{¶ 2} In his sole assignment of error, Gutierrez contends the trial court erred in overruling his motion to suppress. In support, he claims a traffic stop that led to his arrest was made without a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity. For the reasons set forth below, we find this argument to be without merit. Accordingly, the trial court's judgment will be affirmed.
{¶ 4} Officer Williams approached the Honda's driver-side window and encountered Gutierrez. The officer immediately detected the odor of alcohol and noticed that Gutierrez's eyes were blood-shot and glassy. When Gutierrez admitted having consumed two beers, Officer Williams noted that his speech was slurred and slow. Gutierrez then agreed to perform several field-sobriety tests. In Officer Williams' opinion, Gutierrez performed poorly on these tests. Based on the foregoing facts, Officer Williams arrested Gutierrez for driving under the influence of alcohol. In addition to citing Gutierrez for the DUI offense, Officer Williams also cited him for stopping in the roadway in violation of R.C. §
{¶ 5} Gutierrez subsequently filed a motion to suppress, arguing, inter alia, that Officer Williams lacked a reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop him. The matter proceeded to a hearing before a magistrate, who sustained Gutierrez's motion. On objections from the State, the trial court rejected the magistrate's decision and found that Officer Williams had a reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop Gutierrez for violating R.C. §
{¶ 7} Upon review, we find Gutierrez's assignment of error to be unpersuasive. It is well settled that "where an officer has an articulable reasonable suspicion * * * to stop a motorist for any criminal violation, including a minor traffic violation, the stop is constitutionally valid[.]" Dayton v. Erickson (1996),
{¶ 8} The Eleventh District's decision in Echols is distinguishable insofar as the police officer in that case was not following the stopped motorist. Rather, the officer and the motorist approached an intersection from opposite directions, and the motorist stopped for several seconds and voluntarily yielded the right-of-way to allow the officer to make a left-hand turn. As the trial court recognized, the stopped motorist in Echols did not impede or block the normal movement of traffic to the same degree that Gutierrez did in the present case when he stopped directly in front of Officer Williams. In any event, we are not bound by the Eleventh District's ruling in Echols. Based on our belief that Officer Williams possessed specific articulable facts supporting a reasonable suspicion that Gutierrez had violated the slow-speed statute, we overrule the assignment of error.
Grady, J., and Young, J., concur.
