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State v. Gustafson
515 P.2d 1256
Haw.
1973
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*1 T. HAWAII, iff-Appellee, Plaint ROBERT STATE OF GUSTAFSON, Defendant-Appellant

NO. 5397 7, 1973 NOVEMBER C.J., RICHARDSON, MARUMOTO, ABE, KOBAYASHI, AND LEVINSON JJ.

Per Defendant-appellant utility pole Curiam. struck while driving automobile on Kinau Street Honolulu. The officer, investigating police believing appellant to be under alcohol, placed influence of him under arrest requested that he take a “breath or blood” test under the implied statute, consent ch. Upon HRS 286. refusal test, submit to a the officer executed and filed an affidavit magistrate of the district court of Honolulu A required by was held 286-155.1 before pursuant district to HRS At judge 286-156. found the statements contained in

to be and revoked appellant’s operate true motor period vehicle of six months the authority of HRS § 286-155. 188, 39, 1Magistrate Judge now entitled under Act District January Hawaii 1972.

Session Laws of effective appellant appealed circuit court of first circuit. After a the circuit court ruling affirmed the district court appellant appealed to this court.

ISSUES following by appeal The contentions raised on by appellant merit this court: consideration (1) was denied he provided copy arresting because was not with a hearing; officer’s affidavit to the (2) that appellant was a arrested without warrant unlawfully and that said arrest was not made accordance probable the constitutional standard of cause.

APPLICABLE STATUTES privilege HRS 286-155 Revocation drive motor testing. person vehicle to submit to a upon If refusal blood, arrest to submit a refuses test of his breath or shall given, arresting shall, none but the officer as soon practicable, as submit an magistrate affidavit to a made, stating: arrest was

(1) arrest, That the time of the had he grounds person reasonable to believe the arrested had driving either in actual physical been control of public a highways motor vehicle while under liquor; of intoxicating influence (2) That the person arrested had been informed of section; the sanctions of this (3) a person That the had refused to submit to test of his or blood. breath receipt Upon affidavit, magistrate shall hold provided and shall determine whether statements contained magistrate affidavit are true and correct. If the finds true, in the affidavit shall statements contained are license, permit, any person’s revoke the arrested period six operating privilege nonresident of months. If the is a person arrested resident without license or permit operate State, in the motor vehicle magistrate shall send notice of the results of the examiners all chauffeurs counties. The deny examiners shall person chauffeurs permit of a period issuance for a of six months. penalties The provided this section are additional penalties penalties not substitutes other provided law. magistrate. A 286-156Hearing before of an determine the truth correctness

submitted to within matistrate shall be held ten days after the has magistrate received the affidavit. magistrate shall hear and determine: had Whether officer reasonable

grounds to believe that had person been either *3 driving or in physical actual control motor vehicle public highways while under the influence of intoxicating liquor.

(2) person lawfully arrested; Whether (3) the arresting Whether officer had informed the person of 286-155; the sanctions of section and person Whether the to submit refused to a test of his breath or blood.

PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS Appellant’s appeal first this is that contention raised he process prosecutor was denied due when provide appellant copy failed with of the officer’s affidavit within reasonable time hearing prepare so that appellant adequately could Appellant’s defense. brief states that was allowed glimpse of the affidavit and did not sufficient time to it thoroughly. read requirements

The process, as to notice and hearing, are so well established additional merely opinion repetitious. dissertation would See Co., v. Mullane Central Hanover Bank & Trust 339 U.S. 306 68 (1956), Hutchinson, (1950), City Walker v. 352 U.S. 475, 497 P.2d v. Castle Memorial Haw. Hospital,

Silver (1972), v. Kim Poo Kum 33 Haw. 545 Sugiyama, 59-60, However, Dickison, 46 Haw. Stafford cited, 665, 670(1962), Wabash approval,Linkv. we P.2d Co., (1962), Railroad to-wit: mean process “does not requirement of due [T]he preliminary and a every order without notice entered adversary hearing process. adequacy offends due may proceeding that affect respecting and notice extent, turns, a considerable on the party’s rights party knowledge show such which the circumstances may consequences of his own be taken to have of the conduct.” § definitively provides what must be stated gives appellant

in the affidavit thus notice forewarns as affidavit. HRS 286-156 then to the contents to determine and correctness provides for the truth specifically the affidavit and delineates the statements and determine. that the district shall hear the issues of the though copy served with a appellant And provisions days prior hearing, since the to the date of what the it clear to the of HRS 286-155 make is further necessarily state and the affidavit must scope protected against surprise that the relevant under HRS we are necessary clear, provide unambiguous statutes are safeguards. procedural due LAWFUL ARREST *4 that his arrest was unlawful Appellant’s final contention is probable arresting in that was for the officer to there no cause made arrest a warrant. He further contends the without that, after a lawful applicable since HRS 286-155 is arrest, to submit required he should not have been “breath or blood” test. facts. following When

