State v. GutierrezState v. Gutierrez
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- C. Shannon Bacon, Michael E. Vigil, David K. Thomson, Briana H. Zamora, Bryan P. Biedscheid
BACON, Chief Justice.
{1} This consolidated case requires us to determine whether the Legislature intended for violations of
{2} The Court of Appeals first concluded that the Legislature intended for violations of Subsections (A)-(C) to be punishable as crimes, relying on its plain-meaning statutory interpretation of the GCA’s penalty provision,
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The Relevant Statutes
{3} We begin by providing the relevant sections of the GCA. We then summarize the underlying district court cases and the Court of Appeals’ consolidated opinion.
{4}
Ethical principles of public service; certain official acts prohibited; penalty. A. A legislator or public officer or еmployee shall treat the legislator’s or public officer’s or employee’s government position as a public trust. The legislator or public officer or employee shall use the powers and resources of public office only to advance the public interest and not to obtain personal benefits or pursue private interests.
B. Legislators and public officers and employees shall conduct themselves in a manner that justifies the confidence placed in them by the people, at all times maintaining the integrity and discharging ethically the high responsibilities of public service.
C. Full disclosure of real or potential conflicts of interest shall be a guiding principle for determining appropriate conduct. At all times, reasonable efforts shall be made to avoid undue influence and abuse of office in public service.
D. No legislator or public officer or employee may request or receive, and no person may offer a legislator or public officer or employee, any money, thing of value or promise thereof that is conditioned upon or given in exchange for promised performanсe of an official act. Any person who knowingly and willfully violates the provisions of this subsection is guilty of a fourth degree felony and shall be sentenced pursuant to the provisions of [
NMSA 1978, ]Section 31-18-15 [(2007, amended 2022)].
{5}
Unless specified otherwise in the [GCA], any person who knowingly and willfully violates any of the provisions of [the GCA] is guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be punished by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000) or by imprisonment for not more than one year or both. Nothing in the [GCA] shall preclude criminal prosecution for bribery or other provisions of law set forth in the constitution of New Mexico or by statute.
B. The Underlying Cases in the District Courts
{6} We restate herе the Court of Appeals’ succinct recitation of the facts in the four separate and unrelated underlying cases:
[Petitioner] Gutierrez
The State charged [Petitioner] Gutierrez with violating [S]ection[] 10-16-3(A)-(C) of the GCA, alleging he pursued an unwanted sexual relationship with one of his employees during the course of his work as county treasurer by repeatedly commenting on her physical appearance and offering to give her money and use his authority as treasurer to expunge a prior disciplinary write-up in exchange for sex. [Petitioner] Gutierrez filed three motions, which included a motion in limine, а motion to dismiss, and a motion pursuant to State v. Foulenfont, 1995-NMCA-028, ¶ 6, 119 N.M. 788, 895 P.2d 1329 (authorizing dismissal of a case in lieu of an evidentiary hearing or a trial on the merits where a case raises a purely legal issue). These motions made largely the same assertion—that the provisions of [S]ection[] 10-16-3(A)-(C) do not define or create criminal offenses, but instead are ethical principles intended to guide the behavior of public officials.
The district court granted [Petitioner] Gutierrez’s motions and dismissed the indictment, reasoning that violations of [S]ection[] 10-16-3(A)-(C) were not crimes but “ethical considerations,” and that the grand jury indictment, therefore, “failed to allege the commission of a criminal offense.”
Gutierrez, 2020-NMCA-045, ¶¶ 4, 5.
[Petitioner] Estevez
The State charged [Petitioner] Estevez, in relevant part, with violating [S]ection[] 10-16-3(A) and (B) of the GCA, alleging she attempted to use her position as district attorney to manipulate or intimidate officers who were investigating allegations that she improperly used a state vehicle for personal use. [Petitioner] Estevez filed a motion to dismiss these counts, arguing the GCA was unconstitutionally vague. The district court concluded that although
Section 10-16-3 establishes “advisory guideposts setting forth standards of ethical conduct[,]” insurmountable ambiguities existed regarding its intended scope and the applicability ofSection 10-16-17 ’s provision for criminal penalties. As a result, the district court applied the rule of lenity and dismissed the charges.Gutierrez, 2020-NMCA-045, ¶ 6 (sixth alteration in original).
