OPINION
{1} Citing its recent opinion, State v. Phillips,
{2} Because we conclude that Phillips established a standard that is unnecessarily preoccupied with the reason a witness is absent, instead of considering whether confrontation of the witness is essential to the truth-finding process in the context of probation revocation, we overrule Phillips,
BACKGROUND
{3} In 2005, Defendant pled guilty to three offenses and was placed on supervised probation. Following a motion to revoke probation, Defendant agreed to attend a ninety-day residential treatment program. Defendant’s probation officer, Cindy Chavez, signed his order of probation.
{4} In 2006, the State filed a motion to revoke probation alleging several probation violations, the most significant, for our purposes, being Defendant’s failure to complete the ninety-day treatment program. The State initially subpoenaed Chavez as its only witness to testify at the probation revocation hearing. When the hearing was rescheduled, however, the State called Jaime Olivas, Chavez’s supervisor, to testify, instead of Chavez, who apparently had transferred to another part of the state.
{5} During the revocation hearing, Defendant moved to dismiss because Chavez was not available for cross examination, although she had filed the probation violation report upon which the motion was based. Olivas apparently had little or no personal knowledge about the ease. After a brief discussion of the merits of Defendant’s hearsay and confrontation objections, the judge reserved ruling.
{6} Olivas testified that he was a probation supervisor but that he had not directly supervised Defendant. Olivas identified a document presented to him as a “report of probation.” Olivas referred to documents from Defendant’s probation file, including a probation report and a fax from Defendant’s residential treatment center, to testify that Defendant had been discharged from the court-ordered treatment program without completing it, had not attended other required appointments, and had not paid probation costs.
{7} In the course of cross examining Olivas, Defendant challenged Olivas’s lack of personal knowledge of the alleged probation violations and the lack of explanation why Chavez was not present at the hearing. Olivas conceded that he had not signed Defendant’s probation report, had never met Defendant, and had no personal knowledge about Defendant. In addition, Olivas had never spoken with anyone from the residential treatment center, nor had he independently investigated any of the allegations against Defendant. Olivas’s knowledge was based solely on the information he had reviewed in the probation file and the report, including a fax from the treatment program and documents prepared by Chavez.
{8} At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court found that Defendant had violated his probation. Importantly, the judge observed that Defendant had been arrested in Quay County and that “we have no residential treatment center in Quay County,” the obvious inference being that Defendant could not have successfully completed his assigned program. The judge did not evaluate the reasons for Chavez’s absence or elaborate on his reasons for relying on the hearsay evidence from Olivas.
{9} When Defendant appealed his probation revocation, our Court of Appeals reversed, stating that the district court had failed to address the reasons for Chavez’s absence or “the reasons that the evidence was sufficiently accurate or reliable so as to excuse the presence of Ms. Chavez.” Guthrie,
DUE PROCESS RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION IN PROBATION PROCEEDINGS
{10} The U.S. Supreme Court has held that, under the conditions specified in Morrissey v. Brewer,
{11} Morrissey instructs that due process “is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands” and “not all situations calling for procedural safeguards call for the same kind of procedure.”
must lead to a final evaluation of any contested relevant facts and consideration of whether the facts as determined warrant revocation. The parolee must have an opportunity to be heard and to show, if he can, that he did not violate the conditions, or, if he did, that circumstances in mitigation suggest that the violation does not warrant revocation.
Id. at 488,
{12} Within that basic framework, the U.S. Supreme Court detailed six components of due process in Gagnon:
‘(a) written notice of the claimed violations of (probation or) parole; (b) disclosure to the (probationer or) parolee of evidence against him; (c) opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not allounng confrontation); (e) a ‘neutral and detached’ hearing body such as a traditional parole board, members of which need not be judicial officers or lawyers; and (f) a written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking (probation or) parole.’
{13} In Gagnon, the Supreme Court subsequently addressed “the difficulty and expense of procuring witnesses from perhaps thousands of miles away,” and emphasized that alternatives to live testimony are available during probation revocation hearings.
While in some cases there is simply no adequate alternative to live testimony, we emphasize that we did not in Morrissey intend to prohibit use where appropriate of the conventional substitutes for live testimony, including affidavits, depositions, and documentary evidence. Nor did we intend to foreclose the States ... from developing other creative solutions to the practical difficulties of the Morrissey requirements.