The record indicates that site, at arrest he observed arresting officer arrived appellant’s very car was that was damaged; appellant unsteady lip. his feet on and that he had small cut on his The officer then asked been appellant whether he had appellant in an to which involved automobile accident affirmatively. appellant was then advised of answered The lawyer responded his that rights he engaged that he knew them. While this conversation smelled on the officer alcohol breath. The arresting appellant any officer then asked if taken he had intoxicating liquor appellant responded and the that he was required not question. appellant answer this then arresting described to the officer the circumstances by stating way accident on he was rate of home approximately per Appellant fifteen miles hour. stated that and that tired he had an telephone struck unidentified pole. point At placed officer arrest. Texeira, 138, 142, 593,

In State v. 50 Haw. 433 P.2d (1967), States, this court cited Carroll v. United 267 U.S. 132 (1925), in which Supreme case the United States Court stated: have probable

Officers cause to make arrest when the facts and within knowledge circumstances their they reasonably trustworthy which had information were sufficient themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in being the belief crime was [a committed]. 226, 231, Chong, v. State 52 Haw. 473 P.2d

(1970), Scott, People we App. cited 259 Cal. 2d 66 Cal. (1968), Rptr. 257 with approval: is generally cause based

[P]robable [to arrest] factors, combination of together form a sort of mosaic, piece by one might itself often enough cause, which, probable to constitute but when whole, probable viewed as does constitute cause. Based on the facts and put circumstances forth record, we are of had officer probable cause to arrest charges involved

herein and that subsequent request that he submit to the “breath or blood” test was lawful.2

The other issues appellant raised are without merit. judgment of the circuit court is affirmed. Robert T. Gustafson, defendant-appellant, pro se. Sepaniak, Adrienne Deputy Prosecuting Attorney (Barry Chung, brief) Prosecuting Attorney, with her on the plaintiff-appellee.

LEVINSON, J., IN PART CONCURRING

AND DISSENTING IN PART agreement I am in portion majority opinion with that that a prerequisite applicability holds to the 286-155, § statute, or revocation HRS presence premised arrest on facts which meet standard, probable rigorous cause not the less constitutionally questionable standard of “reasonable suspicion” set out the Hawaii authorizing statute further, warrantless in general, arrests agree, 708-5. I that on the ample record of this case there exists evidence from which the district could have concluded that appellant’s warrantless arrest was pursuant executed probable concept cause as that defined Carroll v. States, United

However, I majority dissent from the conclusion of the provide the failure of the district court copy officer’s affidavit on relying 2The appellant officer, further contends that the on HRS reads: justice, §708-5, Policemen, without warrant. or By policeman other officers town, seaport even cases where it is not that an certain offense has committed, been may, without warrant, arrest and detain for examination such justify as be found persons may under such circumstances reasonable suspicion they have committed intend to an offense, commit arrested on reasonable and thus the arrest was unlawful. suspicion also maintains that said Appellant HRS 708-5 is unconstitutional because allows arrest without warrant it is based “reasonable Since suspicion”. necessary case, construe HRS 708-5 for the resolution of the instant we dispose appellant’s stating contention that arrest without warrant on must be premised probable canse. suspended been whether license should have *6 It not constitute a denial of his rights. revoked did my statutory is opinion that the district court was under copy by to of of mandate afford virtue affidavit Act, section 91-9 of the Hawaii Administrative Procedure special HRS ch. 91. of light nature of case, my hearing at issue in this it is that view the district court provided should copy with a as part of responsibility its to conform procedures process its to due of law. I structure this separately along two major analysis. these lines of