[Petitioner] Johnston
The State charged [Petitioner] Johnston, in relevant part, with violating [S]ection[] 10-16-3(A) and (B) based on allegations that, while acting in her capacity as a magistrate judge, [Petitioner] Johnston unlawfully recorded the communications of her colleagues and coworkers in secure areas within the Aztec Magistrate Court Building. [Petitioner] Johnston filed a motion to dismiss these charges, arguing that the subsections at issue sеt forth “aspirational provisions” rather than criminal offenses and are unconstitutionally vague. The district court dismissed the charges, concluding that even if Subsections (A) and (B) provided for criminal offenses, they were nevertheless void for vagueness.
Gutierrez, 2020-NMCA-045, ¶ 7.
[Cross-Respondent] Padilla
The State charged [Cross-Respondent] Padilla, in relevant part, with violating [S]ection[] 10-16-3(B) and (C), alleging she used her position as the Secretary of the New Mexico Taxation and Revenue Department to access the tax records of the accounting firm at which she worked prior to her appointment as well as the recоrds of her former clients. [Cross-Respondent] Padilla filed motions to dismiss these charges, arguing the subsections at issue were unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. The district court granted [Cross-Respondent] Padilla’s motions and dismissed these charges.
C. The Court of Appeals’ Consolidated Opinion
{7} In all four cases, the State appealed the district courts’ orders dismissing the charges brought under Subsections (A)-(C). Gutierrez, 2020-NMCA-045, ¶ 2. Though the district courts dismissed those charges on different grounds, the Court of Appeals consolidated based on the identical issues shared by the four cases. Id.
{8} As we recount below, being central to our determination, the Court of Appeals first conducted statutory interpretation as to whether violations of Subsections (A)-(C) of
{10} In its statutory interpretation, the Court of Appeals began by recognizing that if the plain language of a statute renders its “‘meaning . . . truly clear—not vague, uncertain, ambiguous, or otherwise doubtful—it is of course the responsibility of the judiciary to apply the statute as written.’” Id. ¶ 12 (quoting State ex rel. Helman v. Gallegos, 1994-NMSC-023, ¶ 22, 117 N.M. 346, 871 P.2d 1352). The Court stated that “[w]e therefore first consider whether the language of the
{11} The Court of Appeals then reviewed the plain language of
{12} Noting the parties’ focus on
{13} The Court of Appeals next considered Petitioners’ and Counter-Respondent’s arguments that the heading of
{14} The Court of Appeals rejected these arguments regarding the heading of
{15} The Court of Appeals also considered Cross-Respondent Padilla’s argument that absurdity would result from a strict application of the plain language of
may mask a host of reasons why a statute, apparently clear and unambiguous on its face, may for one reason or another give rise to legitimate (i.e., nonfrivolous) differences of opinion concerning the statute’s meaning. In such a case, it can rarely be said that the legislation is indeed free from all ambiguity and is crystal clear in its meaning.
Id. ¶ 20 (quoting Helman, 1994-NMSC-023, ¶ 23) (internal quotation marks omitted).