Id. (emphasis added). The requirements were not meant to “impose a great burden on any State’s [probation or] parole system.” Morrissey,
{14} Until now, this Court has not had occasion to apply the Morrissey requirements to probation. Even before Morrissey, however, we recognized that the right to due process in a probation revocation hearing means, at a minimum, notice and an opportunity to be heard. See Ex parte Lucero,
{15} Our Court of Appeals has previously applied several of the Morrissey due process factors. See, e.g., State v. Orquiz,
{16} In Vigil, a confidential informant gave sworn, out-of-court statements accusing probationer Vigil of having committed a new crime — possessing stolen property — while on probation.
{17} After Vigil, our Court of Appeals next applied Morrissey's good-cause exception in Phillips,
{18} In each proceeding, the district court revoked probation without requiring testimony from the probation officer having personal knowledge of the contents of the file. In Phillips, the judge appropriately emphasized that the state’s evidence about failure to complete the treatment program had not been rebutted and was essentially uncontested: “it was a verified fact that [the defendant ... had been in his program for less than the requisite six months.”
{19} Similarly in Guthrie, the district court noted that the probationer (Defendant in this case) was arrested in Quay County at the very time he was supposed to be in treatment in another locale. In addition to that verifiable fact, the State’s in-court testimony concerning the fax from the treatment center was “ ‘probative of the fact’ that Defendant had violated the terms of his probation by not successfully completing the residential treatment program.” Guthrie,
{20} Notwithstanding the explanations by the trial judges for their findings of probation violation, in each ease the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the probationers were denied due process. According to Phillips, if the state had attempted to obtain the testimony of the out-of-state witnesses but could not, or if there were another “reason on the record for the district court to accept the documents ... as true,” then that might have constituted good cause.
{21} In both cases, our Court of Appeals interpreted “good cause” to mean, in large part, a sufficient explanation for the absence of live testimony. In neither case did the Court of Appeals consider the necessity for, and utility of, confrontation with respect to the truth-finding process in the specific case before it. And in neither case did the Court of Appeals attempt to assess the utility of confrontation in light of these straightforward and routine charges — the “simple, objective, and uneontroverted fact” that probationer “either did or did not successfully complete the program,” Bailey v. State,
DISCUSSION
{22} Because we review a question purely of law, we review the Court of Appeals’ decision de novo while deferring to the trial court’s factual findings. See State v. Brown,
{23} Other state courts have embraced the U.S. Supreme Court directive to develop “creative” solutions to the practical difficulties presented under the Morrissey requirements to probation revocation. See Gagnon,
{24} Some courts only consider the reasons for a witness’s absence, while other courts only consider the “substantial trustworthiness” of the evidence presented without concerning themselves with the absence. Compare State v. Brown,
{25} Regardless of the test applied, the focus of the good-cause inquiry is “fundamental fairness,” the “touchstone of due process.” Gagnon,
{26} The first case, Bailey, is one of the strongest opinions to rely primarily on the reliability of the evidence presented to determine the necessity for confrontation without inquiring too much into the reasons for the witness’s absence.
{27} The Maryland Court of Appeals found certain factors helpful in determining sufficient reliability. Id. The court’s non-exhaustive list of factors included:
the presence of any additional evidence which corroborates the proffered hearsay; the type of and centrality of the issue that the hearsay is being offered to prove; and the source of the hearsay, including the possibility of bias or motive to fabricate [and] the facts and circumstances of a particular case....
Id. Applying these factors, the court found the letter was reasonably reliable. Its contents were corroborated by tacit admissions from the probationer to his probation officer and were uncontested at the revocation hearing. Id. at 295. The relevant portions of the letter asserted the “simple, objective, and uncontroverted fact” that the probationer had left the treatment program. Id. Moreover, the source of the information (the treatment center) was reliable because it was “duty-bound to report to the Division of Parole and Probation or the court any failure of the probationer to comply with its conditions for the completion of its program.” Id. Thus, the Maryland trial court properly admitted and relied upon the letter to revoke probation, without requiring any additional testimony or providing for additional opportunities to confront witnesses. Id. at 296.