I. THE OF THE APPLICABILITY HAWAII

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 519, 520, In State v. Gustafson, 54 Haw. 511 P.2d 162 now, (1973), the same case which is before us this court held “proceedings to revoke a driver’s license for drunken test’ refuses to take ‘breath blood driving where driver implied under is consent statute treated as a added). (Emphasis an administrative That before officer.” necessary holding jurisdiction to support appellate our 286-157, § provides appeals under HRS for pursuant suspension orders entered to or revocation 286-155, § provided in HRS “in the manner §] [HRS 286-129, turn, appeals 286-129.” HRS allows by applicants by circuit court are licenses who denied chauffeurs, of examiner that the declares decision of the except circuit court on review “shall be final as otherwise ” provided in Finally, 91. of 91-15 ch. section HRS [HRS ch.] Act) (the 91 Hawaii provides Administrative Procedure part aggrieved party may secure review of “[a]n final by judgment chapter circuit court under appeal supreme tracing court.” In the our appellate jurisdiction through directly expressly providing review revocation 286-157, orders, HRS legislative we concluded that §§ in enacting intent HRS 286-155 to “treat” hearings pursuant held as administrative those sections officers, course, judges judicial nature. Of district are and as may constitutionally statutorily such sit as authority administrative officers created and under the However, legislative or executive it is branches.1 within province legislature provide for the formulation proceedings rules judicial before a sitting officer are to regulated. such Sibbach v. See Co., Wilson & The first proposition case stands for the Gustafson court under HRS procedures

reviewahle established for the review proceedings. my administrative opinion, reasoning that case also extends applicable at the itself, district court and therefore 1 would hold that which sets out the rules conducting *7 administrative adjudications, likewise establishes the §8 norms by hearings which under HRS 286-155 156 are to be held. First,

I am drawn to this conclusion several reasons. contours the of the in outlined HRS 286-156 are substantive, wholly is and that silent as to section the procedures employed by judge.2 to be district it is Since doubtful the Hawaii District Rules of Court Civil apply suspension Procedure to license or hearings revocation 286-156,3 under procedures section out in set HRS 91-9 appear be a from natural source legislature could (“The judiciary § Const. art. V; and the several 1Hawaii HRS 601-5 department judicial of lmth judges thereof shall he the executive and other officers independent Co., legislative Transfer departments”); cf. Ins. v. Tidewater National Mut. Co. and (1949) (Vinson, dissenting, expressing C.J., but 582, 626, opinion at 640 concurred) ("[A] long majority of . . line eases . on this in which a Court issue or or duties combination personnel, powers, the intermixture prohibits] system). legislative courts” federal in the majority § in at 2-3. is pp. 2The text HRS 286-156 quoted 11A WAII nature”, a to "suits of civil 3The District Court Rules are applicable only DtS. Ct. R. Civ. P. 1. While a license or revocation is not a he a civil action. Under Hawaii Dis. Ct. R. action, neither does it criminal appear 3(a), filing Civ. P. court,” is a civil action commenced "[a] by complaint proceedings "[u|pon § initialed whereas under HRS 286-155 are receipt § [arresting officer’s) affidavit” court. HRS 286-155 uses referring judge the district under the term in the sanctions "penalties” imposed by or section, that, best, an indication at license suspension proceedings. § revocation is a of civil and criminal .Sec also HRS 286-159. hybrid its court draw intended the district highly guidelines, especially in view of the “administrative” performs nature of task which the district under Second, §§ of a proof HRS 286-155 to 156.4 defendant’s to submit to test is admissible refusal “breath blood” “only appeal under section 286-156 thereof any action or proceeding, .. . not. .. other whether civil § (emphasis added), indicating or criminal” HRS 286-159 legislative intention to draw distinction between section “hearing” proceeding[s].” 286-156 and all other “action[s] finally, Third, by providing appeals 286-155 section clearly “in the manner” from the appeals orders chauffeurs, administrative determination of the examiner of 286-157, § legislature intentionally parity HRS created a processes between decision-making logic the two beyond solely extends the correlation for their Gustafson, review. See State v. supra 511 P.2d at 162. ’ 91-1(1) § is Although “agency’ the term defined HRS branch,” “judicial this does exclude members of the alone hearing requirements view that dissuade me adjudications under sections of HRS extend 286-155 91-9 chapter appeals provision of to 156. The by virtue of HRS applicable adjudications made to such §286-129 notwithstanding & the fact that its terms 286-157 [by operates to “secure review judgment supreme final of the circuit court court] added) (i.e., final (emphasis chapter” “agency” respect of a court with to an judgment circuit *8 Suspension Antony, 4In A. and Revocation of Drivers’ Licenses: A Study Comparative (1961), reported of Laws it is 51 State 54 that out of United jurisdictions Columbia), (including require States District of 22 authorize the the courts, suspension while in licenses in first instance 29 or revocation of the jurisdiction. jurisdictions agencies in exclusive initial administrative suspension primary responsibility or revocation for license five states does the judicial system. support to the conclusion that rest with Id. at 8. This data lends the qualifications, the overall for the determination of automobile driver reasons, including suspension is of licenses for various the revocation Moyers, fundamentally functionally in v. 86 administrative nature. See State 101, 189 (suspension licenses is P.2d or revocation of drivers’ Okla. Crim. 952 action); accord, action, judicial in nature of the executive or administrative (1939). Davis, Cronin, generally Commonwealth v. 336 Pa. A.2d 408 See K. (1958). Administrative Law Treatise 1.05 Furthermore, previously, the hearing). as I indicated legislature specific procedures applicable is free to make judicial determinations, though even apply those long agency adjudications, also to so the administrative as independence is of the courts left intact in all respects. other § 91-9, of