{16} Notwithstanding Helman’s warning, the Court of Appeals hewed to its plain-meaning construction of
{17} The Court of Appeals’ “adherence to the plain[-]meaning rule” was bolstered by the legislative history of
{18} The Court of Appeals concluded its statutory interpretation analysis by rejecting arguments that the penalty for a violation of Subsection (C) is limited to civil sanctions or penalties and that the rule of lenity should apply. Gutierrez, 2020-NMCA-045, ¶¶ 25-27. The Court rejected the first argument because no relevant provision in the GCA “limits the discretion of the attorney general or a district attorney to prosecute a knowing and willful violation of the GCA.” Id. ¶ 26. In rejecting the second argument, the Court again applied its plain-meaning construction of
{19} As discussed, the Court of Appeals reversed the district courts’ dismissals of the counts charging Petitioners under Subsection (A), remanded for reinstatement of thоse counts, and affirmed the dismissals of the counts charging Petitioners and Cross-Respondent under Subsections (B) and (C) based on those provisions being unconstitutionally vague. Gutierrez, 2020-NMCA-045, ¶¶ 38, 42, 43.
D. Certiorari Granted
{20} Following the consolidated appeal, Petitioners timely petitioned this Court for certiorari regarding the Court of Appeals’ reinstatement of their charges under Subsection (A). Concurrently, the State timely petitioned for certiorari regarding the Court of Appeals’ holding that Subsections (B) and (C) are unconstitutionally vague. This Court granted certiorari on the petitions and cross-petition and consolidated the cаses.
II. DISCUSSION
{21} The first issue raised in this appeal is one of statutory interpretation: whether the Legislature intended for violations of Subsections (A)-(C) of
A. Standard of Review for Statutory Interpretation
{22} “We review questions of statutory . . . interpretation de novo.” State v. Radosevich, 2018-NMSC-028, ¶ 8, 419 P.3d 176 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “The principal command of statutory construction is that the court should determine and effectuate the intent of the [L]egislature, using the plain language of the stаtute as the primary indicator of legislative intent.” State v. Willie, 2009-NMSC-037, ¶ 9, 146 N.M. 481, 212 P.3d 369 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see State v. Davis, 2003-NMSC-022, ¶ 6, 134 N.M. 172, 74 P.3d 1064 (“Under the plain[-]meaning rule statutes are to be given effect as written without room for construction.”). “If statutory language is doubtful, ambiguous, or an adherence to the literal use of the words would lead to injustice, absurdity, or contradiction, the court should reject the plain[-]meaning rule in favor of construing the statute according to its obvious spirit or reason.” State v. Adams, 2022-NMSC-008, ¶ 16, 503 P.3d 1130 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We have said that
[w]hile . . . one part of [a] statute may appear absolutely clear and certain to the point of mathematical precision, lurking in another part of the enactment, or even in the same section, or in the history and background of the legislation, or in an apparent conflict between the statutory wording and the overall legislative intent, there may be one or more provisions giving rise to genuine uncertainty as to what the [L]egislature was trying to accomplish. In such a case, it is part of the essence of judicial responsibility to search for and effectuate the legislative intent—the purpose or object—underlying the statute.
{23} “Statutes that define criminal conduct should bе strictly construed and doubts regarding their interpretation or construction should be resolved in favor of lenity.” State v. Anaya, 1997-NMSC-010, ¶ 30, 123 N.M. 14, 933 P.2d 223.
B. Analysis
1. The plain language of Subsections (A)-(C) demonstrates legislative intent as expressions of ethical principles for the GCA rather than as criminal statutes within the scope of Section 10-16-17
{24} Petitioners and Cross-Respondent make multiple arguments supporting the contention that the Legislature did not intend for criminal charges to result from violations of the subsections under which they are charged. They assert that the Legislature understood that the text of Subsections (A)-(C) constitutes the aspirаtional language of ethical principles rather than elements of criminal statutes. They also argue that the Legislature understood that absurdity would result from a strict application of
{25} Quoting
{26} The core question before this Court is whether the Legislature intended for
{27} We agree with our Court of Appeals that the plain language оf
{28} The importance of fully considering the texts of related provisions is demonstrated in State v. Padilla, 2008-NMSC-006, 143 N.M. 310, 176 P.3d 299, which turned on the relationship of the aggravated fleeing statute,
{29} In Padilla, we considered “whether the Legislature intended the phrase ‘in accordance with the provisions of the LESPA’ found at the end of the aggravated fleeing statute to be an essential element of the crime of aggravated fleeing.” 2008-NMSC-006, ¶ 8 (brackets omitted). Under a plain-meaning analysis of the aggravated fleeing statute alone—without also analyzing the LESPA—the Padilla Court could have concluded that “the Legislature intended the phrase [in question] to be an essential element, . . . and [thus] a pursuit not [being] ‘in accordance’ with the LESPA would nullify an otherwise valid arrest and prosecution for aggravated fleeing.” Id. Such a law would be unusual in conditioning criminal liability on “the officer’s conduct in purs[u]ing a suspect.” Id. ¶ 23. The Padilla Court recognized the Legislature’s authority to enact such a law, but nonetheless analyzed the LESPA as well, since “we would be remiss in our duties of judicial review if we did not demand a high level of confidence before concluding that the Legislature intended such an unorthodox result.” Id.
