State v. HaasState v. Haas
{¶1} Defendant-Appellant, Dustin Haas (“Haas” or “Appellant”), appeals the judgment of the Napoleon Municipal Court convicting him of operating a vehicle under the influence pursuant to
{¶2} In March 2010, Haas was cited for O.V.I. in violation of
{¶3} During the hearing on the motion to suppress, the following testimony was heard.
{¶5} On cross-examination, Deputy Wymer testified that the vehicle was stopped inside the business and/or residential district of McClure; that he cited Haas for violation of
{¶6} Alicia Reinbolt (“Alicia”) testified that on the night of March 16, 2010, she left an establishment and was walking on the sidewalk along State Route 65 in the town of McClure when she called Haas to pick her up. She testified that when Haas came to pick her up, he stopped on the side of the road, not in the lane of travel; that after she got in the car they went to a friend’s house; that when they pulled in the driveway, she saw the police parked behind them; that she attempted to exit the car, but that the police ordered her to get back in the car; and, that she did not feel free to leave due to the officer’s screaming.
{¶7} Haas testified that on the night of March 16, 2010, Alicia called him to pick her up; that in doing so, he pulled his car off to the right side of State Route 65; that after he pulled away, he went to his friend’s house; that he turned into the driveway, turned off the vehicle, and Alicia and another passenger began to approach the house; that the officer’s vehicle pulled in the driveway behind him prohibiting him from exiting the driveway; that the officers yelled at Alicia and the other passenger to get back in the vehicle; and, that he did not feel free to leave.
{¶9} The trial court entered judgment overruling defendant’s motion to suppress, finding that, based on the totality of the circumstances, “it was reasonable to view the conduct of the driver as being suspicious.” Judgment Entry, Docket No. 20. It is from this decision Haas appeals presenting the following assignment of error for our review.
Assignment of Error No. I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE PREJUDICE OF DEFENDANT/APPELLANT IN FAILING TO SUPPRESS THE OBSERVATIONS OF, AND EVIDENCE OBTAINED BY, THE POLICE AS A RESULT OF THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL STOP OF THE APPELLANT’S VEHICLE. THE STOP WAS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS THE OFFICER DID NOT HAVE A REASONABLE, ARTICULABLE BASIS TO STOP THE VEHICLE UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION.
{¶10} In his sole assignment of error, Haas asserts that the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress was unconstitutional according to the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution as the officer did not have a reasonable articulable suspicion to effect a stop. Specifically, because the evidence showed that Haas’s actions were lawful and could not have been unlawful, the search was unconstitutional. We agree.
{¶12} “Appellate review of a decision on a motion to suppress evidence presents mixed questions of law and fact.” State v. Dudli, 3d Dist. No. 3-05-13, 2006-Ohio-601, ¶ 12, citing United States v. Martinez, 949 F.2d 1117 (11th Cir. 1992). The trial court serves as the trier of fact and is the primary judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to the evidence presented. State v. Johnson, 137 Ohio App.3d 847, 850 (12th Dist. 2000). Therefore, when an appellate court reviews a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, it must accept the trial court’s findings of facts so long as they are supported by competent, credible evidence. State v. Roberts, 110 Ohio St.3d 71, 2006-Ohio-3665, ¶ 100, citing State v. Fanning, 1 Ohio St.3d 19, 20 (1982). The appellate court must then review the application of the law to the facts de novo. Roberts, citing State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, ¶ 8.
{¶14} At a suppression hearing, the State bears the burden of establishing that a warrantless search and seizure falls within one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement, Xenia v. Wallace, 37 Ohio St.3d 216 (1988), paragraph two of the syllabus; State v. Kessler, 53 Ohio St.2d 204, 207 (1978), and that it meets Fourth Amendment standards of reasonableness. Maumee v. Weisner, 87 Ohio St.3d 295, 297 (1999), citing 5 LaFave, Search and Seizure (3 Ed.1996), Section 11.2(b).
{¶16} Reasonable articulable suspicion is “‘specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the intrusion.’” Stephenson at ¶ 16, quoting Bobo at 178. In forming reasonable articulable suspicion, law enforcement officers may “draw on their own experience and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information available to them that ‘might well elude an untrained person.’” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273, 122 S.Ct. 744 (2002), quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-418, 101 S.Ct. 690 (1981).
{¶17} The Ohio Supreme Court has reiterated that, “[t]o justify a particular intrusion, the officer must demonstrate ‘specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.’” (Emphasis added.) State v. Mays, 119 Ohio St.3d 406, 408-409, 2008-Ohio-4539, ¶ 12, citing Terry. “The reasonable and articulable suspicion analysis is based on the collection of factors, not the individual factors themselves.” Id. at 409.
