State v. HaddixState v. Haddix
For Plaintiff-Appellee:
JOHN D. FERRERO, JR. STARK CO. PROSECUTOR RONALD MARK CALDWELL 110 Central Plaza South – Ste. 510 Cantоn, OH 44702-1413
For Defendant-Appellant:
DOUGLAS HADDIX, PRO SE Inmate No. A304-270 Warren Correctional Institution P.O. Box 120 Lebanon, OH 45036
{¶1} Appellant Douglas Haddix appeals from the August 16, 2017 Judgment Entry of the Stark County Court of Commоn Pleas overruling his “Motion for Relief from the Judgment.” Appellee is the state of Ohio.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
{¶2} A statement of the facts underlying appellant‘s criminal сonvictions is not necessary to our resolution of this appeal. This case has a lengthy procedural history.
{¶3} On February 2, 1995, appellant was charged by indictment with three counts of rape in violation of
{¶4} A jury trial commenced on April 25, 1995. At the conclusion of appellee‘s case-in-chief, the trial court dismissed the endangering count. The jury found aрpellant guilty as charged save for one of the rape counts. By judgment entry filed May 30, 1995, the trial court sentenced appellant to аn aggregate indeterminate term of seventeen to fifty years in prison.
{¶5} Appellant appealed and this Court affirmed his convictions and sentences. State v. Haddix, 5th Dist. Stark No. 95–CA–0175, 1996 WL 363510 (June 3, 1996), delayed appeal not allowed, 85 Ohio St.3d 1478, 85 N.E.2d 850 (1999). For a complete history of ensuing appeals, see State v. Haddix, 5th Dist. Stark No.1998–CA–0096, 1998 WL 753263 (September 28, 1998), appeal not allowed, 84 Ohio St.3d 1471, 704 N.E.2d 579 (1999); State v. Haddix, 5th Dist. Stark No.1999–CA–00227, 1999 WL 107980 (November 15, 1999), appeal not allowed, 88 Ohio St.3d 1434, 724 N.E.3d 810 (2000); State v. Haddix, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2011 CA00276, 2012–Ohio–4259, appeal not allowed, 134 Ohio St.3d 1422, 2013-Ohio-158, 981 N.E.2d 886; State v. Haddix, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2012-CA-00218, 2013-Ohio-1974, appeal not allowed, 136 Ohio St.3d 1492, 2013-Ohio-4140, 994 N.E.2d 463.
{¶6} On August 10, 2017, appellant filed a “Motion for Relief from the Judgment,” arguing that his conviction upon “the sеcond count” is void because he “does not come within the definition of ‘whoever’ in section 1.02(A) of the Revised Code.” The trial court ovеrruled the motion on August 11, 2017.
{¶7} Appellant now appeals from the trial court‘s Judgment Entry of August 11, 2017.
{¶8} Appellant raises one assignment of error:
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
{¶9} “THE SECOND COUNT JURY CONVICTION VOID AB INITIO FOR WANT OF JURISDICTION TO PROSECUTE (sic).”
ANALYSIS
{¶10} Appellant argues his conviction and sentence uрon Count II, rape, should be vacated because the trial court lacked jurisdiction over him. We disagree.
{¶11} Appellant referenсes only “the second count jury conviction” in his assignment of error and has attached the guilty verdict of the jury upon Count II as an exhibit to his brief. Appellant has also attached a number of documents from, e.g., the Ohio Secretary of State purporting to establish that “Douglas Edward Haddix” is а corporation in the state of Ohio. Appellant also purports to be a “foreign sovereign.” We
{¶12} Although the trial court does not explicitly state in the Judgment Entry that it treated the motion as a petition for post-conviction relief, the motion was properly overruled as such. The caption of a pro se pleading does not define the nature of the pleading. State v. Reynolds, 79 Ohio St.3d 158, 160, 679 N.E.2d 1131 (1997). Thus, if the pleading meets the definition of a petition for post-conviction relief, it must be treated as such, regardless of the manner in which appellant actually presents the motion to the court. State v. Green, 5th Dist. Knox No. 15–CA–13, 2015–Ohio–4441, ¶ 10. A motion meets the definition of a motion for post-conviction relief set forth in
{¶13} Appellant‘s “Motion for Relief from the Judgment” satisfies this definition of a petition for post-conviction relief as defined in
{¶14} As a petition for post-conviction relief, it was filed well beyond the time limits set by
{¶15} Appellant has made no attempt to show that any of the exceptions to
{¶16} When a petition for post-convictiоn relief is filed untimely and does not meet the requirements of
{¶17} Further, it is well-settled that, “pursuant to res judicata, a defendant cannоt raise an issue in a [petition] for post-conviction relief if he or she could have raised the issue on direct appeal.” State v. Elmore, 5th Dist. Licking No. 2005–CA–32, 2005–Ohio–5940, citing Reynolds, supra. Under the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment of conviction bars the defendant who was represented by counsel from raising and litigating in any prоceedings, except an appeal from that judgment, any defense or claimed lack of due process that the defendant rаised or could have raised at the trial which resulted in that judgment of conviction or on appeal from that judgment. State v. Perry, 10 Ohio St.2d 175, 226 N.E.2d 104 (1967). A defendant who was represented by counsel is barred from raising an issue in a petition for post-conviction relief if the defendant raised or could have raised the issue at trial or on direct appeal. State v. Szefcyk, 77 Ohio St.3d 93, 671 N.E.2d 233 (1996).
{¶18} Appellant‘s arguments regarding the purported lack of jurisdiction of the trial court could have been raised on direct appeal. See, State v. Flugga, 5th Dist. Licking No. 09-CA-140, 2010-Ohio-4237, ¶ 17. Appellant‘s purported status as a “corporation” or “foreign sovеreign” does not legitimately create a jurisdictional defect and the issue is now barred from consideration based on the doctrine оf res judicata. See, State v. Lawrence, 2nd Dist. Montgomery No. 27014, 2016-Ohio-7626.
{¶19} Therefore, the trial court properly denied appellant‘s motion.
{¶20} Appellant‘s sole assignment of error is overruled.
{¶21} Appellant‘s sole assignment of errоr is overruled and the judgment of the Stark County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
By: Delaney, P.J.,
Wise, John W. and
Wise, Earle, J., concur.