{30} Under that further analysis, the Padilla Court found that the text of the LESPA “included an enforcement mechanism within . . . itself” that represented the Legislature’s affirmative choice of an effective means to ensure compliance. Id. ¶¶ 25, 28. That internal enforcement mechanism, the Padilla Court concluded, supported that “[t]he Legislature did not intend to create an additional enforcement mechanism for compliance” via the aggravated fleeing statute. Id. ¶ 33 (emphasis added). Full consideration of the LESPA thus led this Court to hold that “thе Legislature did not intend the phrase [in question] to be an essential element of the crime” of aggravated fleeing. Id. Padilla implicitly counsels that full consideration of the text of each provision is warranted where the analysis turns on the relationship of those provisions.
{31} Here, we similarly would be remiss if we did not fully consider the text of Subsections (A)-(C) before concluding that the Legislature intended to criminalize those provisions. Applying Helman, the appearance of
{32} Accordingly, we analyze the plain language of Subsections (A)-(C) below, considering the nature of criminal statutes. As a general principle, criminal statutes “declare[] what conduct is criminal and prescribe[] the punishment to be imposed for such conduct.” 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Crim. L. § 1.2, at 11 (3d ed. 2018). “Typically, criminal liability is premised upon a defendant’s culpable conduct, the actus reus, coupled with a defendant’s culpable mental state, the mens rea.” Padilla, 2008-NMSC-006, ¶ 12 (citing 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Crim. L. § 1.2, at 11 (2d ed. 2003)). The actus reus is the “wrongful deed” or “forbidden act” that is defined by a criminal statute. Actus reus, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). A basic characteristic of substantive criminal law is that a statute “will spell out what act . . . is required for its commission.” 1 LaFave, supra, § 1.2 at 11-12 (3d ed.).
{33} Under these principles, the plain language of Subsections (A)-(C) does not express conduct that would constitute a criminal
{34} Subsection (B) requires that a legislator or public officer or employee shall “at all times maintain[] the integrity and discharg[e] ethically the high responsibilities of public service.” Subsection (B) offers no definition as to what conduct would qualify as criminal in not maintaining the integrity or discharging ethically the high responsibilities of public service, at all times.
{35} Without specifying the governmental actors within its scope, Subsection (C) requires thаt “[a]t all times, reasonable efforts shall be made to avoid undue influence and abuse of office in public service.” Subsection (C) offers no definition as to what conduct would qualify as criminal in not exercising relevant reasonable efforts, at all times.
{36} Each relevant subsection communicates a general goal or proscription without specifying a wrongful deed or forbidden act. We need not entertain hypotheticals to recognize that the plain language of each subsection does not spell out what act or omission is required for its violation and dоes not establish criminal elements that could inform clear jury instructions.
