STATE OF OHIO v. JESSE LEE HAGAN
CASE NO. CA2018-07-136
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO BUTLER COUNTY
3/25/2019
[Cite as State v. Hagan, 2019-Ohio-1047.]
S. POWELL, J.
CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM BUTLER COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS Case No. CR2018-02-0357
Scott N. Blauvelt, 315 South Monument, Hamilton, Ohio 45011, for appellant
S. POWELL, J.
{¶ 1} Appellant, Jesse Lee Hagan, appeals from his conviction and sentence in the Butler County Court of Common Pleas after he pled guilty to one count of third-degree felony sexual battery. For the reasons outlined below, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
{¶ 2} On March 28, 2018, the Butler County Grand Jury returned a three-count
{¶ 3} On May 10, 2018, Hagan entered into a plea agreement and agreed to plead guilty to one count of third-degree felony sexual battery in exchange for the remaining charges against him being dismissed. As part of his plea agreement, Hagan executed a plea form noting his intent to plead guilty to the sexual battery offense. As relevant here, the plea form stated:
Upon conviction Defendant will be designated a Tier III sex offender requiring in-person verification every 90 days for life among other restrictions including a prohibition from living within 1000 feet of a school.
{¶ 4} After Hagan executed the plea form, a plea hearing was held before the trial court. During this hearing, Hagan acknowledged that he had read and signed the plea form with a full understanding of its contents after conferring with his trial counsel. This included the fact that he would be subject to various requirements and restrictions as a Tier III sex offender.
{¶ 5} After confirming Hagan had read and signed the plea form, the trial court addressed Hagan and stated the following:
THE COURT: The Court understands that you are entering a guilty plea to Count III. That is sexual battery, a felony of the third degree. Please understand that as a result of this plea this Court could sentence you to 60 months in prison and impose a fine in the amount of $10,000.
Also you will be designated a tier 3 sex offender and that will require that you register in person for verification every 90 days
for the rest of your life. There will be other restrictions which will include a prohibition from moving within a thousand feet of a school. Do you understand that? THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
{¶ 6} Further into the proceedings, the trial court again addressed Hagan and stated the following:
THE COURT: Do you have any questions about anything that we discussed?
THE DEFENDANT: No.
THE COURT: Do you have any questions about anything that we have not discussed?
THE DEFENDANT: No.
THE COURT: Do you have any questions about anything that‘s on this plea form that you told me you signed?
THE DEFENDANT: No.
{¶ 7} Hagan then entered his plea of guilty, which the trial court accepted. Upon accepting Hagan‘s guilty plea, the trial court ordered a presentence-investigative report and scheduled the matter for sentencing.
{¶ 8} On June 14, 2018, the parties reconvened for purposes of sentencing. During this hearing, but prior to issuing its sentencing decision, the trial court noted that it had considered the necessary sentencing statutes,
{¶ 9} The trial court also noted that Hagan had previously served time in prison after he was convicted of trafficking in heroin. The trial court further noted that following Hagan‘s release from prison that “[w]hile he was under supervision to the parole authority he violated his post-release control and completed the River City program.”
{¶ 10} Continuing, the trial court stated:
The Court notes within the specifics to the facts of this case, that the Defendant did hold a special – had a relationship of trust with the victim in this case. The victim perceived him to be a father figure and he likewise perceived to be her (sic) a daughter-like figure. And the Court finds he used that position of trust in facilitating this offense.
{¶ 11} Concluding, the trial court noted the “serious nature of this offense and the age of this victim. The victim was 14 years old when this offense occurred.” The trial court then issued its sentencing decision and sentenced Hagan to serve 42 months in prison. The trial court also ordered Hagan to pay court costs and notified Hagan that he would be subject to a mandatory five-year postrelease control term.
Appeal
{¶ 12} Hagan now appeals from his conviction and sentence, raising two assignments of error for review.
{¶ 13} Assignment of Error No. 1:
{¶ 14} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ACCEPTING A GUILTY PLEA WHICH WAS NOT KNOWING, INTELLIGENT AND VOLUNTARY.