{¶18} Deputy Wymer, testified several times that the sole reason he stopped Haas was to investigate why he was stopped on the roadway. Hearing Tr., pp. 9, 11, 15. Specifically, during cross-examination, the following exchange occurred:
[Appellant’s Attorney]: And the sole reason you stopped him was because he was stopped on the roadway, and you believe he was in violation of 4511.66? * * *
[Deputy Wymer]: Yes. (Emphasis added.) Hearing Tr., p. 11.
In its judgment entry, however, the trial court focused on the following:
Deputy Wymer observed a vehicle stopped on a state highway in the early hours of the morning. After he passed the vehicle he observed it pull away so he could reasonably conclude is (sic) was not
disabled and it was occupied. The vehicle then pulled down a side street which caused the Deputy to make further inquiry. The [c]ourt would find that given the totality of the circumstances it was reasonable to view the conduct of the driver as being suspicious, thus allowing the stop under the reasoning of Callarman. Consequently, the [c]ourt would find that there was sufficient credible evidence for Deputy Wymer to have formed a reasonable articulable suspicion to justify the temporary stop of the Haas vehicle to further his investigation into possible violations of the law. Judgment Entry, August 12, 2010.
{¶19} Although it is proper for a trial court to examine the collection of factors rather than the individual factors, the trial court erred in considering factors that Deputy Wymer did not testify to as contributing to the basis for the stop. The trial court stated in its entry that “[t]he vehicle then pulled down a side street which caused the Deputy to make further inquiry.” The deputy made no such statement, and did not indicate that any conduct, other than the stopping on the street, had caused him any concern. Since the record reflects that Deputy Wymer decided to initiate the stop solely based on observing Haas parked on the roadway, the additional factors such as Haas’s driving away from the scene, turning down a side street, and the time of morning did not influence Deputy Wymer’s suspicion. The trial court erred in considering these factors in evaluating the reasonableness of the officer’s stop. See State v. Hageman, 180 Ohio App.3d 640, 644-645, 2009-Ohio-169, ¶ 19-22 (6th Dist.).
{¶21} Under the circumstances of this case, and limiting our consideration to the matters articulated by the deputy, the proper analysis for determining whether the officer had a reasonable articulable suspicion to effectuate the traffic stop is to determine whether the alleged stopping on the roadway, alone, satisfied the probable cause and/or the reasonable articulable suspicion standard.
{¶22}
Upon any highway outside a business or residence district no person shall stop, park, or leave standing any vehicle, whether attended or unattended, upon the paved or main traveled part of the highway if it is practicable to stop, park, or so leave such vehicle off the paved or main traveled part of said highway. (Emphasis added.).
R.C. 4511.66 .
{¶23} Deputy Wymer testified that he was not familiar with this section of the code. Moreover, the parties stipulated, and the officer testified, that Haas’s vehicle was not stopped outside a business or residential district as required by the statute. The issue we must address, then, is whether an officer can have a reasonable articulable suspicion that the individual is engaging in criminal
{¶24} This court has previously held that an officer lacked reasonable articulable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop when the defendant clearly did not violate either of two statutes which the officer testified provided the basis for his suspicion. State v. Young, 3d Dist. No. 13-03-52, 2004-Ohio-540. In Young, a Tiffin police officer stopped Linda Young after he observed her make a right turn from a driveway into the left lane of travel on East Market Street. He also testified that Young made an improper lane change by failing to signal before driving into the left lane. The officer testified that he stopped Young for improperly turning onto East Market Street. Young contended that she violated neither
{¶25} The First District has also held that a stop is unconstitutional where the defendant’s conduct does not violate the law the officer cites as providing the
{¶26} The Sixth District held that the officer did not have a reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity to effectuate a traffic stop when the defendant’s conduct did not violate the statute which provided the basis for the officer’s suspicion. In State v. Hageman, Officer Viers observed Hageman turn left onto High Street into the curb, rather than the inside, lane. 180 Ohio App.3d 640, 2009-Ohio-169 (6th Dist.). Viers stated that the basis for the traffic stop was the improper turn. Because both the Bryan Municipal Ordinance and
{¶27} In light of the relevant case law from this and other districts, we hold that when a defendant’s conduct does not facially violate the traffic statute which provides the sole basis for the officer’s alleged reasonable articulable suspicion, the stop is unconstitutional.