Turning requirements provision is the of section prerequisite The term “reasonable parties. notice” to the “reasonable (b) include, among in defined section other notice” is plain language in oftheissues explicit statement things, “[a^n. alleged agency in support the and the involved facts thereof; if unable to state such agency is provided, the in served, detail at time notice is the and facts the the issues to a statement of the issues may be limited initial notice involved, upon application particulars bill of and thereafter ” added). provides This (Emphasis section shall furnished. adjudicated in an legal rights are whose individuals as proceeding complete forewarning as administrative they alleged facts must meet possible of issues so, agency is unable do notice them. Unless the against particulars i.e., it must a bill of constitute must function — heart of facts and circumstances reveal provide for basic clearly Its is proceeding. objective fairness, concept expounded by this as that 475, 497 Hospital, Silver Castle Memorial 53 Haw. court denied, reh. cert. (1972), (1972), U.S. P.2d denied, 409 U.S. 1131 revocation context of license

hearings §§ requirements 286-155 to under HRS importance. inquiry particular 91-9 are exclusively hearings judge such channeled “truth and determination correctness towards [the in this case affidavit.” The district officer’s] veracity solely involving the issue of treated affidavit, so to admit evidence doing refused .cause for supporting probable the existence of In view of the beyond went the affidavit. arrest which point hearing, importance this document as the focal *9 I agree cannot unspoken with the conclusion of majority that HRS in providing for pre-hearing divulgence ” alleged “facts a against party, require does not a copy that itof should have been served on the appellant sufficiently anterior time to the him properly enable prepare Compare defense. Davis, K. Administrative 8.05 Law Treatise the facts of this case do bear out reasoning majority provisions that “the of HRS it clear to what 286-155 make the affidavit must state,” necessarily and therefore he need not have been hearing. against served with The affidavit reads follows: I,Gary S.Au, T. officer, being duly sworn on first police oath, depose say: do arrested Robert T. at 1. I That Gustafson P.M. 1972 on KINAU STREET

o’clock on June approx. mile AVE. 1110th Ewa WARD 2. grounds I had reasonable Robert believe T. driving had either been or was actual Gustafson physical control public of motor vehicle on a Datsun, sedan, wit: dr. highway; green in color, license No. 8CJ3112. being operated by Vehicle the above named T. person, Gustafson, Robert while intoxicating beverage. influence Gustafson, while headed in the kokohead direction on Street, right Kinau veered side the road off and struck a object, telephone No. 6. pole fixed T. 3. At I Gustafson, the time I arrestedi?o6erí had grounds reasonable to believe he was under him, alcohol; confronting to wit: upon influence of intoxicating liquor there was smell his breath, slurred, his speech very and he was unsteady on feet. T. informed Robert 4. I had a Gustafson choice of chemical tests take to determine amount of alcohol in his contained blood. He could test, either take a if blood breath he refused to test, any operator’s take blood or breath *10 license, permit

chauffeur’s instruction driving privilege possessed non-resident which he may by be a magistrate revoked six months after a hearing. I T. his 5. After Robert informed Gustafson a possible

choice to take blood or test and of breath take of his driving privileges, revocation he refused any chemical tests. mimeographed

Although prepared on a was form, spaces, that into which form leaves numerous blank individually by typed portions quoted above were italicized an of these is evident from examination Au. As officer affidavit, significant/acis are revealed portions impossible and which appellant’s case are unique are facts These language of section 286-155. glean the bare necessary with the leads provided appellant well have could his chief defense greater establish with forcefulness that he drawing the conclusion Au was unwarranted officer only a few saw the affidavit appellant intoxicated.5 Since was It trial, to him. opportunity was lost minutes before by suspended his license that the follows if proper procedures well might have had different outcome detailed been followed. 91-9 had Accordingly, suspending I would the order reverse license, non-compliance on ground contained court with as a matter of course to failing statute aforementioned affidavit, officer’s arresting with the provide appellant hearing. would the case a new remand PROCESS II. PROCEDURAL DUE with the basic quarrel apparently does majority . . . issued licenses are “[ojnce proposition that [drivers’] 5Indeed, significant might regard, name in this officer Au’s alone was since appellant opportunity have afforded Au and thus to interview inquire deeply perception more into the latter’s incident at It issue. cannot already officer, assumed that according aware of the name of since incapable the accident left him dazed and hence of rational responses. in the may become essential possession their continued thus pursuit of issued licenses Suspension livelihood. adjudicates important interests involves state action to be taken licenses are not the licensees. In such cases the required away procedural process due without ” Burson, Fourteenth Bell v. U.S. Amendment.