{¶ 15} In his first assignment of error, Hagan argues his guilty plea was not entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily since the trial court failed to explicitly advise him, as a Tier III sex offender, that he would be subject to a mandatory community notification requirement as provided for by
Standard of Review: Knowing, Intelligent, and Voluntary Guilty Plea
{¶ 16} When a defendant enters a guilty plea in a criminal case, the plea must be
{¶ 17} As relevant here, pursuant to
(a) Determining that the defendant is making the plea voluntarily, with understanding of the nature of the charges and of the maximum penalty involved, and if applicable, that the defendant is not eligible for probation or for the imposition of community control sanctions at the sentencing hearing.
(b) Informing the defendant of and determining that the defendant understands the effect of the plea of guilty or no contest, and that the court, upon acceptance of the plea, may proceed with judgment and sentence.
(c) Informing the defendant and determining that the defendant understands that by the plea the defendant is waiving the rights to jury trial, to confront witnesses against him or her, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in the defendant‘s favor, and to require the state to prove the defendant‘s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial at which the defendant cannot be compelled to testify against himself or herself.
{¶ 18} A guilty plea is invalid if the trial court does not strictly comply with
Analysis
{¶ 19} As noted above, Hagan does not dispute that the trial court strictly complied with
{¶ 20} In State v. Williams, 129 Ohio St.3d 344, 2011-Ohio-3374, the Ohio Supreme Court found that
{¶ 21} Upon outlining these principles in Butcher, this court thereafter upheld appellant‘s guilty plea upon finding:
In the present case, the record indicates that Butcher subjectively understood the maximum penalty resulting from his guilty plea, including his classification as a Tier III sex offender and the resulting registration requirements. During the plea hearing, the trial court correctly advised Butcher that he would be labeled a Tier III sex offender. The trial court also notified Butcher that he would be subject to certain registration requirements as a result of this classification. The trial court specifically informed Butcher that every 90 days, for the rest of his life, he would be required to register with the sheriff of the county where he resides. Importantly, after informing Butcher of his Tier III classification and the lifetime reporting requirements, the trial court specifically asked Butcher if this “in any way change[d] what you wish to do here as far as plea,” and Butcher respond, “no.”
The trial court‘s failure to specify that Butcher would also be required to register with the sheriff of the county in which he works, attends school, or “temporarily resides” does not invalidate his plea. Rather, the totality of the circumstances indicate that Butcher subjectively understood that by pleading guilty to rape, he would be subjected to certain restrictions as a Tier III sex offender. Accordingly, we find that the statements made by the trial court with regard to Butcher‘s registration requirements under
R.C. Chapter 2950 were such that the trial court substantially complied with the nonconstitutional provisions ofCrim.R. 11 .
(Emphasis added.) Id. at ¶ 12-13.
{¶ 22} Relying on this court‘s decision in Butcher, we find the statements made by the trial court regarding the various requirements and restrictions Hagan faced as a Tier III sex offender in this case were such that the trial court, at worst, substantially complied with the nonconstitutional provisions of
{¶ 23} Although not explicit, this court has already found as much in State v. Henson, 12th Dist. Butler Case No. CA2013-12-221, 2014-Ohio-3994, ¶ 13. As this court stated in Henson:
[A] trial court is not required to review each of the numerous individual restrictions and requirements set forth in
R.C. Chapter 2950 to substantially comply with SeeCrim.R. 11 . However, where a trial court reviews a specific requirement set forth in ChapterR.C. 2950 , such as the requirement for community notification, the trial court is under an obligation to provide accurate information to the defendant. Where a trial court affirmatively misadvises a defendant about his reporting and notification requirements underR.C. Chapter 2950 , the trial court has failed to comply with the requirements ofCrim.R. 11(C) , and the defendant need not show prejudice to have his plea vacated.
(Emphasis added. Internal citation omitted.)
{¶ 24} This court‘s holding in Henson demonstrates that a trial court may, but is not required to, specifically notify a defendant of the community notification requirement when the defendant enters a guilty plea to an offense that includes a Tier III sex offender classification. But, although not required to do so, where the trial court does advise a defendant of the community notification requirement, the trial court must provide the
{¶ 25} Our holding is further supported by the Second District Court of Appeals in State v. Mayes, 2nd Dist. Montgomery No. 27194, 2017-Ohio-9313. In that case, just as in the case at bar, appellant argued his guilty plea was not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered where the trial court advised appellant, as a Tier III sex offender, that he would be required to register every 90 days for the rest of his life as part of its
{¶ 26} Finding the trial court “at least partially complied” with the requirements of
The court advised Mayes that he would be “required to register as a Tier [III] offender every 90 days for the rest of [his] life.” Although the court does not appear to have complied completely with
Crim.R. 11 , inasmuch as it did not inform Mayes “about the fact that a Tier III conviction includes [a] community notification [requirement],” the court at least partially complied with the rule. Mayes says that the omission rendered his plea unknowing and involuntary, but the mere recitation of these words falls far short of the demonstration of prejudice that would entitle Mayes to have his plea vacated.