{¶28} In support of its decision, the trial court cites cases which stand for the proposition that an officer’s reasonable articulable suspicion is not negated by the failure to ultimately establish that a traffic offense occurred and to attain a conviction. Stated in other words, courts have held that an officer’s reasonable articulable suspicion does not require proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant has satisfied every element of the offense,1 or that an officer adequately predict the outcome of an arrestee’s legal defenses or ultimate conviction.2 We agree with this proposition. We assert, however, that there is a difference between proving elements beyond a reasonable doubt and making a prima facie showing that the defendant’s conduct has violated the elements of a statute on its face. In
{¶29} The trial court cites Bowling Green v. Godwin, 110 Ohio St.3d 58, 2006-Ohio-3563. In that case, the issue addressed by the Ohio Supreme Court was whether a defendant’s failure to yield to a traffic-control device that lacked the statutorily required authorization could serve as the basis for a traffic stop. Ultimately, the Supreme Court held in the affirmative as “[n]othing in the record . . . justifies the conclusion that an objectively reasonable officer would have had any reason to doubt their enforceability.” Id. at ¶ 17. Because the traffic sign was not irregular in size, height, placement, visibility, or distance, there was no way for the officer to have known that the traffic sign was not authorized by city council and therefore no reason for the officer to doubt the sign’s validity. Under the facts of that case, the court reasoned that “probable cause does not require the officer to correctly predict that a conviction will result.” Id. at ¶ 15.
{¶30} The trial court sub judice also relied on State v. Zervos, 6th Dist. No. L-09-1249, 2010-Ohio-1998, which relies heavily on Godwin. In that case, the officer stopped Zervos for what the officer believed was an illegal U-turn. Zervos argued that there was no probable cause as the requirement in the U-turn statute that no U-turn be made if the vehicle cannot be seen by another approaching
{¶31} Primarily, Godwin resolved a very limited issue regarding the violation of a traffic-control device that lacked proper authorization. This issue was grounded in whether the officer had probable cause to effectuate a stop when he had “no reason to doubt [the sign’s] enforceability.” Godwin at ¶17. In Godwin, everything within the purview of the officer at the time of the stop indicated that Godwin had violated a traffic-control device. Therefore, there was probable cause to effectuate a stop. The issue in Zervos, however, was whether an officer had probable cause to effectuate a stop when Zervos’ conduct simply did not violate the statute which provided the basis for the stop. Everything within the officer’s purview at the time of the stop indicated that Zervos had in fact not violated a traffic law. The dissent noted that “[b]ecause there was no offense and there was no set of facts to prompt a reasonable suspicion that an offense had occurred, there was no reason to stop appellant‘s vehicle.” Id. at ¶ 34. The
{¶32} Lastly, the trial court relied on the Ninth Circuit’s analysis in United States v. Wallace, 213 F.3d 1216 (9th Cir. 2000). In that case, the court reasoned that law enforcement officers, when forming their probable cause, are “not taking the bar exam.” Id. at 1220. The Ninth Circuit emphasized that the issue is not how well the officer understood California laws, but whether he had probable cause to believe that what he observed was a violation of the law. This analysis simply begs the question, how can a law enforcement officer reasonably believe conduct violates a law if he does not understand or have a working knowledge of the law? Which begs another question, to what standard of knowledge of the laws they are enforcing should we hold our law enforcement officers before they can infringe upon one’s constitutional right to be free from warrantless seizures?
{¶33} The State argues that it would be unreasonable to expect our law enforcement officers to know the details of every traffic offense and to make an accurate determination of the statute’s applicability. Such requirements, the State explains, would hamper law enforcement to the extent it would cause “paralysis by analysis.” We aver that knowledge of the traffic laws is the very essence of a patrol officer’s job. To require any less than an accurate, working knowledge of the traffic offenses and to fail to ensure that the one being seized at least
{¶34} This is the unfortunate scenario in the present case. Officer Wymer unconstitutionally seized Haas under the suspicion that Haas violated a law. However, the officer’s own testimony revealed that he did not know the requirements of this very law. Haas was not and could not have been engaged in the specific criminal activity testified to by Officer Wymer. Yet he was seized and arrested due to the officer’s lack of knowledge of the very law he was enforcing.
{¶35} In light of the above, we find that, in analyzing the officer’s stated reasonable articulable suspicion, the trial court erred by considering factors that Deputy Wymer did not consider at the time he initiated the traffic stop. Further, because Haas neither violated nor could have violated
Judgment Reversed
WILLAMOWSKI, J., concurs.