{28} In the second case, Reyes, the Supreme Court of Indiana upheld a probation revocation based on an affidavit from the scientific director of a toxicology laboratory, stating his professional opinion that the probationer had used cocaine within seventy-two hours of a urine sample collected during the probation period.
{29} The Indiana court found that the scientific director’s education in related science, experience with various labs and their procedures, and his personal review of probationer’s urinalysis, rendered the affidavits substantially trustworthy. Id. at 442. The court saw
no reason to require that the State expend its resources to demonstrate that its interest in not producing the declarant outweighs the probationer’s interest in confronting the same every time it seeks to admit reliable hearsay evidence in a routine probation revocation hearing or, if the State fails the balancing test, expend its resources to produce a witness (or indeed to require that witness to expend his or her time) to give routine testimony in that routine probation revocation hearing, when a rehable piece of hearsay evidence is available as a substitute.
Id. at 441-42
{30} In our third case, People v. Gomez, the California Court of Appeal upheld the admission of a hearsay probation report on electronic probation records during a revocation hearing to prove that the probationer did not report as directed, make restitution payments, or submit verification of his employment and attendance at counseling sessions.
{31} Continuing, the Gomez court observed that “the demeanor of the [probation] officers would not have been a significant factor in evaluating the credibility of their foundational testimony pertaining to the contents of the probation department’s records regarding defendant’s failure to report, provide verification of his employment, attend counseling, and pay restitution.” Id. In other words, live testimony is not required when the evidence concerns “routine matters,” such as keeping appointments, making restitution, and “similar records of events of which the probation officer is not likely to have personal recollection and as to which the officer would rely instead upon the record of his or her own action.” Id. at 691 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The court did not discuss the reasons why certain witnesses were not present to testify, but instead analyzed good cause in terms of the reliability of the hearsay evidence to determine that the probationer’s confrontation rights were not compromised.
{32} A final ease, Wibbens, thoughtfully illustrates when confrontation is essential to due process, depending, again, on the reliability of the hearsay evidence.
General Principles
{33} From our review of the case law, and these four opinions in particular, we glean certain principles that guide us as we try to determine what it means to establish “good cause for not allowing confrontation.” Gagnon,
{34} In evaluating the utility of confrontation, courts look to the kind of evidence offered to prove a particular kind of assertion. Is the assertion central to the reasons for revocation, or is it collateral? See Bailey,
{35} We reiterate that under Morrissey only contested relevant facts must be evaluated during a hearing to guarantee due process. See
{36} Examining utility through another lens, many courts look either exclusively or primarily to the inherent reliability of the evidence offered. As discussed in Bailey, certain hearsay evidence is inherently reliable due to its source and the circumstances surrounding its introduction.
{37} By way of another example of the utility analysis, live testimony and confrontation are not equally useful in all situations to test the truthfulness and credibility of hearsay evidence. As recognized in Gomez, certain in-court testimony would rely upon records, even if given by the witness who originally made the records, while the source of other hearsay is essentially live testimony given elsewhere.
{38} Evidence supporting subjective conclusions, which may require confrontation, includes sensory-based or judgment-based determinations or interpretations, such as testimony evaluating a probationer’s progress during a treatment program. This evidence stands in contrast with evidence supporting the straightforward fact of treatment completion: the probationer “either did or did not successfully complete the program.” Bailey,
{39} Live testimony is often more useful and important in ascertaining the truth of subjective conclusions which involve judgment, perception, credibility, inferences, and interpretation. See Wibbens,
The Good-Cause Spectrum
{40} For illustrative purposes, we set forth the need-for-confrontation analysis as a kind of spectrum or sliding scale with extremes at either end and much balancing and weighing of competing interests in between. Combinations of the non-exhaustive factors that affect the utility of cross examination create infinite degrees of “cause,” a full spectrum. On one end of the spectrum, where good cause for not requiring confrontation is likely, we would include situations in which the state’s evidence is uncontested, corroborated by other reliable evidence, and documented by a reliable source without a motive to fabricate, or possibly situations where the evidence is about an objective conclusion, a routine recording, or a negative fact, making the demeanor and credibility of the witness less relevant to the truth-finding process. On this side of the good-cause spectrum, live testimony and cross examination offer almost no utility to the fact-finding process.
