although exceeded court’s mental freedom imprisonment. as See the factual circumstances in some of these id. at 565. In the sentencing, context of responsible producing cases be present, where these same are interests outcome, pivotal dispute among independent by we demand consideration balancing various courts centers on the case, in sentencing court each myriad competing interests. reject policies. the use of fixed See State (Iowa hand, Jackson, many

On one there are 204 N.W.2d 917 1973). Likewise, weigh against policy factors which the exercise of a fixed should a in guilty plea rejecting plea agreements. discretion to refuse be followed Miller, it a presented guilty because after See 722 F.2d at 564-65. The exer- charges to reduce and the interest of imрrison- tors in the area of discretion cise one of the are out- plead has been the defendant ment and freedom judicial system. by judicial of our the needed discretion weighed hallmarks and effective- to control the court schedule hand, important it is the other On Gamboa, ly utilize court resources. See effectively and to be legal system for our Ellis, 868; 1331; at 547 F.2d at F.3d Consequently, efficiently administered. Grove, Thus, they at 558. 566 N.W.2d a case has be processing efficient to refuse to consider discretion in admin element important come an for the plea bargain enough to be broad courts, and a deadline istration of our reject plea bargains presented court commonly method in criminal cases is one Moreover, after a deadline. Id. these manage increas by help utilized courts to recognize court-imposed plea courts that on the criminal dockets. ing demands good exceptions deadlines cause have distinguish way help are a Deadlines pleas accept- some late to be permit which ultimately need a those cases that dо not any arbitrary to overcome claims of ed and trial, require trial from those cases that Jasper, action. See P.3d help in the ensure point process at a in time and resources involved case, in in rejecting The trial court this for trial are not devoted preparation by Hager, tendered followed the late ultimately re cases that will be to those articulated those courts the rationale guilty plea. A deadline solved In plea deadlines. approved which have administrative point a cutoff becomes it observed that it was neces- particular, the court to direct purposes, and enables strictly adhere to the deadline sary to resources to those cases which its trial in order to achieve the particular case do not reach a parties manage- of efficient greater goal overall only impor by a certain date. This is not system. court ment of our entire operation of our crimi tant to the efficient of the com our consideration docket, opera overall nal but also to the stake, recоgnize we peting interests at system. Criminal cases tion of our courts in an effi vital need to administer civil cases. given priority are over most However, efficiency must al cient manner. delayed trials are when Consequently, civil fairness, ways compatible be cases are scheduled for trial but criminal the fundamental fairness must consider morning of trial ultimately settled on the system jus which drive our principles Cobb, 188 Cal. plea bargain. See of each in rights tice and the and liberties Rptr. at 713-14. many procedures are dividual. There Additionally, adherence to strict quickly that would employ courts could justified as a guilty plea deadlines is legal enable our backlogs eliminate giving integrity. the deadline means of an efficiency run the of system to with Ellis, parties at If are 547 F.2d See line, they imple are not assembly but plea agreements after allowed submit they offend the mented because would ‍​​‌‌‌‌​​‌​‌‌​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​‌​‌​‌‌​‌​​​​​‌​​​‌​‍passed, it would render the deadline has system fundamental to our principles Thus, meaningless. Id. the deadline justice. operate uniformity to all deadlines litigants. only not ad Plea deadlines discretion and versely impact prоsecutorial approved plea courts that have

Those interests, but strict adherence individual determined that generally deadlines have impedes very the discretion prosecu- deadlines given the traditional deference Moreover, the exponentially. in increased policy Like the use of a fixed the court. the jury compo- fixed deadline is function of a and the other sentencing, a discretionary decision- beyond a trial can at extend very antithesis nents of times Jackson, 204 N.W.2d at 916. in a making. ultimately See those matters that rеsult exercise of discretion. precludes times, It very presence At of a verdict. Miller, A F.2d at 565. court See jury morning engender on the of trial can when it fails to exer- abuses its discretion plead guilty a desire the defendant to from any discretion. cise replicated any prior that cannot be at time Thus, process. jury’s in the function argues dead The State help performed resolve cases can be actually in case was not fixed line this by presence morning times its mere on the good exception. it included a cause because If in a conclu- process of trial. results Thus, did asserts that the court State morning to a case on the of trial which sion but strictly not adhere to deadline before, possible day was not the time any good cause necessarily considered to the case were not and resources devoted permitted that would have a late ground important wasted. It is also to consider cause plea. good The claims the State that a that concludes criminal case component to the deadline renders the de trial often continuеs to burden the court discretionary. cision-making process expense appeal, with the of an in system as good to observe that the important It is case, proceed- or other postconviction to the deadline in the case exception cause hand, a ings. guilty On the other enough not to include a mere was broad variety rights, in the waiver of a results renegotiation of mind or a change normally the case without concludes Thus, the plea bargain by parties. expense proceedings. of further See litigants, Hager, is fixed for like deadline (Iowa Hook, State v. 623 N.W.2d change their mind after the simply who 2001). Moreover, plea deadline. the sole reason rejected in this the court case balancing In administrative benefits of strictly late. The because it was against rudimentary prin- deadlines those adhered to the deadline and refused to deadlines, ciples impacted by which are pressures consider the individual and inde- system justice we observe that our has by Hager. cision faced necessarily some costs that be elim- cannot by principles inated or reduced of efficien- balancing the need for dead cy recognized private business or even against principles lines the fundamental aspects in other of government. sys- Our deadlines, are we fur impacted which efficient, justice tem of must strive to be ther that the ratio recognize underlying justice efficiency system but does not supporting nale the deadlines is flawed. necessarily meaning have the same as it imposed While deadlines are as means to operation does in the of a business. The expense eliminate the and time of assem goals are different. cannot be witnesses, pro- Justice bling jurors, and others for a line, assembly duced an the princi- trial that never occurs because the defen trial, ples of court administration must be- pleads dant on the morning of principles come detached from those which the refusal to such a justice. system lie at the heart of our of morning only compounds of trial the time Instead, they harmony must work in expense parties and when the are forced to principles try may the ease. The trial last several those basic inherent our con- weeks, days expense actually cept justice system. or and the is of a request by Hager in rections to consider the conclude the trial court