(Brackets sic. Internal citations omitted.) Id. at ¶ 17; see also State v. Young, 2d Dist. Greene No. 2013-CA-22, 2014-Ohio-2213, ¶ 20 (trial court failed to substantially comply
{¶ 27} Mayes appealed from the Second District‘s decision to the Ohio Supreme Court. The Ohio Supreme Court nevertheless declined Mayes’ motion to file a delayed appeal in 6/27/2018 Case Announcements, 2018-Ohio-2418, and thereafter denied review in both 8/15/2018 Case Announcements, 2018-Ohio-3257, and 9/26/2018 Case Announcements #2, 2018-Ohio-3868.
{¶ 28} Although our holding in Butcher and the Second District‘s holding in Mayes are not currently under review, the Ohio Supreme Court is currently reviewing the Sixth District Court of Appeals’ holding originally pronounced in State v. Ragusa, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-15-1244, 2016-Ohio-3373; specifically, that before a defendant enters a plea that results in the defendant being classified as a sex offender under
{¶ 29} The Sixth District‘s holding in Ragusa has resulted in that district invalidating several pleas upon finding the trial court failed to notify the defendant of all of the various requirements and restrictions set forth in
{¶ 30} Although informative, unless and until the Ohio Supreme Court affirms this proposition of law as initially set forth by the Sixth District in Ragusa, we decline to accept the Sixth District‘s holding in Ragusa and its progeny as the law of this district and adhere to our decisions in Butcher and Henson, as well as the Second District‘s decision in Mayes.
{¶ 31} In light of the foregoing, we find no merit to Hagan‘s claim that his guilty plea was not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered since the trial court failed to explicitly advise him, as a Tier III sex offender, that he would be subject to a mandatory community notification requirement as provided for by
{¶ 32} We also find significant the fact that the trial court specifically addressed
THE COURT: The Court understands that you are entering a guilty plea to Count III. That is sexual battery, a felony of the third degree. Please understand that as a result of this plea this Court could sentence you to 60 months in prison and impose a fine in the amount of $10,000.
Also you will be designated a tier 3 sex offender and that will require that you register in person for verification every 90 days for the rest of your life. There will be other restrictions which will include a prohibition from moving with a thousand feet of a school. Do you understand that?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
(Emphasis added.)
{¶ 33} Further into the proceedings, the trial court again addressed Hagan and stated:
THE COURT: Do you have any questions about anything that we discussed?
THE DEFENDANT: No.
THE COURT: Do you have any questions about anything that we have not discussed?
THE DEFENDANT: No.
THE COURT: Do you have any questions about anything that‘s on this plea form that you told me you signed?
THE DEFENDANT: No.
{¶ 34} When reviewing the totality of the circumstances surrounding Hagan‘s guilty plea, including the plea form read and signed by Hagan, we find the record supports the trial court‘s finding Hagan subjectively understood the effects of his guilty plea. This includes the fact that Hagan would be subject to certain requirements and restrictions as a Tier III sex offender. See Butcher, 2013-Ohio-3081 at ¶ 13 (“the totality of the circumstances indicate that Butcher subjectively understood that by pleading guilty to rape,
{¶ 35} Due to the generous plea agreement offered by the state, there is also nothing in the record to indicate Hagan would not have pled guilty had the trial court explicitly advised him of the community notification requirement. Therefore, in light of our holdings in Butcher, Henson, and the Second District‘s holding in Mayes, we find that the statements made by the trial court with regard to the various requirements and restrictions Hagan faced as a Tier III sex offender under
{¶ 36} Affirming Hagan‘s guilty plea in this matter, we would be remiss not to address several issues we discovered in researching the law applicable to this case. In Henson this court stated at ¶ 13:
We have previously found that the registration and notification requirements set forth in
R.C. Chapter 2950 are part of the penalty imposed upon a defendant, and that “Crim.R. 11 obligates a trial court to advise a defendant of the basic requirements underR.C. Chapter 2950 before accepting a guilty plea.”