{41} On the “no good cause” end of the spectrum, evidence is contested by the defendant, unsupported or contradicted, and its source has a motive to fabricate; it is about a subjective, judgment-based observation that is subject to inference and interpretation, and makes a conclusion that is central to the necessary proof that the defendant violated probation. In such a case, the state’s failure to produce the witness, for almost any reason, deprives a defendant of due process. Between the two extremes there is no bright-line rule for determining good cause — but then, that is the nature of due process; it “is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.” Morrissey,
Applying the Test for Good Cause to Guthrie
{42} Ironically, the Court of Appeals in Guthrie appeared to be headed in the very direction we set forth today, with one exception. The Court stated, “[t]he weaker the probative value, the greater the need for confrontation, and, hence, the greater the need to justify the absence of the witness.” Guthrie,
{43} The trial court should focus its analysis on the relative need for confrontation to protect the truth-finding process and the substantial reliability of the evidence, as we have outlined in this Opinion. If that need is significant, and the court specifies the reasons why, then the witness must appear and be subject to confrontation, regardless of the reasons for his or her absence. Conversely, if the need for confrontation is not significant, as discussed earlier, and the court specifies why, then it does not matter whether the witness is available. Simply put, the reasons for the witness’s absence are, for the most part, irrelevant to the balancing process we set forth. A court’s focus should instead be on the need for, and utility of, confrontation with respect to the truth-finding process and in light of the particular case at hand, including the specific charge pressed against the probationer.
{44} Our Court of Appeals may have felt bound by Phillips in continuing to focus on the reason for the witness’s absence. Therefore, we overrule Phillips. With some revisions as indicated, we endorse the Court of Appeals’ balancing analysis; namely, the stronger the probative value and reliability of the evidence, the less the need for confrontation.
{45} Applying our spectrum or sliding scale analysis, Guthrie falls decisively on the “good cause” end and does not require confrontation. Several reasons support our conclusion. First, Defendant did not contest the allegation that he failed to complete his treatment at the rehabilitation center, thus precluding a due process complaint under Morrissey’s requirement for a hearing on contested facts.
{46} Second, the key evidentiary fact of Defendant’s non-compliance with residential treatment—an objective, negative, and rather routine fact—was easily and reliably established to a reasonable degree of certainty by a written statement from the treatment center. Here the testifying probation officer had a fax from the treatment center saying as much. While it would have been preferable to introduce the fax itself into evidence, and better yet with an affidavit, in this case the fax was in the probation file and the probation officer testified to its contents relating to routine matters, like those in Gomez,
{47} Third, based on this record, little to nothing could be gained by testimony from a treatment center representative or from Chavez, the absent probation officer. Live testimony would have been of little use to gauge Chavez’s demeanor, truthfulness, and credibility. Chavez was known to Defendant, so identity was not at issue. There was no known need to impress upon a probation officer the seriousness of revocation. Neither Chavez nor any representative from the treatment center had any known motive to fabricate or deceive. See Morrissey,
{48} Finally, in this particular case, the district judge made his own observations— essentially taking judicial notice — that it would have been factually impossible for Defendant to have completed treatment as required, given the time and place of his arrest. In so doing, the judge not only corroborated the State’s hearsay evidence, but also provided an independent source supporting the State’s hearsay allegation that Defendant had violated his probation. In effect, the judge made the functional equivalent of “specific finding of good cause” for not requiring confrontation. While the content of the State’s hearsay evidence was central and important to the State’s case against Defendant, when no doubt is cast upon otherwise reliable evidence, the centrality of that evidence does not make confrontation any more essential. Defendant only attacked Olivas’s testimony on hearsay grounds; he did not dispute the accuracy of the evidence or bring to light any mitigating circumstances.
{49} Although the judge made no explicit findings of good cause, and we do exhort district judges in the future to explain their rulings in more detail, the test for validity of the finding need not be so formulaic. The record supports, and incontrovertibly so, the judge’s finding that Defendant violated the terms of his probation. Accordingly, the district court should have been affirmed.
CONCLUSION
{50} We reverse the Court of Appeals and remand to the district court for remaining proceedings, if any, in furtherance of probation revocation.
{51} IT IS SO ORDERED.
Notes
. Vigil cited two out-of-state cases for guidance in future probation revocation cases where "non-confronted information might properly be used.”