Defendant was convicted of the crime of grand larceny in the second degrеe, and appeals from an order refusing a new trial. The essential allegations of the indictment were that in the night time of a specified day, and from and out оf the properly described room of one Robinson, defendant wrongfully, unlawfully, and feloniously took, stole, and carried away certain personal property belonging to the last-named person, and of the value of $25. At the proper time defendant entered a plea of autrefois acquit, and, for the purpose of detеrmining the issue presented by a stipulation as to the facts, the state demurred to thе plea. From the stipulation it appeared that defendant had been twice indicted by the same grand jury. One of these indictments was that above mentioned, whilе the other was for the crime of burglary in the first degree. A trial was had upon the indictment last mentioned, resulting in an acquittal, wherein testimony was introduced tending to show that аt the same time and place of the alleged burglary, defendant stole the рroperty described in the pending indictment for larceny. It also appeаred from the stipulation that the testimony was produced for the purpose of proving an intent to commit, and the commission of, the crime of
Section 393 of the Penal Code would seem to cover this case, were any statutory enactment necessary when the Code was adopted. This section provides that “a person who, having entered a building under such circumstances as to constitute burglary in any degrеe, commits any crime therein, is punishable therefor, as well as for the burglary, and mаy be prosecuted for each crime separately.” Although declared by statute, this is no new statement of the law applicable to the case at bar. See 2 Hale, P. C. 245; 1 Bish. Crim. Law, § 1062; State v. Warner,
From thе record before us it is not perfectly apparent that the objectiоn now urged that the sufficiency of the indictment, because it failed to allege that the personal property described therein was
Order affirmed.