/jlr
{¶36} In reversing the trial court, the majority goes far beyond the simple totality of the circumstances analysis necessary to decide this case, and instead, bases its decision upon its own “unique” interpretations regarding the appellate review of Fourth Amendment cases, police practices in general and the proper role of the arresting officer and the trial judge at a suppression hearing. I respectfully dissent in order to emphasize that I do not concur with the majority opinion as to any of these interpretations.
{¶37} In this case, the officer first observed the defendant’s vehicle to be stopped with its lights on in the southbound lane of two lane State Route 65 within the village of McClure at 2:30 a.m. While the officer was passing by and turning his patrol car around to approach the defendant’s vehicle, the officer observed a person outside the defendant’s vehicle get into the vehicle, saw the vehicle pull away, quickly turn onto a side street and immediately pull into the first available driveway, all before the officer had any opportunity to actually make a law enforcement stop or even activate his overhead lights.
{¶38} In fact, the events apparently happened so quickly that the officer following in his patrol car actually overshot the first driveway and had to proceed further down the street, turn around in another driveway and drive back to the first driveway. As the officer pulled his vehicle in front of the first driveway, he then
{¶39} Assuming this was even a “law enforcement” stop, the majority cites settled authority establishing that our determination of reasonable, articulable, suspicion in these cases is properly based upon the totality of the circumstances within the police officer’s knowledge. However, by either disregarding or ineffectively attempting to distinguish this authority, the majority elects instead to base its decision on the rather bizarre ruling that a court’s evaluation of a Terry stop is not to be based upon all of the facts and circumstances that the officer observed prior to the stop, but only upon those facts which the officer identifies as the primary reason for initiating the investigation.
{¶40} Thus, the majority notes that the officer in this case testified to at least five different observations of the defendant’s conduct. These included seeing the defendant’s vehicle stopped in the roadway with its lights on, at 2:30 a.m., suddenly pulling away, quickly turning onto a side street, and immediately pulling into a driveway. Not mentioned was the additional observation of seeing someone outside the vehicle getting into the car while it was stopped in the roadway as the officer first drove by.
{¶42} In other words, according to the majority, if an officer testifies into the record as to fifty separate circumstances he personally observed, which in totality clearly establish a reasonable articulable suspicion, but then testifies that one of those circumstances was the primary reason he initiated the stop, the trial court (and the appellate court) are precluded from considering the remaining forty-nine circumstances testified to by the officer in ruling on the constitutionality of the stop. And if the one circumstance named by the officer does not, by itself, establish a specific statutory violation of law, the trial court is compelled to invalidate the stop, without considering anything else the officer may have observed prior to initiating the stop.
{¶43} More significantly perhaps, the majority effectively holds that any trial judge conducting a suppression hearing, who is charged with making the
{¶44} In addition to being absurd on its face, the majority holding directly challenges the constitutional and statutory authority of trial courts and appellate courts in this state to consider and review all of the evidence properly before it in evaluating Fourth Amendment issues in criminal cases.
{¶45} Of course, the ruling of the majority that we must exclusively focus upon the officer’s stated reasons, motives or personal state of mind instead of the objective facts observed by the officer in Fourth Amendment cases, also happens to conflict with numerous case decisions from other courts cited in the majority opinion and elsewhere. See for example, State v. Jamison 2nd Dist. No. 19357, 2003-Ohio-907, ¶ 13. (Legal issues involved in a Fourth Amendment challenge are not controlled by the particular reasons given by a law enforcement officer for why he engaged in the particular intrusion involved.); State v. Crenshaw, 6th Dist.No. L-02-1337, 2003-Ohio-4860, ¶ 11. State v. Runyon, 12th Dist.No. CA2010-05-032, 2011-Ohio-263, ¶ 18 (Officer’s underlying subjective intent or motivation for stopping a vehicle does not invalidate an otherwise valid traffic
{¶46} But, the majority does not stop there. The majority also reverses this case because it finds that the officer failed to prove a valid violation of a criminal statute in order to justify investigating a car stopped in the public roadway at 2:30 a.m. All because the officer, who did have legitimate safety concerns as well as the correct traffic offense applicable to this situation in mind, was not aware of the exact physical boundaries of the village which created an exception to the offense.
{¶47} Again, the majority seems to acknowledge that this is a Terry situation involving a temporary investigative detention by the officer. The majority also seems to acknowledge in principle, the settled authority establishing that Terry does not require establishing probable cause that a criminal statute has been violated, but only that the officer establish a reasonable, articulable suspicion
{¶48} I personally concur with the trial judge that the totality of these circumstances warranted the limited investigative detention of the officer in this case. Thus, I believe the assignment of error should be overruled and the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed. But whether we affirm or reverse, our decision should be based upon the proper standards of appellate review governing Fourth Amendment issues.