State v. GwinnState v. Gwinn
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Susan Gwinn, appeals from a judgment of conviction and sentence entered by the Athens County Court of Common Pleas. Because the trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction to enter judgment and because the judgment is not against the manifest weight of the evidence, we affirm.
Factual Background
{¶ 2} Gwinn ran for Athens County Prosecuting Attorney in the March 2008 Democratic primary against C. David Warren, the incumbent county prosecutor. On February 8, 2008, Gwinn received a wire transfer into her personal checking account at the Hocking Valley Bank in the amount of $7,500 from Gregory Kenley, a personal friend. The balance in Gwinn‘s personal checking account prior to the February 8 wire transfer was $975.94. That same day, Gwinn wrote a check from her personal checking account in the amount of $5,000 made payable to her campaign committee.
{¶ 3} Also, on February 8 and February 13, 2008, Gwinn‘s brother, Daniel Gwinn, purchased 24 separate money orders from four different vendors, all payable to Gwinn. These money orders totaled $20,000. Gwinn endorsed all the money orders and the funds were deposited into her personal checking account between February 11 and February 21, 2008.
{¶ 4} Between February 14 and 27, 2008, Gwinn wrote six additional checks drawn on her personal checking account payable to her campaign committee.
{¶ 5} The primary election took place on March 4, 2008. Warren won the primary election. Gwinn repaid Kenley $7,500 on March 7, 2008.
{¶ 6} Gwinn‘s campaign committee filed a pre-primary campaign-finance report with the Athens County Board of Elections on February 21, 2008. The report listed no outstanding loans to the campaign committee. Nor did the report list Kenley or Daniel Gwinn as contributors. On April 10, 2008, Gwinn‘s campaign committee filed a post-primary campaign-finance report with the Athens County Board of Elections. The report represented that Gwinn personally made a $27,000 loan to her campaign committee. Again, neither Kenley nor Daniel Gwinn were listed as contributors.
Procedural History
{¶ 7} In the late summer of 2008, David Yost, the Delaware County Prosecutor, was appointed special prosecutor for Athens County. Yost conducted an investigation of the money transfers described above and the campaign-finance reports filed by Gwinn‘s campaign committee. Following the investigation, Yost filed a verified complaint with the Ohio Elections Commission (“OEC“) alleging that Gwinn had violated Ohio election laws by knowingly concealing and/or misrepresenting contributions to her campaign committee in her pre-primary and post-primary campaign-finance reports. The allegations in the verified complaint focused on Gwinn‘s failure to list Kenley and David Gwinn as donors to her campaign committee and her representation that she personally loaned her campaign committee $27,000.
{¶ 8} Gwinn contended that Kenley and David Gwinn loaned money to her and that she, in turn, loaned money to her campaign committee. Because her post-primary campaign-finance report listed her personal loan to her campaign committee, Gwinn argued that the reports did not conceal or misrepresent any financial information. She also alleged that she repaid Kenley in full shortly after the primary election and that she partially repaid her brother soon after Yost began his investigation.
{¶ 9} Following a hearing, the OEC found that Gwinn violated
{¶ 10} Shortly thereafter, Gwinn filed a motion for injunction pending appeal with the Tenth District Court of Appeals. Gwinn sought an order enjoining Yost from impaneling a grand jury or taking any other action to prosecute her pursuant to the OEC‘s referral during the pendency of the
{¶ 11} Yost pursued Gwinn‘s prosecution in Athens County. A grand jury indicted Gwinn on two counts of theft in office, two counts of unauthorized use of property, two counts of falsification, one count of money laundering, and two counts of bribery. The case was tried to the court. The court found Gwinn guilty of the falsification counts but acquitted her of the remaining counts.1
{¶ 12} Thereafter, the Tenth District Court of Appeals reversed the Franklin County trial court‘s dismissal of Gwinn‘s
{¶ 13} On January 25, 2010, Gwinn filed a motion for arrest of judgment and a motion for acquittal in the Athens County trial court. The Athens County trial court denied both motions on March 1, 2010, and Gwinn appealed to this court. Gwinn filed a renewed motion for arrest of judgment and/or motion for new trial shortly after the Tenth District Court of Appeals reversed the Franklin County trial court‘s decision in the
{¶ 14} Gwinn appeals assigning the following errors:
- The Trial Court Did Not have Subject Matter Jurisdiction regarding counts 5 and 6 of the Indictment in the case of State of Ohio v. Susan Gwinn, Case No. 09CR0335 filed in the Athens County Common Pleas Court.
- The Judgment of the trial court is against the manifest weight of the evidence.
{¶ 15} In her first assignment of error, Gwinn contends that the Athens County trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the two falsification counts against her. We disagree.
{¶ 16} “‘Subject-matter jurisdiction of a court connotes the power to hear and decide a case upon its merits.‘” State ex rel. Ohio Democratic Party v. Blackwell, 111 Ohio St.3d 246, 2006-Ohio-5202, 855 N.E.2d 1188, ¶ 8, quoting Morrison v. Steiner (1972), 32 Ohio St.2d 86, 290 N.E.2d 841, paragraph one of the syllabus. Subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law that we review de novo. Eicher v. Eicher, 4th Dist. No. 09CA34, 2010-Ohio-3784, 2010 WL 3194912, ¶ 10.