(Emphasis added.)
{¶ 37} This court quoted this same passage in our subsequent decision in State v. Swinson, 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2016-05-024, 2017-Ohio-150. Specifically, this court in Swinson stated at ¶ 16:
This court has previously found that “the registration and notification requirements set forth in
R.C. Chapter 2950 are partof the penalty imposed upon a defendant, and that ‘Crim.R. 11 obligates a trial court to advise a defendant of the basic requirements under R.C. Chapter 2950 before accepting a guilty plea.‘”
(Emphasis added.)
{¶ 38} This court in Henson (and by extension Swinson) extrapolated this statement of law by quoting from this court‘s prior decision in Butcher. The quote in Henson, however, excluded the word “registration” from the phrase “basic registration requirements” as originally pronounced in Butcher. Specifically, as this court stated in Butcher at ¶ 11:
As the requirements under
R.C. Chapter 2950 are now part of penalty for the offense, we find thatCrim.R. 11 obligates a trial court to advise a defendant of the basic registration requirements underR.C. Chapter 2950 before accepting a guilty plea.
(Emphasis added.)
{¶ 39} These misstatements in Henson and Swinson, by misquoting our prior decision in Butcher, implies that there is a distinction between the registration and community notification requirements to that of the verification requirement and residential restrictions as it relates to a
{¶ 40} When taken in context, we find that our initial use of the phrase “basic registration requirements” in Butcher was referring to that requirement as it related to the specific facts of that case and the arguments raised therein. Our holding in Butcher, however, should not be so limited. This becomes apparent based on the plain language
{¶ 41} We also find it necessary to note our decision in State v. Johnson, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2015-02-016, 2015-Ohio-4650. In that case, appellant pled guilty to rape and was classified as a Tier III sex offender. On appeal, appellant argued his guilty plea was not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered. Id. at ¶ 18. In support, appellant argued his plea should be vacated since the trial court misstated the repercussions of his Tier III sex offender classification by notifying him as part of its
{¶ 42} Of significance to this case, however, was this court‘s statement that “[t]he trial court‘s colloquy should have informed [appellant] that community notification was a mandatory aspect of his Tier III classification.” Id. at ¶ 20. At first glance, this court‘s pronouncement could certainly be read to mean a trial court is required to explicitly notify a defendant, as a Tier III sex offender, that he or she would be subject to a community notification requirement as part of its
{¶ 43} Our interpretation of Johnson becomes even more apparent when considering that decision has not been cited as authority by this court or any other court for the proposition that a trial court must explicitly advise a defendant, as a Tier III sex offender, that he or she would be subject to a community notification requirement as part of its
{¶ 44} Due to the confusion that may arise between Butcher, Henson, Swinson, and Johnson, we find it necessary to reiterate and explicitly hold that “a trial court is not required to review each of the numerous individual restrictions and requirements set forth in
{¶ 45} Assignment of Error No. 2:
{¶ 46} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING A PRISON TERM WHERE THE FINDING THAT APPELLANT HELD A POSITION OF TRUST IN RELATION TO THE VICTIM WAS CONTRARY TO LAW AND UNSUPPORTED BY THE RECORD.
{¶ 47} In his second assignment of error, Hagan argues the trial court erred by sentencing him to serve 42 months in prison upon finding he held a position of trust in relation to his 14-year-old victim as provided by
Standard of Review: Felony Sentencing
{¶ 48} As with all felony sentences, we review the trial court‘s sentencing decision under the standard of review set forth in
Analysis
{¶ 49} Hagan challenges the following statement made by the trial court at the sentencing hearing:
The Court notes within the specifics to the facts of this case, that
the Defendant did hold a special – had a relationship of trust with the victim in this case. The victim perceived him to be a father figure and he likewise perceived to be her (sic) a daughter-like figure. And the Court finds he used that position of trust in facilitating this offense.
{¶ 50} Based on this statement, Hagan argues the trial court mistakenly found that he had used a “position of trust” in facilitating the offenses as provided by
(B) The sentencing court shall consider all of the following that apply regarding the offender, the offense, or the victim, and any other relevant factors, as indicating that the offender‘s conduct is more serious than conduct normally constituting the offense:
* * *
(3) The offender held a public office or position of trust in the community, and the offenses related to that office or position.