{37} “We presume that the [L]egislature acted with full knowledge of relevant statutory and common law,” State v. Tufts, 2016-NMSC-020, ¶ 7, 500 P.3d 600 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), including the necessity of a criminal statute to provide a sufficiently defined actus reus. Criminal enforcement of provisions that do not meet this standard would indeed be absurd. We presume as well that the Legislature acted with full knowledge of “the rule that criminal statutes must be sufficiently clear and definite to inform a person of ordinary intelligence what conduct is punishable.” Swafford v. State, 1991-NMSC-043, ¶ 41, 112 N.M. 3, 810 P.2d 1223. While this rule аlso underlies unconstitutional vagueness analysis, our presumption of the Legislature’s knowledge of the rule should not be viewed as an analysis on vagueness but rather as bolstering our conclusion regarding the Legislature’s intent for Subsections (A)-(C). Based on the foregoing, we conclude under our plain-meaning interpretation of Subsections (A)-(C) that the Legislature did not intend for those provisions to be enforced as criminal statutes.
{38} However, as aspirational expressions of ethical principles, Subsections (A)-(C) are effective and unambiguous. Subsection (A) grounds its proscription in the ideal of “treat[ing one’s] government position as a public trust.” Subsection (B) grounds its proscription in the ideal of “conduct[ing] themselves in a manner that justifies the confidence placed in them by the people.” Subsection (C) grounds its proscription in the ideal of “[f]ull disclosure of real or potential conflicts of interest [as] a guiding principle for determining appropriate conduct.” Seen as ethical principles, these provisions provide general guidance for the purpose and application of the GCA generally, and thus these provisions are not surplusаge. See State v. Vest, 2021-NMSC-020, ¶ 18, 488 P.3d 626 (“A statute must be construed so that no part of the statute is rendered surplusage or superfluous.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
{39} Our plain-meaning interpretation of Subsections (A)-(C) is not eroded by the plain language of
2. The heading of Section 10-16-3 supports that Subsections (A)-(C) are not criminal provisions
{40} Further, our plain-meaning interpretation of Subsections (A)-(C) is bolstered by the Legislature’s express use of “Ethical principles of public service” in the language
{41} First, as Petitioner Gutierrez cites, our “canons are not mandatory rules . . . [but] guides . . . designed to help [this Court] determine the Legislature’s intent as embodied in particular statutory language.” Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84, 94 (2001); see also Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 511 (1996) (“Canons of construction . . . are simply rules of thumb which will sometimes help courts determine the meaning of legislation.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
{42} Second, a relevant canon expressed in Tri-State, cited by both the parties and the Court of Appeals, provides that “ordinarily [a section’s heading] may be considered as a part of the act if necessary to its construction.” 2012-NMSC-039, ¶ 18 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see Gutierrez, 2020-NMCA-045, ¶ 15 (quoting Tri-State, 2012-NMSC-039, ¶ 18). However, the underlying authority for that proposition offers no bar to the use of a statutory title to help determine “the nature and extent of [an] enactment.” State ex rel. State Corp. Comm’n v. Old Abe Co., 1939-NMSC-046, ¶ 27, 43 N.M. 367, 94 P.2d 105; see generally id. ¶¶ 26-28. To the contrary, the Old Abe Court stated that a “title is quite properly to be considered a part of an act, particularly where it is a constitutional requirement that every act have a title, as is truе in this state.” Id. ¶ 27 (citing
{43} Third, we look to the heading of
{44} The remainder of the heading supports no contrary conclusion. We need not determine whether “certain official acts prohibited” refers to Subsections (A)-(C), since a prohibition need not be criminal and since that phrase refers at least to the prohibition on bribery in Subsection (D). See
III. CONCLUSION
{45} For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the Legislature intended for Subsections (A)-(C) of
{46} We reverse the Court of Appeals’ determination that the Legislature intended to make violations of Subsections (A)-(C) of
{47} IT IS SO ORDERED.
C. SHANNON BACON, Chief Justice
WE CONCUR:
MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Justice
BRIANA H. ZAMORA, Justice
BRYAN P. BIEDSCHEID, Judge,
Sitting by Designation