We by refusing plea guilty pursuant case abused its discretion to enter a the to plea agree the terms of the to consider bargain prior offered to plea terms presented it was after solely ment because to exercising accept trial.5 discretion or court. A pleas by set the the deadline reject plea, may the the court not refuse deadline, alone, sup will not plea missed the for the sole reason that it was plea agree the refusal to a port tendered after the deadline. additional reasons. ment. There must be AND REVERSED REMANDED. fall These additional reasons are broad and power the court’s over within the ambit of justices except All concur NEUMAN justice. the See United administration TERNUS, JJ., dissent, and who and (2d Severino, 800 F.2d States SNELL, J., part. who takes no Cir.1986) (court may reject plea if it has grounds NEUMAN, to believe it would be reasonable (dissenting). Justice the administration of contrary to sound “There are cases that in fаirness some justice). They may relate to the terms of by jury.” are best resolved these With proper disposition plea bargain, words, up the district court summed case, underlying impunity any or even attempt get Mary Hager plead failed to a defendant toward the efforts charges pretrial to reduced at the through docket dead court to control its Thursday preceding conference held on Thus, within its lines. a court could act Monday her trial. Now convicted of ter- guilty plea to refuse to discretion intent, going Hag- armed with rorism if the defendant after a missed deadline lawyer the court and her er blames ignores by making the deadline no reason tendering her from preventing favor- plea agreement prior to reach a able effort guilty plea on the able—but belated — to the deadline. tactic, interesting trial. an morning of It’s given are discretion Courts I one we should not reward. therefore but law, fail it this area of the to exercise dissent. respectfully by strictly adhering to a deadline. majority’s with the reason- My quarrel The benefits of strict adherence utterly disregards First it ing is two-fold. outweigh the need for deadlines do principal argument supporting the State’s discretion, judges to exercise the deference there the district court’s decision—that prosecutors, and the the discretion fact, was, in reached on plea agreement no Moreover, rights Hager of the defendant. assuming trial. Even ar- morning prejudice by the abuse of clearly suffered had a fixed and unwaver- guendo Shepherd, 102 F.3d at 563. discretion. See no accommoda- ing policy permitted that IV. Conclusion. cause,” “good no reversal based on tion for of discretion would be warranted. abuse reverse the conviction and remand We with di- It is evident from the record defense the case to the district court plea bargain parties recognize the decision the trial court never formalized 5. We plea bargain presenting it to the trial court on to refuse the was based on a before trial, memorialized, morning prejudice agreement suffered that was never because the trial court decision denied her an issue arise on remand as to terms plea agreement agreement. oppоrtunity to finalize the existence of the Notwithstand- or parties are ing, with the State. If the unable the record is clear that the State was not remand, agree- the dis- opposed resolving by plea reach a the case Thus, trial. morning court shall schedule the case for of trial. even if trict ment cajoling was still counsel —unsuc- Iowa, Plaintiff, trial. No STATE morning of cessfully—on Al- writing. ‍​​‌‌‌‌​​‌​‌‌​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​‌​‌​‌‌​‌​​​​​‌​​​‌​‍reduced agreement was process argu- her due rests though Hager requires rule “the fact that

ment DISTRICT COURT FOR IOWA court,” agreement open disclosure COUNTY, JOHNSON that an presupposes rule’s requirement Defendant. R. reached. See Iowa has been agreement No. 99-1836. 9(2). beyond vague But refer- P.' Crim. nothing charges,” before to “reduced ence of Iowa. Supreme Court charging firm concession reveals a

us or, willing- importantly, more July the State guilty plea. to tender a by Hager ness

Second, majority joined has the dis- concerning modern

tinctly minority view that Those courts

court administration. plea deadlines as

recognize the value of management protect trial

part of sound pleas arbitrary rejection belated

against exceptions

by tempering deadlines good rule cause. relief from the

permit however, recognize,

Those same courts “more than a implicates cause good

that renegotiation of mind or a change

mere Jasper, 17 P.3d parties.” State v. (Colo. 2001). that By rejecting sound here, permits a defen- majority

caveat trial trump only

dant’s indecision to sound administrative

court discretion but

policy as well. about the factual

Despite my misgivings decision, majority’s legal bases for the prospect perhaps puzzled

I am most remand. happen

of what will What entertain?

plea is there for the court to having once been convict- Hager,

No doubt

ed, more amenable to will now be much ‍​​‌‌‌‌​​‌​‌‌​‌​​​‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​‌​‌​‌‌​‌​​​​​‌​​​‌​‍But, majori- despite the negotiations.

ty’s contrary, to the protestations manipulation

sounds to more like than me

justice.

TERNUS, J., joins this dissent.

Case Details

Case Name: State v. Hager

Court Name: Supreme Court of Iowa

Date Published: Jul 5, 2001

Citation: 630 N.W.2d 828

Docket Number: 99-1251

Court Abbreviation: Iowa