(1971); Mahoney, (1971) (per Jennings v. 404 U.S. 25 see curiam). great overlap deal between the is a There by the and Federal required State Hawaii and the norms of the Constitutions Act, Trustees Administrative Procedure Mortensen v. System, Haw. 473 P.2d 866 Retirement Employees’ of basic (1970), and therefore the considerations fairness the rubric of HRS already in this noted *11 with similar force here. apply Hospital, my opinion

It is V. Castle Memorial Silver disposition the of Haw. 497 P.2d 564 controls procedural of due respect requirements this to the case with Silver, hospital a private In this held that process. court could receiving and federal financial assistance some state to deny physician practice a licensed surgical privileges not to a conducting hearing first at Hawaii without medicine were which the rudiments court noted that the circumstances the followed. The procedural rights physician rigid, were not but applying of the balancing a fair and physician’s right resulted the to facts and the impartial hospital’s determination of the need expeditious for an matters determination necessarily quality provided. affected the of the health care product of this balancing hearing

The should have been at which minimum rights physician would include following: hearing

The doctor should be on that a available notice is sufficiently him. given timely to He should be notification prior him adequately prepare to the for to notice, conjunction In whose defense. with such a doctor denied being being is privileges are revoked or who provided should statement reappointment be a written be against should charges him. Such statement specific to him sufficiently adequate apprise being A initial charges against him. who is denied doctor be provided appointment hospital to staff should application his specifying written statement the reasons being denied. 485, 497 added). at (emphasis reviewing Id. at In P.2d surgical hospital denying fact followed Silver, to court found privileges them following for constitutionally deficient reasons: case, prior appellant’s this to the termination [I]n privileges, appellant provided specific never charges performance his why written as to merely acceptable. He was indictment of deemed read hearing. In general at the order allegations must have been to a right effective against specific particulars claims apprised had no hearing. case him investigate performance basis his opportunity being questioned. right present such defense As nugatory. was rendered added). (emphasis P.2d at

Id. clear. of this case is applicability Silver facts The pursuant dealt 286-155 to 156 held accuracy officer’s exclusively with the previously opinion, in this affidavit. As noted unique facts and circumstances were contained sufficiently which, if him revealed to appellant’s case *12 him hearing, time well have enabled to might countervailing there is defense. no strengthen his against pre-hearing which cuts service government interest — is a the affidavit affidavit as matter course just easily easily copied and which is document one-page process on those whose initial service includable with the §§ subject scrutiny to to drive is Dickison, 52, 374 P.2d 665 cited v. 46 Haw. Stafford process due is a procedural for the by majority notion proposition that the concept, flexible also stands true meaningful is whether process litmus test of due pre-hearing was afforded.6 opportunity to defend been would affidavit provision officer’s case, and the extremely practical as a facile matter to 156 HRS 286-155 proceedings under nature of the provision made crucial such contents of the to defend. I opportunity a meaningful allowing rights of the process due would hold against defend forced to he was appellant were violated when having previous had a without his license — very document study the affidavit opportunity my opinion, him against turned. proceedings general inexorably follows this conclusion Due Process required proposition that “[t]he Manzo, Armstrong v. ‘meaningful,’ must be Clause the nature of the case.’ 545, (1965), ‘appropriate Co., Trust U.S. Bank & Central Hanover [339 Mullane v. Burson, at 541-42. supra (1950)].” Bell plaintiff’s notify application held of an that a failure the defendant 6Stafford general judgment for a default in a suit in defendant had entered a which the However, appearance process. went on was not of due the court in itself denial entry notify hold trial actual that the court’s failure to the defendant of the period right challenge default within limited did and of time constitute magnitude judgment Haw. at void. 46 defect of a sufficient to render is the 374 P.2d at 670. thus makes clear that the essence Stafford “opportunity to Id. defend.”

Case Details

Case Name: State v. Gustafson
Court Name: Hawaii Supreme Court
Date Published: Nov 7, 1973
Citation: 515 P.2d 1256
Docket Number: NO. 5397
Court Abbreviation: Haw.
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