As noted by the Ohio Supreme Court, “[b]y including the phrase ‘position of trust in the community,’ the legislature reveals its intent that
{¶ 51} There is no dispute that Hagan is neither a public official nor a community leader. There is also no dispute the sexual battery offense Hagan pled guilty to was in no way related to any office or position held by Hagan. Hagan is therefore correct in his assertion that
{¶ 52} When taken in context, it is clear that the trial court was referring generally to Hagan‘s relationship with the victim, a permissible factor under
(B) The sentencing court shall consider all of the following that apply regarding the offender, the offense, or the victim, and any other relevant factors, as indicating that the offender‘s conduct is more serious than conduct normally constituting the offense:
* * *
(6) The offender‘s relationship with the victim facilitated the offense.
{¶ 53} That is exactly what the trial court did here by finding “[Hagan] did hold a special - had a relationship of trust with the victim in this case.” The trial court‘s subsequent statement finding “[Hagan] used that position of trust in facilitating this offense,” rather than referring back to its previous finding that “[Hagan] did hold a special – had a relationship of trust with the victim in this case,” was nothing more than a slip of the tongue that in no way impacts the trial court‘s sentencing decision. This is certainly the case here when considering the trial court in the immediately preceding sentence found “[t]he victim perceived [Hagan] to be a father figure and he likewise perceived to be her (sic) a daughter-like figure.”
{¶ 54} Although somewhat factually distinguishable, we find this case is nevertheless analogous to the Seventh District Court of Appeals’ decision in State v. Gant, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 04 MA 252, 2006-Ohio-1469. As the Seventh District stated in that case when addressing a substantially similar argument raised by Hagan herein:
Appellant argues that the trial court mistakenly found that Appellant had abused a position of trust. Appellant presumes that the trial court misread
R.C. § 2929.12(B)(3) , which states: “The offender held a public office or position of trust in the community, and the offense related to that office or position.” The trial court, though, was referring generally to a relationship based on trust between Appellant and the victim. This is more related to the factor listed inR.C. § 2929.12(B)(6) : “The offender‘s relationship with the victim facilitated the offense.”
Based on this sentencing factor, rather than the one Appellant has referred to, the trial court did not err in considering the personal relationship between the defendant and the victim.
{¶ 55} In light of the foregoing, including the Seventh District‘s decision in Gant, we find no merit to Hagan‘s claim the trial court erred by sentencing Hagan to 42 months in prison upon finding that he held a position of trust in relation to the victim pursuant to
{¶ 56} Regardless, even if we did find merit to Hagan‘s claim, any such error would be harmless given the significant other factors supporting the trial court‘s sentencing decision. This includes, but is not limited to, the serious nature of the offense and the young age of the victim. This also includes the fact that Hagan had previously served time in prison after he was convicted of trafficking in heroin, as well as the fact Hagan violated his postrelease control shortly after he was released from prison on that charge. These factors, standing alone, justify the trial court‘s decision to sentence Hagan to serve 42 months in prison.
{¶ 57} In reaching this decision, we note that the trial court had the option of sentencing Hagan to a maximum 60-month prison term – 18 months more than the sentence the trial court actually imposed in this case. See
{¶ 58} Judgment affirmed.
M. POWELL, J., dissents.
M. POWELL, J., dissenting.
{¶ 59} In
* * *
{¶ 60} In State v. Williams, 129 Ohio St.3d 344, 2011-Ohio-3374, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that
{¶ 61} Since Williams, Ohio courts have routinely included in the plea colloquy
{¶ 62} In State v. Creed, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 97317, 2012-Ohio-2627, the Eighth Appellate District considered a trial court‘s plea colloquy that included advice as to the registration and community notification requirements but omitted mention of the residential restriction. The appellate court held that advice as to each of the three basic SORN requirements of Tier III sex offender classification was unnecessary because, under the totality of the circumstances, Creed “subjectively understood that * * * he would be subjected to certain restrictions as a Tier III sex offender.” Id. at ¶ 17.