{¶ 17} Essentially, Gwinn makes three arguments in support of her first assignment of error. We find all three arguments unpersuasive.
{¶ 18} Gwinn first argues that the Athens County trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the counts premised on the alleged election-law violations because exclusive jurisdiction rested with the OEC. Gwinn is correct that the OEC has exclusive initial jurisdiction over the alleged election-law violations.
{¶ 19}
No prosecution shall commence for a violation of a provision in
sections 3517.08 to3517.13 ,3517.17 ,3517.18 ,3517.20 to3517.22 ,3599.03 , or3599.031 of the Revised Code unless a complaint has been filed with the commission under this section and all proceedings of the commission or a panel of the commission, * * * as appropriate, are completed.
{¶ 20} Yost filed a complaint with the OEC against Susan Gwinn and her campaign committee for the alleged election-law violations as required by
{¶ 21} Because the OEC made a final determination and referred the matter for prosecution, the Athens County trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction to decide the alleged violations.
{¶ 22} In her second argument, Gwinn contends that the Athens County trial court lacked “primary subject-matter jurisdiction” over the falsification counts because the matter was already being reviewed by the Tenth District Court of Appeals. Although Gwinn filed her
{¶ 23} The jurisdictional-priority rule provides that “‘[a]s between [state] courts of concurrent jurisdiction, the tribunal whose power is first invoked by the institution of proper proceedings acquires jurisdiction, to the exclusion of all tribunals, to adjudicate upon the whole issue and to settle the rights of the parties.‘” State ex rel. Dannaher v. Crawford (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 391, 393, 678 N.E.2d 549, quoting State ex rel. Racing Guild of Ohio, Loc. 304, Serv. Emps. Internatl. Union, AFL-CIO, CLC v. Morgan (1985), 17 Ohio St.3d 54, 56, 476 N.E.2d 1060. The jurisdictional-priority rule does not apply here, because the Tenth District Court of Appeals and the Athens County trial court do not share concurrent jurisdiction. The Tenth District Court of Appeals’ jurisdiction derived from
{¶ 24} Lastly, Gwinn argues that the Athens County trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the falsification counts premised on
{¶ 25} As previously noted, the OEC determined that Gwinn violated
{¶ 26} In oral argument, counsel for Gwinn argued that the Athens County trial court erred by permitting the state to prosecute Gwinn pursuant to
{¶ 27} For the foregoing reasons, we find that the Athens County trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the falsification counts asserted under
Second Assignment of Error
{¶ 28} Gwinn contends in her second assignment of error that the judgment is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Again, we disagree.
{¶ 29} “‘When an appellate court considers a claim that a conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence, the court must dutifully examine the entire record, weigh the evidence, and consider the credibility of witnesses. The reviewing court must bear in mind, however, that credibility generally is an issue for the trier of fact to resolve.‘” State v. Tyler, 4th Dist. No. 10CA3183, 2011-Ohio-3937, 2011 WL 3477172, ¶ 43, quoting State v. Puckett, 191 Ohio App.3d 747, 2010-Ohio-6597, 947 N.E.2d 730, ¶ 32. “‘If the prosecution presented substantial evidence upon which the trier of fact reasonably could conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the essential elements of the offense had been established, the judgment of conviction is not against the manifest weight of the evidence.‘” Id., quoting Puckett at ¶ 33. We will reverse a conviction only in the exceptional case where the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction and it appears that the fact-finder, when resolving conflicts in the evidence, “‘clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.‘” Id. at ¶ 43, quoting State v. Thompkins (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387, 678 N.E.2d 541.
(A) No person shall knowingly make a false statement, or knowingly swear or affirm the truth of a false statement previously made, when any of the following applies:
* * *
(7) The statement is in writing on or in connection with a report or return that is required or authorized by law.
As applied to this case,
{¶ 31} Here, the third element of the offense is not disputed.
{¶ 32} Gwinn asserts that the funds she received from Kenley and her brother were personal loans, not loans or contributions to her campaign committee. Gwinn‘s assertions must be examined in the context of the definitions and requirements contained in
{¶ 33}
{¶ 34} There is also substantial evidence that Gwinn acted “knowingly.” “A person acts knowingly, regardless of his purpose, when he is aware that his conduct will probably cause a certain result or will probably be of a certain nature.”
{¶ 35} Because the record reflects substantial evidence upon which the trial court could conclude that the state proved the essential elements of
{¶ 36} Having overruled Gwinn‘s two assignments of error, we affirm the judgment of the Athens County Court of Common Pleas.
Judgment affirmed.
Bryant and Sadler, JJ., concur.
Peggy L. Bryant, William A. Klatt, and Lisa L. Sadler, JJ., of the Tenth Appellate District, sitting by assignment.