* * *
{¶ 63} The Second Appellate District has also ruled that advice as to some, but not all, of the basic requirements of Tier III sex offender classification is partial compliance with
{¶ 64} The Sixth Appellate District, in a series of cases, has approached the issue differently and held that failure to include advice as to all three basic SORN requirements in the plea colloquy is a complete failure to comply with
Because the requirements imposed upon a defendant classified as a child victim or sex offender pursuant to
R.C. Chapter 2950 [which includes registration, community notifications, and residential restrictions] are now considered punitive sanctions, the trial court must inform the defendant of all of the punitiveconsequences of entering a guilty plea and having a child victim or sex offender classification in order to substantially comply with non-constitutional provisions of Crim.R. 11 . The trial court is not required to address each specific restriction or requirement, but it must substantially notify the defendant of the restriction and registration requirements.
(Citations omitted.) State v. Ragusa, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-15-1244, 2016-Ohio-3373, ¶ 5. See also State v. Kouts, 6th Dist. Sandusky No. S-16-012, 2017-Ohio-2905 (finding that when a guilty plea results in a defendant being classified as a child victim offender or sex offender under
{¶ 65} The First Appellate District has also held that the “registration, community-notification, and verification requirements of the Adam Walsh Act * * * are punitive in nature [and] a defendant must be informed of them before his plea of guilty may be accepted.” State v. Jackson, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-110645, 2012-Ohio-3348, ¶ 6.
{¶ 66} This court has addressed the intersection of
{¶ 67} Our seminal case on the issue is State v. Butcher, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2012-10-206, 2013-Ohio-3081, where we considered the validity of a guilty plea based upon claimed deficiencies in the plea colloquy relating to the registration requirement.
{¶ 68} Butcher’s holding that ”
{¶ 69} Since Butcher, we have considered the requisites of compliance with
{¶ 70} It is indisputable that all basic SORN requirements are part of the maximum penalty referred to in
{¶ 71} A trial court must substantially comply with
{¶ 72} The cases that have found that advice about fewer than all the basic SORN requirements does not invalidate a plea have not applied the substantial compliance standard recognized by the supreme court in Nero. Instead of reviewing whether a defendant “subjectively understands the implications of his plea,” these cases review whether a defendant subjectively understands that by pleading he would be subjected to certain restrictions as a sex offender. See Butcher, 2013-Ohio-3081 at ¶ 13. This latter standard fails to treat all the basic SORN requirements as part of the maximum penalty as it permits omission of some of those requirements from the plea colloquy. See State v. Sarkozy, 117 Ohio St.3d 86, 2008-Ohio-509, ¶ 22 (finding a complete failure of compliance with
{¶ 74} The community notification requirement, with which this case is concerned, is significantly punitive and merits inclusion in a plea colloquy for a sexually oriented offense involving a Tier III sex offender classification. The community notification requirement obligates the county sheriff to provide a Tier III sex offender‘s name, residence, school and employment addresses, photograph, and offense of conviction to persons living within 1,000 feet of the sex offender, all persons sharing a common hallway with the sex offender in a multi-unit building, the building manager of a multi-unit building, and local school superintendents, school principals, and police chiefs. The sheriff must also post a flyer with the sex offender‘s name, address, photograph, and offense of conviction in each common entryway of a multi-unit building in which the sex offender resides. As the Ohio Supreme Court observed, “[t]he stigma attached to sex offenders is significant, and the potential exists for ostracism and harassment.” Williams, 2011-Ohio-3374 at ¶ 15. Community notification gives a name, face, and address to that stigma. The punitive burdens associated with the community notification require a plea colloquy to include advice concerning that requirement.
{¶ 75} I agree with our holding in Butcher that substantial compliance with
{¶ 76} A plea colloquy for a sexually oriented offense involving a Tier III sex offender classification must include advice that the defendant will be subject to address registration and periodic verification, that certain persons in the community will be notified of the defendant‘s sex offender classification, that the defendant will be subject to restrictions on where he may reside, and that failure to comply with certain of these duties may result in the filing of additional criminal charges. If, after such advice, a defendant requires more detail, he may so advise the trial court and such additional detail may be provided. However, at a minimum, substantial compliance with
{¶ 77} As the Sixth Appellate District held in Ragusa, “Each of the penalty
{¶ 78} I would therefore reverse the trial court‘s decision, vacate appellant‘s guilty plea, and remand to the trial court for further proceedings.
{¶ 79} With regard and respect for my colleagues in the majority, I dissent.